Russia’s gains came as competing supplies weakened:
The comparison is important. Russia did not need to capture the entire market through a dramatic increase in tonnage; its position strengthened as its own shipments grew while rival supply declined. The shift left European buyers more exposed to Russian pollock even as the EU was pursuing a broader sanctions policy against Moscow.
Pollock was the largest part of the reported trade, but Russia’s first-half fish exports to the EU covered several whitefish and seafood categories. Russia supplied:
Across all reported fish products, Russian exports to the EU reached 94,000 tonnes worth $417 million in January–June 2026.
The monthly pattern also showed continued commercial access. Russian fish shipments to the EU reached €74.9 million in June, 1.7 times the May figure and the highest monthly level reported since November 2024. Fillets and fish meat accounted for the largest part of June’s imports.
Russia was simultaneously expanding seafood exports to China. In the first half of 2026, those exports reached 723,000 tonnes worth $2.33 billion, up 14% in volume and 52% in value year on year.
Russian average export prices increased by 40% for frozen cod and 30% for cod fillets. One reported factor was a 16% reduction in the 2026 Barents Sea Atlantic-cod total allowable catch, which was set at 285,000 tonnes. Russia’s quota was reported at 136,000 tonnes.
A lower catch limit does not explain every movement in export prices, but it adds a clear supply constraint to the market. For processors that depend on cod as an input, tighter availability can increase procurement costs and make a sudden change in sourcing more disruptive.
When the European Commission presented the proposed 21st sanctions package, it described fisheries as one of the last major Russian sectors not yet covered by substantial restrictions. The proposal included restrictions on some fish products and a complete ban on others, including cod.
The fisheries provisions were later removed from the package after opposition from member states including Germany, Poland and Portugal.
The reported objections centered on supply-chain exposure. German and Polish processors rely heavily on Alaska pollock, while Portugal has strong demand for and processing links to cod. A sudden import prohibition could have raised raw-material costs, disrupted processing operations and put employment under pressure. It could also have contributed to higher food prices.
This was not evidence that the EU had abandoned its wider sanctions policy. Rather, it showed the difficulty of restricting a product category in which European processors and consumers still depended on established supply flows. The EU had already banned Russian caviar imports in 2022, but cod and pollock remained commercially significant.
The first-half trade figures reveal a policy dilemma. Russia’s pollock exports to the EU increased to 66,000 tonnes while US and Chinese supplies fell, and Russian fish exports across categories reached $417 million. That made a comprehensive ban more economically sensitive than it might have been if alternative suppliers were expanding quickly.
The available evidence supports a clear conclusion: Russia strengthened its position through a combination of rising shipments, faster value growth and weaker rival supply. At the same time, cod price increases and lower catch limits highlighted the cost pressures facing buyers and processors.
The record provided here does not independently substantiate specific claims about Norebo or Murman Seafood Company, nor does it verify the claim that Russian products account for roughly one-third of the EU market. Those figures should not be treated as established facts without additional evidence.