Lai’s SEMICON Message: Taiwan’s Chip Strength Depends on Trust and Global Partnerships

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s message at the 2026 Semicon Network Summit was that the island’s semiconductor position is not simply the result of having a large concentration of chip factories. He described it as a long-built ecosystem: one supported by democratic institutions, the rule of law, reliable delivery and an international division of labor. In that account, Taiwan’s role is strengthened—not diminished—when production and investment are shared with trusted partners abroad. 26

A case for trust as industrial infrastructure

Lai said Taiwan had developed a comprehensive semiconductor cluster over decades of global cooperation and long-term investment. He highlighted the industry’s ability to manufacture quickly, flexibly and efficiently, while tying its reliability to the foundations of democracy and the rule of law. Taiwan, he argued, has become a trusted international supplier because it can maintain stable supply and keep commitments to customers worldwide. 26

That is a strategic argument as much as an economic one. Advanced chips sit at the center of AI computing, but their production depends on a far wider ecosystem of design, equipment, materials, fabrication, testing, packaging and end markets. Lai’s position was that no country can sustainably own every part of that chain by itself; resilience comes from dependable partners performing specialized roles.

TSMC’s overseas expansion as diversification, not displacement

Lai presented TSMC’s international investments as examples of Taiwan connecting its capabilities to a broader supply network. TSMC has raised its planned U.S. semiconductor investment to US$265 billion, including an additional US$100 billion and four further advanced manufacturing facilities; the U.S. government said the plan would bring the company’s total to 12 leading-edge manufacturing and packaging facilities. 1

He also cited TSMC’s planned production in Dresden, Germany, and its progress in Japan as part of this outward expansion. The message was not that Taiwan could be replaced by a single new manufacturing hub. Rather, overseas facilities, combined with Taiwan’s domestic ecosystem, could spread risk and add capacity across allied economies.

Foreign companies’ commitments inside Taiwan were another part of that case. Lai cited more than NT$3 trillion in Nvidia investment and annual procurement in Taiwan, more than NT$1.4 trillion in Micron investment, and more than NT$300 billion in AMD investment and research and development. These figures were offered as evidence that Taiwan remains deeply connected to the global technology industry even as manufacturing footprints become more geographically diverse.

The U.S. partnership—and the concentration problem

In a prerecorded summit message, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg described semiconductors as among the most important technologies of the current era. He called Taiwan and the United States key partners in securing critical technologies and building resilient supply chains, while noting that Taiwan is expanding investment in the United States.

That framing emphasizes a tension in current chip policy. Supply-chain concentration creates risk, and more capacity outside Taiwan can reduce that exposure. But Lai and Helberg’s partnership language also rejects a simple zero-sum interpretation: investment in U.S. capacity can be part of a shared supply-chain strategy rather than proof that Taiwan’s industry is being transferred away.

The argument contrasts with President Donald Trump’s repeated assertion that Taiwan “stole” U.S. chip business. Reporting on Lai’s SEMICON remarks noted the accusation alongside U.S. pressure for Taiwanese companies to invest more in America. 2

Why Lai wants Taiwan-EU tax and investment agreements

Lai also called for Taiwan and the European Union to pursue a double-taxation agreement and an investment agreement. The practical aim is to make two-way technology investment more predictable and less burdensome, particularly as Taiwanese companies expand in Europe and European firms remain integral to the wider semiconductor ecosystem.

He cited TSMC’s €3.5 billion Dresden project as an example of Taiwan-European industrial integration. The policy case is straightforward: if countries want diversified supply chains, they need rules that make cross-border investment, technology cooperation and long-term commercial commitments easier to sustain.

A note on the US$1.5 trillion chip-market claim

Reports of the summit said Lai described the global semiconductor market as worth more than US$1.5 trillion in 2026. However, TSMC’s separate May 2026 forecast put the global semiconductor market above US$1.5 trillion by 2030.

The discrepancy matters. The broader point—that AI demand is raising the strategic and commercial importance of chips—is clear in both accounts. But the US$1.5 trillion figure should not be treated as an uncontested 2026 market forecast without further verification.

The takeaway

Lai’s speech defined Taiwan’s semiconductor advantage as a system of trust: institutions that support reliable commerce, a manufacturing ecosystem built over decades, and partnerships that distribute capability across the United States, Europe, Japan and other markets. In this view, the answer to chip concentration is not technological autarky. It is a more connected network in which each participant remains capable, invested and dependable. 26