SoftBank is reportedly seeking a second $10 billion, two-year loan backed by its OpenAI stake, priced at roughly SOFR + 275 basis points and arranged by Mizuho Bank. It is a proposed refinancing instrument—not a confirmed closing—and would replace part of the $40 billion bridge facility that matures in March 2027. 1
How it fits: SoftBank is trying to term out and diversify financing for its AI bet before the bridge-loan deadline. Its expected cumulative OpenAI investment is nearly $65 billion by October, making the refinancing task unusually large. 12
Broader funding package: In addition to the proposed second loan, SoftBank is discussing a $10–$20 billion international bond offering for OpenAI-related refinancing and has planned a record ¥1 trillion retail-bond issue in Japan. 616
Rapid escalation: The new solicitation came only 22 days after SoftBank closed its first $10 billion OpenAI-backed margin loan on August 6, highlighting both the urgency of funding its commitments and its increasingly concentrated reliance on the same private asset as collateral. 315
Why lenders are cautious: SoftBank’s S&P rating is BB+ with a negative outlook; S&P cited likely deterioration in asset liquidity, portfolio quality, and financial capacity following the OpenAI funding round. 8 The earlier margin-loan negotiations stalled because lenders struggled to value unlisted OpenAI equity; SoftBank reportedly offered a corporate guarantee if collateral proved insufficient. 5
Covenant risk: The first OpenAI-backed margin loan reportedly requires additional cash collateral or early repayment if the value assigned to OpenAI shares falls past specified thresholds. That creates a potential liquidity squeeze: SoftBank may need cash precisely when OpenAI’s private valuation is weakening. 12
Core uncertainty: Until OpenAI has a public listing—or another reliable market-based liquidity event—there is no continuously tradable price for the collateral. Lenders must therefore rely on negotiated private valuations, valuation haircuts, covenants, and SoftBank’s corporate credit rather than a market price and readily saleable collateral. This is the central risk in treating the loans and bonds as a durable replacement for the bridge facility. 58