How has the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a joint U.S.-Israeli strike on February 28 reshaped Iran’s political and military power structure six months later—including the IRGC’s rise under commander Ahmad Vahidi and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the Su

Six months after Ali Khamenei’s killing, Iran appears less like a system dominated by a single supreme leader and more like a security-led wartime state: Mojtaba Khamenei provides dynastic-religious continuity, while the IRGC and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) hold greater practical influence over war, internal security, and diplomacy. The result is not a settled succession but an unresolved contest between officials who need a deal to relieve economic pressure and security institutions whose authority has expanded through conflict. 46

• Security consolidation: Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession has restored a formal apex to the system, but the elevation of Ahmad Vahidi to lead the IRGC and the prominence of security bodies indicate that coercive institutions—not the elected presidency—now set the effective limits of policy. The SNSC’s public conditions for reopening Hormuz illustrate its enlarged role in linking military operations, sanctions relief, and diplomacy. 456

• Civilian pressure for diplomacy: Pezeshkian’s invocation of Ali Khamenei’s alleged openness to diplomacy is politically important: it seeks to give negotiations revolutionary legitimacy rather than portray them as capitulation. But his ability to translate that position into an agreement is constrained by the supreme leader, SNSC, IRGC, and hard-line factions. His late-July meeting with Mojtaba Khamenei suggests that access to the new leader remains central to any civilian initiative. 4

• Economic imperative versus ideological resistance: Ghalibaf’s warnings about economic hardship reflect the civilian leadership’s core problem—war, sanctions, restricted shipping, and blocked revenues impose costs that the state cannot indefinitely shift onto society. The United States had granted a 60-day sanctions waiver in June, but the temporary arrangement unraveled; Washington subsequently imposed fresh Iran-related sanctions in July. 1215 Hard-liners, however, oppose concessions absent major U.S. commitments, making economic pain a reason both to negotiate and to demand more leverage first.

• Cease-fire failure and Hormuz as leverage: The 60-day window for a final settlement expired without an extension or permanent agreement, and both sides accuse the other of violating or failing to implement the interim arrangement. 25 Tehran says the Strait of Hormuz will remain restricted until Washington meets its conditions, including relief from the blockade, sanctions, and military pressure; Washington says no talks are under way. 14

• Military adaptation: Iran has shifted from merely absorbing strikes to using maritime disruption and the threat of a more “offensive” posture as bargaining instruments. A senior Iranian official told Reuters Tehran could escalate in Hormuz and beyond if the interim deal is not implemented, while resumed attacks on tankers have already prompted additional U.S. sanctions. 615 This gives the IRGC’s naval and missile-centered capabilities disproportionate strategic weight.

• The central contradiction: Prolonged war strengthens the security establishment institutionally, justifies exceptional SNSC/IRGC control, and lets hard-liners frame compromise as surrender. Yet the same war damages the economy and creates incentives for Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and other civilian figures to seek sanctions relief and a durable settlement. The near-term risk is therefore neither clear peace nor decisive escalation, but a security-managed stalemate in which Hormuz pressure substitutes for a coherent political settlement. 26