How are the United States and China preparing for potential warfare in space, and what do recent developments—including secretive unmanned spaceplanes, hunter and pursuit satellites capable of inspecting, capturing, refueling, or maneuvering around other spacecraft, orbital “dogf

The United States and China are preparing less for cinematic battles in orbit than for a contest over who can see, communicate, navigate, target, protect, disrupt, and—if ordered—disable space systems that terrestrial militaries and economies depend on. The most consequential shift is toward reversible, hard-to-attribute actions—jamming, dazzling, cyber intrusion, close approaches, inspection, and interference—alongside the still-present threat of destructive anti-satellite weapons. 34

What each side is building

• China is combining a rapidly expanding satellite force with counterspace tools. U.S. intelligence assesses that PLA counterspace operations would be integral to a military campaign and that China has fielded electronic-warfare systems, directed-energy weapons, and anti-satellite missiles aimed at U.S. and allied spacecraft. 3

• China has also demonstrated sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations: spacecraft have captured and relocated a defunct satellite, and U.S. officials judged a more recent mission as a likely on-orbit refueling attempt. Five Chinese satellites also conducted synchronized close maneuvers in low Earth orbit. 12

• Those capabilities are inherently dual use. Robotic arms, docking, refueling, debris removal, and satellite inspection can extend a spacecraft’s life and make space safer; the same systems could grapple, tow, blind, obstruct, or place another satellite in an unusable orbit. Whether a particular satellite is an “inspector” or a weapon can be impossible to establish from public tracking data alone. 14

• China’s secretive reusable unmanned spaceplane has added to that ambiguity. In a recent mission, it deployed a small object that maneuvered around another Chinese spacecraft and then returned toward the plane—an operation consistent with experimentation in autonomous proximity operations, though not proof of an operational weapon. 5

• The United States is pursuing space-domain awareness, maneuverable satellites, resilience, and coalition operations rather than relying solely on a few exquisite, vulnerable spacecraft. Public assessments document U.S. proximity-operation systems, while the U.S. response also emphasizes tracking threats, defending satellite services, dispersing functions across constellations, and coordinating with allies and commercial operators. 12

Weapons and likely methods of conflict

• The arsenal is layered: direct-ascent ASAT missiles; co-orbital satellites that approach a target; ground-based lasers; radio-frequency jammers; GPS spoofing; cyber attacks on satellites and ground stations; and potentially space-based systems. U.S. military testimony specifically identifies China’s DA-ASAT missiles, lasers, jammers, maneuverable co-orbital ASATs, and dual-use satellites such as Shijian-21 as concerns. 4

• A destructive missile strike would be dramatic but risky because it can generate enduring debris, including threats to the attacker’s own spacecraft. China’s 2007 ASAT test produced more than 2,700 trackable debris pieces, illustrating why non-destructive and deniable options are attractive. 11

• “Orbital dogfighting” is therefore a misleading but useful shorthand. Satellites do not maneuver like fighter aircraft; orbital changes are fuel-intensive and unfold over hours or days. The real contest is likely to be slow, highly technical, and often ambiguous: shadowing, inspection, positioning for interference, protecting high-value assets, and signaling the ability to act.

Allies and commercial systems

• The United States is turning alliance cooperation into an operational advantage. In September 2025, U.S. and British forces conducted their first joint military orbital operation, maneuvering a U.S. satellite near a British one while the suspected Chinese Shiyan-12-01 satellite passed roughly 83 km below. The event demonstrated interoperable command, coordination, and a willingness to conduct visible maneuvers near a Chinese spacecraft. 515

• This is expanding beyond the UK: the United States and France have also pursued synchronized military satellite operations. Such cooperation improves surveillance, shares risk, and complicates an adversary’s targeting calculus because an attack on a space service may affect several governments. 7

• Commercial constellations increasingly matter because they can provide communications, Earth observation, positioning augmentation, and rapid replacement capacity. Their large numbers make a single catastrophic strike less effective, but their civilian status, private ownership, supply chains, ground stations, and shared radio spectrum create legal, political, and escalation problems. A commercial satellite that directly supports military operations can become a target in an adversary’s eyes.

What the competing narratives mean

• Beijing can plausibly describe refueling, inspection, robotic servicing, reusable spaceplanes, and debris removal as peaceful or commercial technologies. That description is technically credible because the technologies genuinely have civil uses. 1

• Washington’s counterargument is also credible: the PLA has fielded multiple counterspace capabilities, and a servicing satellite’s demonstrated ability to approach, dock with, or move another spacecraft creates a latent coercive or offensive option. 34

• The core problem is intent and transparency, not merely hardware. Existing public evidence shows expanding capabilities, but it does not prove that every close approach or servicing test is an imminent weapon deployment. Conversely, the absence of declared weapons does not eliminate military utility.

What this reveals about the future

• Space is becoming a central enabling theater for a conflict on Earth—especially a regional conflict involving long-range precision strike, missile warning, naval operations, intelligence, and command-and-control—not necessarily a separate war fought primarily in orbit. 3

• The near-term danger is likely a gray-zone campaign: interference with GPS or communications, cyber attacks, temporary dazzling, suspicious proximity operations, or attacks on ground infrastructure. These actions may be reversible yet could still cause military miscalculation or civilian disruption.

• The strategic paradox is that resilience measures—proliferated constellations, maneuverable satellites, on-orbit servicing, allied operations, and faster replacement launches—can reduce vulnerability, but they also normalize the same technologies that make coercion and counterspace warfare more feasible.

• The future will depend on whether the United States, China, and other space powers establish clearer rules for notification, safe separation, responsible proximity operations, and debris-producing ASAT tests. Without such norms, ambiguous maneuvers around valuable satellites may increasingly be interpreted as preparation for attack—and become a trigger for escalation.