What did Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s ultra conservative Kayhan newspaper and a representative of the supreme leader, urge the Iranian military and IRGC to do to international undersea fiber optic cables in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz on September 3; why did

On September 3, Hossein Shariatmadari urged Iran’s military and the IRGC to disrupt or cut international fibre-optic cables on the Persian Gulf seabed and through the Strait of Hormuz. He acknowledged that doing so would violate international law, but portrayed it as a necessary retaliatory measure against the “crimes of America and its wicked allies,” arguing Iran had a right to force those “sources of evil” to yield. 25

• Relation to the U.S. strikes: The timing matters but does not prove a direct operational link. A report citing a U.S. source said the September 2 strikes were pre-emptive action against an Iranian plot to target Hormuz cables; independently, CENTCOM publicly said it struck Iranian air defences, radar, maritime assets, mine-laying capability and communications sites. The cable-plot rationale itself has not been independently confirmed by CENTCOM or other high-authority public evidence. 89

• Relation to earlier Iranian signalling: The call escalated earlier pressure tactics. Iranian state-linked or IRGC-adjacent reporting had floated regulation/licensing, traffic-access or monitoring demands, and substantial annual transit fees on cable owners and large technology companies; reporting also noted that Tehran had not formally adopted such a policy or legislation. 37

• Why Hormuz matters: The strait carries several major submarine systems, including AAE-1, and links India and Southeast Asia with Europe via Gulf states and Egypt. It is therefore both a regional connectivity hub and a concentrated international data chokepoint. 16

• Likely effects of a successful multi-cable attack: It could produce severe latency, congestion and outages for Gulf connectivity and for traffic transiting between Asia and Europe; cloud platforms, data-centre interconnection, corporate networks and digital communications would be affected first. Financial-market data, cross-border bank operations and SWIFT-connected payment workflows could be delayed or disrupted where their telecommunications providers lost capacity—but a total global SWIFT shutdown is not established by the available evidence. 16

• Regional asymmetry: Gulf states would be especially exposed because their international links heavily use these maritime routes. Iran could also suffer, but its greater use of terrestrial/overland routes would plausibly give it more alternatives than some Gulf neighbours; that does not make Iran immune to knock-on congestion, sanctions, retaliation, or domestic connectivity effects. Insufficient evidence is available here to quantify the relative resilience of each country.

• “2008 financial-crisis” analogy: That is a warning about a potential systemic shock, not a demonstrated forecast. A prolonged, coordinated loss of multiple cables—especially alongside disruption to shipping and energy flows—could magnify economic and market stress, but the available reporting does not support a confident claim that a cable attack alone would recreate the 2008 crisis.