Russia’s Fuel Export Ban Shows the Cost of Ukraine’s Refinery Strikes

Russia’s decision to extend restrictions on diesel, marine fuel and kerosene exports through September 30 is a sign that its fuel-supply problem has outlasted the emergency measures introduced in July. Repeated Ukrainian drone strikes have disrupted refinery operations, leaving domestic gasoline production below consumption and forcing Moscow to combine export controls with imports, postponed maintenance and regional supply measures. 167

Why Russia extended the ban

The immediate reason was domestic market stability. Several Russian refineries remained idle or operated with reduced capacity after drone attacks, while fuel shortages spread across regional markets. By late August, two industry sources told Reuters that Russia was producing roughly 80,000 tonnes of gasoline a day against domestic demand of about 115,000 tonnes—around 70% of requirements.

That shortfall helps explain why the government is keeping refined fuel inside Russia rather than allowing producers to export it. The policy is not simply a trade measure: it is a way to redirect scarce diesel and other products toward domestic consumers while repairs and production disruptions continue.

How the restrictions evolved

The restrictions developed in stages:

• July 8: Russia introduced a diesel-export ban scheduled to last until July 31. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the move would increase supplies to the domestic market, and the government also announced plans to begin importing fuel. 4
• Late July: The government extended broader gasoline and diesel restrictions, with some measures running into 2027. The July 30 announcement also covered diesel and marine fuel among the products subject to temporary export controls. 2
• August: Restrictions applying to fuel producers were extended through August 31 as refinery outages and domestic shortages persisted. 1
• August 29: Russia extended the ban on diesel, marine fuel and kerosene through September 30, while separate gasoline and jet-fuel restrictions continued on different timetables. 67

The progression from a three-week diesel measure to a wider and longer set of controls indicates that the original intervention did not restore a reliable balance between domestic supply and demand.

The scale of the refinery disruption

The pressure on fuel supplies followed an intense campaign against Russian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian forces struck Russian refineries at least 21 times in August, according to a tally based on public statements. That was described as the highest monthly total since the full-scale invasion began. 6

Several large facilities were affected. Lukoil’s NORSI refinery, Russia’s fourth-largest refinery and its second-largest gasoline producer, suspended crude processing on August 26. The plant has capacity to process about 15 million metric tonnes of oil annually. 17 Lukoil’s Perm refinery, Russia’s seventh-largest by processing volume, also halted operations after an August 21 drone strike damaged technological units; one primary processing unit alone could handle 14,000 tonnes of oil per day.

The attacks have reduced refining rates as well as individual plant output. Bloomberg reported that Russian crude-processing rates had fallen to multiyear lows, while other reporting described renewed shortages in multiple regions.

Imports, rationing and other emergency measures

Export controls have been only one part of Moscow’s response. Russia announced fuel imports in July to support the domestic market, and officials later confirmed that imports had begun. 4 The government has also used measures intended to increase available production, including allowing lower-standard fuel production and adjusting refinery maintenance schedules.

The strain has nevertheless reached consumers and regional distributors. Kaluga planned a rationing system based on vehicle licence plates, while other regions considered limits on the amount of fuel sold per vehicle or restricted activity at some stations.

These measures show why the September extension matters. A country that normally exports large volumes of petroleum products is restricting shipments, importing fuel and managing local sales at the same time. The available reporting does not establish a single nationwide price increase or provide a definitive volume for emergency gasoline imports, so the scale of those effects should not be overstated. It does establish that ordinary supply channels were under enough pressure to trigger extraordinary intervention. 147

What the decision reveals about Russia’s energy security

Russia’s export ban is evidence of a sustained domestic vulnerability rather than a one-off refinery outage. The country has significant oil resources, but crude production does not automatically translate into enough gasoline, diesel or aviation fuel when refining units are damaged or offline. The result is a mismatch: crude may remain available while the products needed by motorists, industry and transport become scarce.

The attacks on NORSI and Perm illustrate how damage to a relatively small number of strategically important facilities can affect the wider market. NORSI’s role as a major gasoline producer is especially significant because gasoline shortages have been among the most visible consequences of the disruption. 17

The policy also carries a financial cost. Restricting exports removes refined-product revenue and narrows Russia’s ability to use international sales to offset domestic disruption. In July, Russian oil-product exports fell to 1.18 million barrels per day from 1.51 million barrels per day in June, according to preliminary S&P Global data—the lowest level in that dataset since 2016.

Why global fuel markets are watching

The consequences extend beyond Russia. Diesel and other middle distillates are traded internationally, so a major exporter keeping products at home reduces supply available to overseas buyers. The July ban was associated with a sharp rise in global diesel prices, according to Bloomberg. 5

The disruption has also affected Russia’s crude-export logistics. Ukrainian attacks on refineries and Black Sea infrastructure have simultaneously constrained domestic fuel production and Russia’s ability to redirect crude into exports. Overseas crude flows averaged 3.46 million barrels per day in the four weeks through August 23, according to tanker-movement data compiled by Bloomberg.

That creates a two-sided pressure point for Moscow: less refined fuel for the domestic market and fewer straightforward export options for some crude. The September 30 extension therefore signals more than a temporary protectionist measure. It shows that refinery damage has become a continuing test of Russia’s domestic energy security—and a potential source of additional volatility for global fuel markets.