Why G42 Is Considering U.S. Ownership to Secure AI Chip Access

Advanced AI chips have become more than a procurement issue for Abu Dhabi-based G42: they are a question of corporate control, security assurances and U.S. export policy.

G42 executives have reportedly held exploratory discussions about selling a majority stake to American companies or using a U.S.-domiciled, American-majority-owned vehicle. The aim is to preserve access to leading U.S. processors after the UAE’s current period of license-free access expires around April 2027. No transaction or final structure has been announced. 13

The immediate issue: a temporary route to advanced chips

In July 2026, the United States eased export controls for the UAE, allowing the UAE government and approved companies—including G42 and Core42—to receive advanced computing items without export licenses. Reuters reported that the policy change made exports of Nvidia AI chips easier.

But reporting on G42’s discussions says its ability to buy cutting-edge chips without individual U.S. licenses runs only until roughly April 2027. After that point, the company’s structure may again be central to whether it can secure continuing access to advanced hardware from suppliers such as Nvidia and AMD. 13

For a company building AI infrastructure, that uncertainty matters. The most capable processors are essential inputs for training and serving large AI models, and export restrictions can determine not only the cost of a project but whether capacity can be deployed on schedule.

Why a U.S.-majority structure could help

A U.S.-domiciled company with American-majority ownership could offer Washington a clearer basis for oversight of ownership, governance, operations and end use. The reported proposals appear designed to make G42 look less like a foreign recipient seeking an exception and more like a U.S.-aligned entity operating within a framework that regulators can audit. 12

That distinction could improve G42’s case for continued approvals, particularly where U.S. officials are focused on the risks that sensitive technology could be diverted, accessed by unapproved parties or used alongside restricted Chinese technology.

Still, incorporation or ownership alone would not create an automatic entitlement to chips. U.S. export rules would continue to apply, and Nvidia, AMD and other suppliers would retain their own compliance and commercial decisions. A restructuring would be a risk-reduction strategy, not a guarantee of future supply. 13

The earlier pivot away from China and Huawei

G42 has already made significant concessions to deepen its U.S. technology relationship. Microsoft announced a $1.5 billion investment in G42 in April 2024, a partnership that gave Microsoft President Brad Smith a seat on G42’s board. 17

The deal followed discussions with the U.S. government and a commitment by G42 to end cooperation with China, according to Bloomberg’s reporting. A White House technology adviser later described the Microsoft deal as positive because it compelled G42 to cut its connections with Huawei.

Subsequent reporting says G42 removed Huawei equipment and introduced U.S.-specified monitoring in its data centers in February 2026. Those steps were intended to give U.S. officials greater confidence in the equipment and controls surrounding sensitive computing infrastructure. 6

The reported ownership options would extend that same logic: from changing vendors and operational controls to changing the entity that ultimately owns and directs the business.

What it could mean for Sheikh Tahnoon’s control

G42 is controlled by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE national security adviser, according to reporting. 10

If a U.S. buyer acquired a true majority of ordinary voting shares, Sheikh Tahnoon’s effective voting control would normally be diluted or lost. But the eventual outcome would depend entirely on deal terms. Companies can separate economics from control through voting classes, board appointment rights, vetoes over specified decisions, minority protections or parent-company arrangements.

There is no public evidence that G42 has settled on any of those mechanisms. That uncertainty is important: a structure that preserves substantial Abu Dhabi control could be commercially attractive to existing stakeholders, but it may be less persuasive if the purpose is to demonstrate durable U.S.-aligned governance.

A different investor base—and more U.S. influence

A majority-U.S. ownership structure would likely broaden G42’s investor base beyond Abu Dhabi-linked capital, potentially bringing in a strategic technology company, U.S. financial investors, or both. It could also strengthen ties to cloud providers, chip suppliers and U.S. compliance infrastructure.

The trade-off is influence. American majority investors would be expected to seek meaningful governance rights and a role in decisions involving data operations, compliance, technology sourcing and long-term strategy. Microsoft already has board representation through its 2024 investment, illustrating how capital partnerships can be paired with governance access. 17

Why the 5-gigawatt AI campus is part of the calculation

The corporate debate matters beyond G42 itself because the UAE and U.S. have positioned Abu Dhabi as a major AI infrastructure hub. The U.S.-UAE AI Acceleration Partnership, announced in May 2025, covers security for AI models, semiconductors and data as well as cross-border investment. The framework includes a planned 5-gigawatt AI campus in Abu Dhabi.

A structure that gives U.S. regulators and prospective tenants more confidence in control and compliance could make that campus more credible as a destination for U.S.-origin chips, cloud capacity and outside investment. Conversely, unresolved governance concerns could constrain allocations of sensitive hardware or push the most sensitive compute operations toward U.S.-owned or U.S.-operated entities.

That is a possible consequence, not a settled outcome. G42’s reported discussions remain preliminary. But the direction is clear: access to frontier AI compute increasingly depends not only on demand and capital, but also on who owns the infrastructure, who governs it and how convincingly it can meet U.S. security expectations. 13