Why the EU Migration Pact Is Sending Asylum Seekers Back to Italy

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum began applying on June 12, 2026, replacing the previous transition period with a broader system for screening, asylum processing, returns, responsibility and solidarity. ^HR Its first major political test is now taking place around Italy, where several northern European countries are seeking to resume transfers of asylum applicants whose cases are considered Italy’s responsibility.

The result is an apparent paradox for Giorgia Meloni’s government: rules designed to make responsibility clearer across Europe may increase the number of people Italy must receive, even as the promised solidarity mechanisms remain limited and contested.

What the Pact changes—and what it does not

The Pact is more than a simple “first country” rule. It establishes common procedures for screening and registering irregular arrivals, faster asylum and return processes, digital systems for tracking applications, clearer responsibility rules and a solidarity mechanism for countries facing migratory pressure. ^HR

In practice, the first EU country through which an asylum seeker entered can often remain responsible for examining the application. The new framework also aims to make transfers more enforceable and operational. Sweden has said it intends to apply the Pact’s rules and expects member states to meet their obligations, while Finland has indicated that transfers to countries of first entry can resume under the new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation. ^N

But a transfer under the Dublin system or its successor is not automatically the deportation of someone whose asylum claim has already been rejected. These cases generally concern asylum applicants who sought protection in one country after previously entering another. Describing every person being transferred as a “failed asylum seeker” therefore overstates what the available reporting establishes. ^T

The transfers to Italy so far

Austria has reported four transfers to Italy since June 12, with people travelling by public transport. ^UE Germany has also sought to restart transfers to Italy and Greece, arguing that an effective responsibility system is necessary for the wider Common European Asylum System. ^DE

Switzerland, which is associated with the Dublin system but is not an EU member, has joined the group seeking to apply the responsibility rules. Sweden and Finland have confirmed or indicated that they will follow the new framework, and the Netherlands has announced its intention to send relevant cases to Italy. ^II

The available sources do not establish a confirmed total of 10,000 transfers. That number should be treated as a political or media estimate of possible exposure rather than an official target or forecast. Nor is there enough strong, independent evidence to state conclusively that France and Spain have permanently declined all such transfers.

Why Rome is disputing the timing

Italy’s central argument is transitional. Rome says the new arrangements should apply to people whose relevant movements or asylum procedures fall under the post-June 12 framework, rather than reopening older cases. Reporting on the dispute indicates that Italy and several other governments disagree over whether pre-June 12 cases can still be transferred under the new rules. ^I

That disagreement matters because the practical impact depends not only on the legal principle of responsibility, but also on which cases remain eligible, how long transfer windows last and whether the receiving state accepts individual requests. The European Commission has described the new system as a balance between responsibility and solidarity, but implementation has already produced resistance and administrative conflict.

Italy also says it rejected roughly 80,000 transfer requests since 2023. That figure is a claim by the Italian government cited in the reporting, not an independently verified total in the strongest sources available here.

Why Meloni’s opponents call it an “own goal”

Opposition figures Matteo Renzi and Elly Schlein argue that Meloni helped champion a tougher European migration framework that was presented as a way to protect Italy, only for the same framework to give other countries a clearer route to return asylum applicants to Italy. The criticism is that Italy may bear the responsibilities associated with being a major arrival country without receiving enough practical relief from its European partners. ^IT

The political charge is especially potent because the Pact was promoted as a collective answer to the weaknesses of the old Dublin system. If responsibility transfers become faster while relocations, funding and other forms of solidarity remain modest, the system could look less like burden-sharing and more like a formalisation of Italy’s role as Europe’s receiving state.

The scale of the solidarity response is a real source of uncertainty. Euronews reported that fewer than 9,000 asylum seekers were expected to be relocated in the year despite a minimum solidarity benchmark of 30,000, alongside financial contributions. ^E That gap helps explain why the transfer dispute has become politically significant even though the confirmed number of returns so far is small.

Meloni’s defence: responsibility and solidarity are separate issues

Meloni rejects the “boomerang” framing. Her government says the Pact provides frontline countries with clearer responsibility rules, faster screening and repatriation procedures, and a solidarity mechanism intended to prevent any member state from being left alone under pressure. The European Commission presents the package in similar terms. ^HI

Meloni also argues that the dispute with Spain over Schengen travel controls is separate from the operation of the asylum pact. That distinction is legally and politically important: one issue concerns responsibility for asylum applications, while the other concerns temporary checks on travel between EU countries after the Ceuta crisis.

How the Spain–Italy border dispute fits in

The confrontation with Spain followed a mass crossing into Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta from Morocco on July 30–31. Spanish officials later estimated that around 72,000 people had entered and that about 70,000 had returned to Morocco.

Italy responded by temporarily reintroducing targeted checks affecting non-EU nationals travelling from Spain, while insisting that EU citizens would not be affected. Spain then imposed reciprocal checks on air and sea travel from Italy for about a month. ^R

Reports that Spain stopped more than 5,000 people arriving from Italy should be treated cautiously. The stronger available reporting confirms the reciprocal border controls, but not that specific aggregate figure. Because Italy and Spain do not share a land border, the measures primarily affect air and sea routes. ^R

The contradiction at the centre of the dispute

The early evidence supports a narrower conclusion than either side’s political slogans. The Pact has made responsibility transfers more visible and appears to be helping several countries restart or expand requests involving Italy. At least four Austrian transfers are documented, and Germany has reportedly completed three, but the eventual caseload is not established. ^UE

At the same time, the Pact is not merely a command to return every person to the first country they entered. It is a package combining responsibility, procedure, returns and solidarity, with important transitional and implementation disputes still unresolved. ^H

For Italy, the outcome will depend on whether the other parts of the bargain operate at meaningful scale: relocation, financial support, external-border management and effective returns. Until that becomes clear, Meloni’s opponents can plausibly call the transfers a political “own goal,” while her government can plausibly argue that the rules are finally making other EU states share responsibility more systematically. The confirmed transfers show the first part of the system working; the unresolved question is whether the solidarity side will work as well.