South Korea Says North Korea Is Preparing More Russia Troops—But Not Yet

South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has drawn a careful distinction: North Korea appears to be continuing preparations for a possible additional deployment to Russia, but Seoul has detected no signs that another dispatch is imminent.

That assessment does not confirm Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s claim that Russia and North Korea had decided on a new deployment of 30,000–50,000 troops. Zelenskyy gave that range without explaining publicly how he obtained it. 17 Kim Yo Jong later rejected the claim as “groundless” and “a self-staged incident.”

What South Korea’s assessment does—and does not—say

The DIA’s wording supports the possibility of another deployment while stopping short of confirming its timing, size or final approval. In practical terms, Seoul is reporting preparation rather than an imminent troop movement.

This makes the South Korean position narrower than Zelenskyy’s. It neither validates the 30,000–50,000 figure nor rules out a future deployment. The available reporting also leaves an important evidentiary gap: the public assessments come from governments and intelligence agencies directly involved in the conflict or its regional security consequences, and the troop totals cannot be independently verified from the material provided.

North Korea’s support for Russia is already broad

The possible next deployment would build on an existing military relationship rather than start a new one. South Korean and other intelligence assessments have described North Korean personnel sent to Russia since October 2024; estimates vary, with some reporting putting the overall number above 16,000. 16 Other South Korean reporting distinguishes between roughly 15,000 combat troops and more than 6,000 additional personnel, illustrating why totals differ depending on who is counted and when.

A more recent Ukrainian intelligence estimate puts the North Korean contingent currently in Russia at about 8,500. That force reportedly includes approximately 400 drone operators and about 1,000 engineers and demining specialists, with many personnel based in the Kursk region. 315

North Korea’s reported material support includes:

• Artillery ammunition: More than 15 million rounds measured in 152-mm shell equivalents have been attributed to North Korean supplies to Russia in one South Korean assessment. An ISW assessment separately cited an estimate of about 15 million 152-mm shells by March 2026.
• Ballistic missiles: Ukrainian officials have reported North Korean short-range ballistic missile deliveries to Russia. A missile unit of about 90 North Korean personnel was reported to be deploying to western Russia and could eventually operate up to 120 missiles and six launchers.
• Drones and specialist personnel: The reported 400-person drone unit could support reconnaissance and attacks against targets in Ukraine, while engineers and demining specialists provide other battlefield capabilities. 310

These figures should be treated as intelligence estimates and reported capabilities, not as independently audited inventories.

Why the missile deployments matter to Seoul

The missiles discussed in the reporting are generally associated with North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 systems and the broader Hwasong-11 family. Ukrainian intelligence has also reported newer or upgraded variants, although assessments differ over which systems have been transferred and how they have been used.

Combat use in Ukraine could give North Korea valuable information about missile performance under real battlefield conditions. That may include lessons about reliability, accuracy, targeting, logistics, air-defense penetration and countermeasures. South Korean reporting has said the missiles used in the war may have improved in accuracy through battlefield data and Russian technical advice, but the extent of any such improvement remains an intelligence assessment rather than a publicly verified measurement.

The longer-term Korean Peninsula risk

For South Korean officials, the concern extends beyond the number of North Korean soldiers in Russia at any one time. Personnel involved in drones, artillery, engineering, demining and missile operations can acquire experience with modern battlefield coordination and technologies that North Korea has had limited opportunity to test in combat. The Institute for the Study of War similarly assessed that deployment of North Korean drone operators could provide Pyongyang with valuable tactical and technological experience. 10

Closer Russia–North Korea cooperation could also provide Pyongyang with technical knowledge, industrial support and other military benefits. Analysts cited in reporting have warned that a North Korean force returning with combat experience and improved access to Russian capabilities could pose a serious future security challenge for South Korea.

The key question, therefore, is not simply whether 30,000–50,000 additional troops are about to arrive in Russia. Based on Seoul’s latest public assessment, there is no evidence of an imminent dispatch. The more durable issue is whether the military partnership is steadily making North Korea’s forces more experienced, better equipped and more capable of threatening the Korean Peninsula.