What Macron and Mohammed bin Salman Are Expected to Discuss in Paris

The Paris meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is expected to combine crisis diplomacy with economic agreements. The agenda is likely to include regional stability, energy security, transport and logistics, with the two leaders also expected to oversee agreements in health, transport and energy. 1246

The most urgent issue is the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. Traffic through the waterway has fallen sharply after attacks and Iranian proposals to restrict some vessels, leaving Gulf producers and international buyers looking for ways to reduce exposure to a single maritime chokepoint.

Why Hormuz has made alternative routes urgent

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical outlet for energy exports from the Gulf. When shipping through it becomes unsafe or unreliable, rerouting is not simply a matter of choosing another port: producers need sufficient pipeline, port, tanker, rail and insurance capacity, as well as secure access to the replacement route.

That is why the likely objective in Paris is resilience rather than a rapid, complete substitute for Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has already been moving crude through its East-West Pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea, bypassing the strait. 14 But existing alternatives cannot instantly match the scale of the disrupted waterway.

The alternatives reportedly under discussion

French presidency officials have said the talks will address ways to diversify energy and logistics routes, including maritime routes, pipeline projects and regional rail links. 111

The proposals fall into three broad categories:

• Omani ports: Greater use of ports on Oman’s Arabian Sea coast could give Gulf trade an outlet outside the Persian Gulf and reduce exposure to Hormuz. Oman has also been involved in discussions over navigation arrangements for the strait itself. 818
• Pipelines and export terminals: Expanded Saudi or cross-border pipeline capacity could move more oil toward Red Sea, Mediterranean or other export terminals. Saudi Arabia’s existing route to Yanbu demonstrates the value of westward export infrastructure, but available reporting does not establish that a new expansion has been approved. 114
• Rail and logistics corridors: New or upgraded rail links could connect Gulf and Middle Eastern production centers with ports and markets farther west, including Europe. These projects would require extensive coordination across borders, financing and security guarantees. 111

Reports describe these as options under consideration, not as a finalized replacement network. The available reporting does not confirm a definitive list of projects, final financing commitments, participating French companies or construction schedules. 111

What France could contribute

The France–Saudi relationship is being given a more formal strategic framework through the first meeting of the Franco-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council. 2714

A related France–Saudi task force is expected to help examine energy and logistics links between the Middle East and Europe. In practical terms, that process could help governments and businesses sort a long list of ideas into projects that are strategically important and commercially financeable.

France’s potential role is therefore broader than supplying equipment. French firms could become involved in engineering, ports, rail, energy and logistics if projects move beyond the discussion stage. But the reporting reviewed supports this as prospective commercial engagement, not as evidence that particular contracts have already been awarded.

Why bypassing Hormuz does not eliminate risk

The largest constraint is that alternative routes have their own chokepoints. Saudi exports traveling west through Yanbu ultimately face risks around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, the southern gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Houthi forces have threatened a blockade of Saudi maritime routes, and attacks on shipping have already caused deaths. Saudi Red Sea oil shipments have also become harder to track as tankers switch off their identification signals amid fears of attack.

That creates a difficult strategic calculation: moving oil west can reduce direct dependence on Hormuz, but it can also concentrate more traffic around another contested corridor. A route is only a genuine fallback if it has enough capacity and can remain open under military, political and commercial pressure.

Iran’s pressure campaign and the diplomatic backdrop

Iran has treated shipping lanes, trade routes and energy infrastructure as leverage in its confrontation with the United States and its allies. Gulf officials and analysts cited by Reuters said Tehran was using pressure on regional routes to raise the cost of continued conflict and push Washington toward a new arrangement around Hormuz.

Iran has also warned Gulf states that renewed U.S. action could bring attacks on oil, power and water facilities. Other Iranian statements have warned countries against joining the U.S. economic campaign, while Tehran has rejected the idea that Washington’s promised economic pressure will succeed.

At the same time, Iranian officials have said negotiations with Oman over a shipping route through Hormuz were in their final stages. Tehran has cautioned that such an arrangement would not necessarily guarantee safe navigation.

Those conflicting signals make the Paris meeting both a development discussion and a hedge against diplomatic failure. France and Saudi Arabia can discuss infrastructure, but the viability of any corridor will still depend on whether regional tensions ease enough for ships, pipelines and cross-border rail to operate reliably.

What the Paris visit is likely to produce

The visit is expected to produce political direction, bilateral agreements and a process for evaluating strategic projects rather than an immediate new energy corridor. The two leaders are also due to appear at the closing ceremony of the Esports World Cup in Paris, an event that reflects the cultural and commercial dimension of the relationship alongside the harder agenda of energy and regional security. 346

The central question is not whether Gulf producers can find any route around Hormuz. They already have partial workarounds. The question is whether those routes can be expanded, financed and protected at a scale that meaningfully improves resilience.

For now, the evidence points to diversification—not replacement. Hormuz remains central, Oman is part of the diplomatic and logistics picture, Saudi pipelines provide an existing western outlet, and the Red Sea’s insecurity shows how quickly one chokepoint can be exchanged for another.