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EIA vs. Rabobank: How Hormuz Disruptions Are Reshaping 2026–2028 Oil Forecasts
EIA’s recovery case sees Brent falling to $65 per barrel in 2027 after supply returns and inventories rebuild, while Rabobank’s latest reported view puts Brent at $90 in both Q3 and Q4 2026, $86 in 2027, and $79 in 2028. EIA estimates Hormuz flows fell to 4.9 million barrels per day in Q2 2026 from 21.6 million b/d...
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Key takeaways
- EIA’s recovery case sees Brent falling to $65 per barrel in 2027 after supply returns and inventories rebuild, while Rabobank’s latest reported view puts Brent at $90 in both Q3 and Q4 2026, $86 in 2027, and $79 in 2028.
- EIA estimates Hormuz flows fell to 4.9 million barrels per day in Q2 2026 from 21.6 million b/d in Q4 2025; global inventories then declined by 4.2 million b/d, with another 3.8 million b/d draw expected in Q3.
- Neither institution’s publicly available material here provides a fully comparable Brent and WTI annual forecast table for every year from 2026 through 2028.
AI Prompt
openai.comCreate a landscape editorial hero image for this Studio Global article: How have persistent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, conflict and sanctions involving the United States and Iran, and resulting global o. Article summary: The forecasts have been highly assumption-sensitive: EIA’s outlook moved from a Hormuz-closure, inventory-draw scenario to a lower-price recovery case after the U.S.–Iran MOU and a partial return of shipping. Rabobank ha. Topic tags: general, government, general web, news. Style: premium digital editorial illustration, source-backed research mood, clean composition, high detail, modern web publication hero. Use reference image context only for broad subject, composition, and topical grounding; do not copy the exact image. Avoid: logos, brand marks, copyrighted characters, real person likenesses, fake screenshots, UI text, readable text, watermarks, charts with
The Strait of Hormuz disruption has made oil-price forecasting unusually dependent on political and logistical assumptions. EIA has repeatedly lowered its price path when it assumed tanker traffic and shut-in production would recover, then raised near-term estimates when renewed constraints prolonged inventory drawdowns. Rabobank’s latest reported outlook is more bullish, reflecting the view that inventories are being consumed too quickly to serve as a lasting buffer. 1
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The central disagreement: recovery speed
EIA’s lower-price case assumes that global crude production and trade flows move close to pre-conflict levels by the end of 2026, with most previously shut-in production returning during the first quarter of 2027. Under that scenario, continued inventory builds push Brent down to an average of $65 per barrel in 2027. EIA’s reported 2026 annual Brent forecast in that recovery case was $82 per barrel, while its Q3 2026 estimate was $74 per barrel. 1
That recovery assumption has since become less straightforward. EIA estimated that crude and petroleum liquids moving through Hormuz averaged only 4.9 million b/d in Q2 2026, compared with 21.6 million b/d in Q4 2025 before the conflict. Its August outlook assumed that most regional production would return near pre-conflict levels in early 2027, but that approximately 0.6 million b/d of disruption could persist through the end of 2027. 2
EIA also raised its near-term estimate when severe shipping constraints persisted, with reporting on its August outlook putting the Q3 Brent forecast at approximately $85 per barrel. The sequence illustrates the main point: EIA’s numbers are not a single fixed view of the crisis, but a model response to changing assumptions about shipping, production, and inventories.
EIA’s disruption scenario: large supply losses and sharp inventory draws
In its more severe disruption case, EIA estimated that Middle Eastern producers had cut more than 11 million b/d of output. It projected global inventory draws averaging 6.3 million b/d in Q2 2026 and 7.6 million b/d in Q3, with Brent averaging $105 per barrel in June and July while shipments remained constrained. 17
Its later outlook showed somewhat smaller—but still substantial—drawdowns. EIA estimated that global oil inventories fell by an average of 4.2 million b/d in Q2 2026 and expected a further 3.8 million b/d decline in Q3. 2
These figures describe changes in inventory levels over time, not the size of physical storage tanks. A draw of 4.2 million b/d means that global stocks were being reduced at an average daily rate equivalent to 4.2 million barrels during the quarter. If sustained, that process can support higher prices even when demand is not accelerating, because the market is using stored supply to compensate for disrupted production and trade.
Rabobank remains more bullish on the near-term price risk
Rabobank’s reported assumptions are more cautious about normalization. The bank said global oil inventories were being drawn by roughly 2–5 million b/d, while refined-product inventories were being consumed at an additional 5–6 million b/d. It described those inventory “savings accounts” as unsustainable over the long term. 6
Its later reported forecast placed Brent at $90 per barrel in both Q3 and Q4 2026. The same reporting put Rabobank’s Brent forecasts at $86 in 2027 and $79 in 2028. 3
Rabobank also reportedly expects Hormuz flows to recover only to 50%–60% of pre-conflict levels by 2027, including diversions through alternative export routes, while Middle East refinery exports may not return to normal until the middle of 2028. 6
9 That distinction matters: crude may find partial alternative routes before refined products regain normal export capacity.
The bank’s forecasts have changed quickly as the assumed reopening timetable changed. In a post-MOU case, Rabobank put Brent at $79 per barrel in Q3 2026 and $78 in Q4, with WTI at $75.50 and $74, respectively. It also projected Brent at $74.50 in 2027 and $71 in 2028 in that softer recovery path. 10 Those figures should be read as an earlier scenario rather than as a direct comparison with its later, more bullish forecast.
Brent and WTI projections: what can be compared
The available material supports the following comparison:
| Institution and scenario | Brent | WTI | What drives the forecast |
|---|---|---|---|
| EIA recovery case, 2026 average | $82/b | Not stated in the cited release | Reopening traffic, restored production, inventory builds |
| EIA recovery case, 2027 average | $65/b | Not stated in the cited release | Supply normalization and rebuilding stocks |
| EIA severe-disruption case, June–July 2026 | $105/b | Not stated | Restricted shipments and deep inventory draws |
| Rabobank later reported view, Q3–Q4 2026 | $90/b | Not stated in the cited report | Persistent geopolitical risk and rapid inventory consumption |
| Rabobank later reported view, 2027 | $86/b | Not reliably available | Partial Hormuz recovery and depleted stocks |
| Rabobank later reported view, 2028 | $79/b | Not reliably available | Delayed normalization of regional refinery exports |
| Rabobank earlier post-MOU view, Q3–Q4 2026 | $79/b; $78/b | $75.50; $74/b | Gradual reopening and a softer price path |
EIA’s cited releases do not provide a comparable official 2028 Brent or WTI forecast. Likewise, the available Rabobank reporting does not establish reliable WTI values for both 2027 and 2028. It would therefore be misleading to fill those gaps by inferring one benchmark from the other.
Will Middle Eastern production return to pre-conflict levels?
EIA’s base case is that most production returns near pre-conflict averages in early 2027, but it does not treat a full return as certain. Its estimate of roughly 0.6 million b/d remaining disrupted through the end of 2027 indicates that some producers may continue to face operational or logistical constraints.
The physical recovery depends on more than whether wells can produce crude. Storage can fill when export routes are blocked, forcing producers to shut in output. Recovery also depends on tanker availability, insurance, port access, infrastructure security, alternative export routes, and confidence that sanctions or political agreements will hold. EIA has previously described how limited tanker traffic and canceled insurance coverage can leave production stranded behind the chokepoint.
Rabobank’s reported assumption is more conservative for trade flows: only 50%–60% of pre-conflict Hormuz volumes may return by 2027, while refinery exports normalize later. 6
9 The difference between production recovery and export recovery is crucial. Oil can be technically available but still unable to reach buyers at the same rate as before the conflict.
The upside risks: another Hormuz or Bab el-Mandab disruption
The immediate bullish risk is a renewed deterioration in tanker traffic through Hormuz. The waterway’s Q2 flow estimate of 4.9 million b/d was far below its pre-conflict comparison point, showing how quickly a shipping chokepoint can alter the physical market. 2
Bab el-Mandab is another variable. EIA estimated that crude and liquids flows through Bab el-Mandab averaged 8.1 million b/d in Q2 2026, up from 5.4 million b/d in Q4 2025, suggesting that some trade was being redirected as Hormuz traffic weakened. 2 A new disruption there would reduce the market’s ability to reroute cargoes and could intensify pressure on both crude and products.
Refined products may be particularly exposed. Tight refining and conversion capacity, alongside low gasoline stocks, can make diesel, jet fuel, marine fuel, and gasoline more vulnerable than the headline crude benchmark. Rabobank has emphasized that product flows may not recover as quickly as crude availability because refining capacity—not just crude supply—is the binding constraint. 12
That creates an asymmetric risk profile. A durable de-escalation and restored shipping could pull Brent toward EIA’s mid-$60s 2027 recovery path. But renewed attacks, prolonged insurance restrictions, additional shut-ins, or impaired Bab el-Mandab traffic could keep Brent in the $90–$105 per barrel near-term range described by the cited forecasts and reopen the possibility of prices above $100. 3
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Bottom line
EIA’s forecast is conditional on a relatively orderly recovery: Hormuz traffic improves, shut-in production returns by early 2027, and inventories begin rebuilding. Rabobank assigns more weight to the possibility that shipping remains impaired, inventories continue to absorb the shock, and refined-product bottlenecks last into 2028.
The most defensible conclusion is not that one institution has a definitive price target. It is that the forecast range is being set by the speed of normalization. If trade and production recover together, prices can ease sharply. If inventories continue to fall while crude and products remain difficult to reroute, the upside risk remains substantial.
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What is the short answer to "EIA vs. Rabobank: How Hormuz Disruptions Are Reshaping 2026–2028 Oil Forecasts"?
EIA’s recovery case sees Brent falling to $65 per barrel in 2027 after supply returns and inventories rebuild, while Rabobank’s latest reported view puts Brent at $90 in both Q3 and Q4 2026, $86 in 2027, and $79 in 2028.
What are the key points to validate first?
EIA’s recovery case sees Brent falling to $65 per barrel in 2027 after supply returns and inventories rebuild, while Rabobank’s latest reported view puts Brent at $90 in both Q3 and Q4 2026, $86 in 2027, and $79 in 2028. EIA estimates Hormuz flows fell to 4.9 million barrels per day in Q2 2026 from 21.6 million b/d in Q4 2025; global inventories then declined by 4.2 million b/d, with another 3.8 million b/d draw expected in Q3.
What should I do next in practice?
Neither institution’s publicly available material here provides a fully comparable Brent and WTI annual forecast table for every year from 2026 through 2028.