What did South Korea’s Climate, Energy and Environment Minister Kim Sung hwan say about the country’s expected surge in electricity demand from Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix expanding chip production, the construction of AI data centres, the transition to electric vehicles and

Kim said electricity demand will rise sharply as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix add chip capacity, AI data centres proliferate, and transport and heating are electrified. The government’s next long-term electricity plan, through 2040, therefore has to reconsider the generation mix—including additional nuclear capacity—rather than assuming existing plans are sufficient. 24

Scale of the demand shock

• The revised forecast puts 2040 peak demand at up to 165 GW, 26.8 GW above the estimate made only months earlier. 6
• Advanced industry and AI data centres together are projected to account for 36.2–36.5 GW of 2040 peak demand. 7
• If the roughly 26.8 GW upward revision were met solely with 1.4-GW APR1400-scale reactors, it would require about 19 reactors. 6
• The southwest semiconductor project is unusually large: four planned fabs alone could consume electricity equivalent to 70–80% of current annual use in Gwangju, North Jeolla and South Jeolla. 4

Implications for the 2040 roadmap and nuclear debate

• Kim’s position was not that reactors are automatically approved; it was that the plan must assess whether new nuclear generation is necessary to maintain reliable, low-carbon supply as industrial and AI demand expands. 4
• Nuclear is viewed as difficult to replace because it provides large-scale, dependable, low-carbon electricity, whereas solar and wind output varies with weather and demand from fabs and data centres is continuous. Existing nuclear generation was already South Korea’s largest power source, producing 188.8 TWh, or 31.7% of output. 1
• Safety, radioactive-waste management, plant siting, and local acceptance remain major objections. The available evidence does not provide a reliable current national polling figure or a quantified breakdown of pro- and anti-nuclear opinion; therefore, insufficient evidence exists here to state exact levels of public support or opposition.

Current mix and stated renewable target

• South Korea operates 26 nuclear reactors, although the supplied evidence does not include the total installed nuclear GW figure. 5
• In generation terms, nuclear supplied 188.8 TWh in 2024; coal and LNG each supplied 167.2 TWh, or 28.1% apiece; renewables supplied 63.2 TWh, or 10.6%. 1
• Renewable installed capacity is about 37 GW, and the government has said it aims to raise that roughly sixfold by 2040. 8
• The supplied evidence does not establish precise installed coal and gas capacities or definitive 2040 nuclear, coal, and gas capacity targets. It does establish the policy direction: much more renewables, possible added nuclear, and a continued role for gas for system reliability. 148

Regional supply and coal backup

• A new reactor may not be needed specifically for the southwest chip cluster if transmission can bring in power from the national grid and if the region develops sufficient local renewable supply; the evidence indicates the issue is not merely total national capacity but where dependable power can be delivered. 4
• The likely local alternatives are additional solar in the southwest—where land and solar resources are relatively more available—and LNG generation in regions needing dispatchable capacity when renewable output is weak. This is an inference consistent with the stated renewable expansion and the scale of southwest industrial demand, rather than a final government siting decision. 48
• Even if coal is formally phased out by 2040, some plants could be retained in emergency reserve because high-demand periods, transmission failures, renewable intermittency, or LNG-supply disruptions can create reliability risks. That would be a contingency role, not normal coal generation; the supplied evidence does not confirm an adopted policy to retain specific coal units.