The threat fits the broader war that began with U.S.-Israeli attacks on February 28, 2026. Iran has subsequently sought control over, and severely restricted commercial transit through, the Strait of Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei describes the threatened U.S. measures as “economic terrorism” and an unlawful claim of extraterritorial authority over other countries’ trade choices. Tehran’s objection is especially directed at secondary pressure on partners such as China.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has dismissed Trump’s “economic D-Day” language and maintains that coercion cannot force Iran into concessions; Tehran’s stated response is resistance while preserving diplomacy on Iranian terms. Negotiations have remained stalled, including over Hormuz.

Washington’s position is explicitly coercive toward third parties: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed it as “either with us, or against us,” while the administration threatens consequences for governments, firms, and banks that provide Iran an economic lifeline.

China is central to the campaign’s feasibility: it bought more than 80% of Iranian seaborne oil in 2025, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. Tehran views the sanctions not merely as leverage for talks but as an effort to create domestic economic strain, fracture social cohesion, and reduce the need for—or improve the effectiveness of—further U.S. military operations. The U.S. has publicly suggested economic pressure could lessen the need for major new military action.

The threat fits the broader war that began with U.S.-Israeli attacks on February 28, 2026. Iran has subsequently sought control over, and severely restricted commercial transit through, the Strait of Hormuz.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei describes the threatened U.S. measures as “economic terrorism” and an unlawful claim of extraterritorial authority over other countries’ trade choices. Tehran’s objection is especially directed at secondary pressure on partners such as China.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has dismissed Trump’s “economic D-Day” language and maintains that coercion cannot force Iran into concessions; Tehran’s stated response is resistance while preserving diplomacy on Iranian terms. Negotiations have remained stalled, including over Hormuz.

Washington’s position is explicitly coercive toward third parties: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed it as “either with us, or against us,” while the administration threatens consequences for governments, firms, and banks that provide Iran an economic lifeline.

China is central to the campaign’s feasibility: it bought more than 80% of Iranian seaborne oil in 2025, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. Tehran views the sanctions not merely as leverage for talks but as an effort to create domestic economic strain, fracture social cohesion, and reduce the need for—or improve the effectiveness of—further U.S. military operations. The U.S. has publicly suggested economic pressure could lessen the need for major new military action.