Ukrainian Strikes Are Pressuring Russia’s Oil Output, Exports and Diesel Market

Russia’s oil system is under pressure in two connected stages. Ukrainian drone strikes initially reduce refinery runs and fuel exports. If outages persist alongside damage or disruption at storage and export infrastructure, they can also constrain the ability to move crude—raising the prospect of production shut-ins rather than a purely temporary refining disruption.

The 2026 forecast was cut below 511 million tonnes

It is important to distinguish between two government forecasts that are sometimes conflated. In May, Russia’s Economy Ministry base-case outlook put 2026 oil and condensate production at 511 million tonnes. By September, a newer government draft seen by Reuters had reduced the 2026 projection to 494.2 million tonnes, a 17-year low, and cut estimates for 2026–29 by 16 million to 20 million tonnes versus the May outlook.

The revised outlook also lowered fuel-export expectations for 2026 and 2027. Reuters reported that the draft cited the effects of the war with Ukraine, including intensifying strikes on refineries and export bottlenecks.

Independent forecasts point in the same direction, though they use different definitions and methods. Rystad Energy forecasts Russian crude production averaging 8.95 million barrels per day in 2026 and around 8.6 million bpd in 2027, a 90,000-bpd reduction from its previous 2026 forecast. It attributes the revision to disruptions at western export terminals and the rising cost and unreliability of seaborne exports. The IEA also cut its Russian supply outlook, saying continued strikes on refineries, storage and transport infrastructure underpin a weaker production outlook.

Why refinery outages can eventually cut crude output

A refinery outage does not automatically mean an oil field must stop producing. At first, the direct impact is lower processing of crude into diesel, gasoline and other products.

The constraint becomes more severe when crude cannot be redirected fast enough. Producers need somewhere to send barrels: another refinery, storage, a pipeline, or an export terminal. When refinery runs fall while storage, logistics, domestic fuel obligations, and export capacity are all strained, crude can accumulate. At that point, producers may have to reduce flows from the wellhead.

That is the practical bridge between Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak’s description of lower output as the result of “unscheduled maintenance” at refineries and the more pessimistic medium-term forecasts. Novak acknowledged in June that oil production had fallen from the start of the year because several refineries were undergoing unplanned maintenance. His explanation can be true for individual outages. The larger question is whether repairs and protective measures can outpace recurring attacks and whether export infrastructure remains capable of absorbing displaced crude.

The scale of disruption is material. Reuters calculated that strikes knocked out roughly 700,000 bpd of refining capacity across 16 Russian refineries between January and May, with some facilities struck more than once.

Diesel exports show the immediate impact

The most visible effect has been in refined products. Russia’s seaborne petroleum-product exports fell by about one-third month on month to roughly 3.9 million tonnes in July, according to LSEG data and market sources cited by Reuters. 2 S&P Global data separately put July seaborne refined-product exports at 1.18 million bpd, down from 1.51 million bpd in June and the lowest level in its series dating to 2016. 9

Diesel and gasoil exports dropped especially sharply. Vortexa data compiled by Bloomberg showed flows of only 80,000 bpd in the first seven days of August, a multiyear low. 18 Earlier, Kpler data showed diesel and gasoil loadings averaging 234,000 bpd in the first 10 days of July, versus a 2025 average of around 817,000 bpd. 3

These figures should not be read as a direct measure of damaged refinery capacity. Export losses reflect a combination of lower refinery runs, domestic shortages, inventory management, logistics constraints and export policy. But together they show that the disruption has moved beyond isolated facility outages into the wider fuel-export system.

Russia’s export ban trades foreign revenue for domestic supply

Moscow introduced a diesel-export ban on July 8 after refinery attacks contributed to domestic fuel shortages and higher prices. 20 The restrictions were subsequently extended through September 30 for diesel, marine fuel and gasoil produced in Russia. 1

The policy helps prioritize domestic availability, but it limits sales of higher-value refined products abroad. It also makes the system more dependent on its ability to store crude, reroute it, process it elsewhere, or export it through still-functioning routes. That trade-off is why a refinery problem can become a production problem when disruption lasts.

Why global diesel markets are more exposed than crude markets

The international effect is concentrated in middle distillates—principally diesel and gasoil—rather than in crude alone. A refinery outage removes usable fuel from the market immediately, while crude can sometimes be diverted or stored. Reduced Russian diesel availability therefore tightens competition for alternative cargoes even in countries that no longer buy Russian fuel directly. 3

Reuters reported that the July diesel ban intensified an already tight global supply picture and pushed fuel prices higher. 3 Replacement capacity is not frictionless: alternative exporters face their own refinery economics, domestic demand, product-quality requirements and shipping constraints. That means a sharp loss of Russian diesel exports cannot necessarily be replaced barrel for barrel in the near term.

What would determine whether the decline is temporary

Novak’s view depends on refineries restarting and the broader logistics system stabilizing. The downside case reflected in the government draft, IEA revisions and Rystad forecast depends on the opposite outcome: recurring strikes, slower repairs, constrained storage, impaired terminals and more expensive or less reliable shipping.

The core takeaway is that Russia faces a two-stage pressure system. Refinery damage first reduces fuel production and exports; sustained disruption can then force crude-output restraint when the country lacks enough flexible routes for the barrels it can no longer process. The latest forecast cuts suggest that this risk is now being incorporated into Russia’s medium-term oil outlook, rather than treated solely as a short-lived maintenance issue.