More Than 80% of Hormuz Traffic Has Shifted to Oman’s Route

The recent Omani-route majority therefore represents resilience, not normalization. Commercial operators are choosing a channel Iran has opposed and has targeted, apparently because U.S. naval protection makes it a viable alternative. CNN’s analysis says Iran attacked dozens of ships attempting to use the Omani-side route, while the United States has been patrolling the waterway.

The distinction matters when assessing President Donald Trump’s claim of “total control.” The available evidence supports a narrower conclusion: U.S. military activity has helped keep some shipping moving and has reduced Iran’s ability to dictate routing, but it has not eliminated attacks or restored normal traffic. A five-day average of only 10 crossings was reported on August 18, even as Trump said the strait was “open and operating.”

Iran still has significant disruptive power

Iran does not need to stop every vessel to exert influence. Threats, attacks, inspections, delays, route demands and uncertainty over insurance can all make a voyage commercially unattractive. Maritime authorities raised the threat level to “severe” after attacks on tankers in July, including a Qatari LNG tanker and a Saudi crude tanker.

Attacks continued even as the Omani route gained market share. The United Arab Emirates said two ADNOC-operated tankers were attacked while transiting the strait in August; the incident caused no casualties but highlighted the risks facing ships using the waterway.

The result is a partially functioning corridor rather than a binary open-or-closed situation. Some ships transit openly, others alter course or turn around, and some vessels switch off tracking systems, making observed traffic an incomplete measure of total movement.

Oil is moving, but below normal levels

A functioning route does not automatically restore oil throughput. Supplied reporting places current Gulf oil flows at roughly 15 million barrels per day, below the approximately 20 million barrels per day reported before the war. The current-flow estimate is also reflected in U.S. Energy Department figures cited by CNBC, while other reporting has produced different estimates of how much oil is actually leaving the Gulf.

That uncertainty is itself important. Ship-tracking systems can miss “dark” tankers whose transponders are disabled, while security delays, insurance restrictions, tanker availability and ship-to-ship transfers make it difficult to compare physical flows with visible transits.

The practical conclusion is that the strait can be open enough for oil to move while remaining too unreliable to support prewar confidence. A few successful voyages do not prove that supply chains have returned to normal.

Iran is seeking to turn leverage into fees and recognition

Tehran has pursued a route arrangement with Oman that would give Iran a formal role in managing ships entering the Gulf. Reuters reported that an Iranian proposal sought fees of 5% to 7% of cargo value, while industry sources said sanctions and insurance restrictions would make the model difficult to implement.

Oman’s proposal takes a different approach: a joint regional mechanism would manage navigation, environmental protection, search and rescue and related services, with voluntary rather than compulsory fees. Reuters noted that international maritime law does not allow coastal states to demand payment simply for permission to pass through a strait, although charges for specific services can be treated differently.

Iran and Oman have said they are close to an agreement on a route or “shipping map,” and Iranian officials have described the coordinates as agreed. But public reporting does not establish that a final, operational framework has been implemented, nor does it resolve the central dispute over who can authorize passage and collect fees.

The route data make the stakes clear: if most ships avoid Iran’s preferred corridor, Tehran has less practical ability to collect transit charges.

Commercial workarounds are reducing—but not removing—the exposure

Energy companies are adapting to the risk rather than waiting for a fully stable reopening. Saudi Aramco has offered Arab Medium and Arab Heavy crude through ship-to-ship transfers near Oman, a model that can move cargoes beyond the most exposed part of the journey.

Those arrangements add complexity. Transfers require additional coordination, vessels and insurance, and can increase freight and handling costs. They also make supply-chain visibility harder, particularly when ships operate without broadcasting their positions.

Iraq has pursued a different workaround. Its state oil marketer, SOMO, reportedly negotiated with U.S. and German shipping companies to move crude through Hormuz on Iraqi-flagged tankers. The negotiations illustrate Baghdad’s effort to secure politically acceptable passage, but the supplied reporting does not establish that a durable agreement or successful export mechanism has been completed.

The main risk is a fragile reopening

The most serious danger is not necessarily a permanent physical closure. It is a militarized waterway in which traffic can resume and then collapse after another attack, mine incident, dispute over route fees or breakdown in Iran–Oman negotiations. Traffic data have repeatedly shown how quickly commercial operators respond to renewed fighting.

That fragility can raise freight rates, war-risk insurance premiums, security expenses and transshipment costs. It also threatens the reliability of oil and LNG deliveries and increases the chance that an incident involving a commercial vessel triggers a broader regional confrontation.

The Omani-route majority is therefore best read as a measure of changing control, not as proof of complete control by either side. Iran’s ability to impose danger remains real. But the fact that most tracked vessels are choosing the alternative route despite Iranian opposition shows that Tehran is losing some of its ability to determine how commercial shipping uses the strait. U.S. naval protection has helped create that opening, but only a credible and durable regional agreement could make it normal.