The damage created a major bottleneck because CPC normally depends on multiple moorings to load crude efficiently. SPM-3 was also undergoing maintenance around the same period, leaving the terminal with sharply reduced redundancy. CPC accelerated work on the remaining infrastructure, including repairs intended to restore SPM-3, while a broader project to replace aging mooring units moved forward.

How CPC is replacing the damaged mooring

The response involves both short-term repairs and a longer-term equipment replacement program:

• SPM-3 repairs: CPC expedited maintenance on SPM-3 after SPM-2 was damaged. The consortium later said repairs to the third mooring had been completed, allowing the terminal to meet shipper nominations at full loading capacity at that point.
• SPM-2 replacement: CPC began a planned replacement project for SPM-2 in May 2026. The mooring had been in service since 2001, so the replacement was not solely an emergency response to the attack.
• New offshore equipment: Kazakhstan said delivery of two new single-point mooring units had been brought forward from April to January to support the terminal’s repairs and restoration of capacity. The available reporting does not establish that every element of the replacement program has been installed and operating continuously.

The tanker observed at SPM-2 is therefore important because it may show the damaged buoy—or its replacement—is being tested or used. However, one vessel alongside the mooring cannot establish sustained throughput, successful commissioning across all systems, or protection from renewed attacks.

July attacks disrupted both shipments and production

CPC briefly resumed accepting crude and loading tankers on July 27 after a week-long suspension. Two tankers were reported loading Tengizchevroil crude at the Novorossiysk terminal, and Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said pipeline operations had restarted.

That reopening was short-lived as a security signal. On July 19, two tankers—the ASIA and NISSOS IOS—were attacked during loading, prompting CPC to suspend loadings. The ASIA caught fire, although CPC said there were no injuries among its staff or contractors and no oil spill.

Further attacks followed. On July 30, another vessel was attacked while loading at SPM-3, and CPC halted loading again. The interruptions reduced CPC’s July loadings by more than 20% from schedule, to roughly 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day, according to sources cited by Reuters.

The disruption also reached Kazakhstan’s oil fields. When CPC stopped accepting crude, reports said storage tanks at the terminal were full, leaving producers with less room to move oil into the export system. Kazakhstan’s daily oil production consequently fell by more than half during the closure, before exports resumed.

The security risk remains after the restart signal

The central challenge is no longer only whether CPC can repair or replace its moorings. It is whether tankers can safely approach, load and leave the terminal.

A Greek-run Suezmax tanker named Skiros was reportedly attacked near Novorossiysk on August 16 after loading at the CPC terminal. The incident indicates that the threat may extend beyond the loading buoy itself and can continue after a vessel has departed.

That distinction matters. Restoring SPM-2 would increase physical loading capacity, but it would not by itself remove the operational risk created by drone attacks on the terminal area or vessels serving it. CPC has already resumed operations under security conditions and confirmed tanker nominations, rather than demonstrating that the route is permanently secure.

Why a sustained CPC restart matters

CPC is the main export route for Kazakhstan’s crude, carrying oil from major producing projects including Tengizchevroil and other fields to the Black Sea. When the route operates normally, producers can continue feeding crude into the pipeline and loading tankers for international markets.

When it does not, the consequences appear quickly: terminal storage fills, producers face output restrictions and international shipments fall. July’s more-than-20% loading shortfall illustrates the scale of the disruption, while the reported halving of Kazakhstan’s daily production shows why a prolonged outage would be more than a shipping problem.

For the oil market, a durable restart would restore a major flow of CPC Blend and reduce one source of Black Sea supply uncertainty. For Kazakhstan, it would provide the infrastructure needed to unwind production curbs and restore export activity. But the latest evidence supports a cautious conclusion: CPC may be bringing SPM-2 back into service, while the security environment still makes reliable, full-capacity operations uncertain.

The damage created a major bottleneck because CPC normally depends on multiple moorings to load crude efficiently. SPM-3 was also undergoing maintenance around the same period, leaving the terminal with sharply reduced redundancy. CPC accelerated work on the remaining infrastructure, including repairs intended to restore SPM-3, while a broader project to replace aging mooring units moved forward.

How CPC is replacing the damaged mooring

The response involves both short-term repairs and a longer-term equipment replacement program:

• SPM-3 repairs: CPC expedited maintenance on SPM-3 after SPM-2 was damaged. The consortium later said repairs to the third mooring had been completed, allowing the terminal to meet shipper nominations at full loading capacity at that point.
• SPM-2 replacement: CPC began a planned replacement project for SPM-2 in May 2026. The mooring had been in service since 2001, so the replacement was not solely an emergency response to the attack.
• New offshore equipment: Kazakhstan said delivery of two new single-point mooring units had been brought forward from April to January to support the terminal’s repairs and restoration of capacity. The available reporting does not establish that every element of the replacement program has been installed and operating continuously.

The tanker observed at SPM-2 is therefore important because it may show the damaged buoy—or its replacement—is being tested or used. However, one vessel alongside the mooring cannot establish sustained throughput, successful commissioning across all systems, or protection from renewed attacks.

July attacks disrupted both shipments and production

CPC briefly resumed accepting crude and loading tankers on July 27 after a week-long suspension. Two tankers were reported loading Tengizchevroil crude at the Novorossiysk terminal, and Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said pipeline operations had restarted.

That reopening was short-lived as a security signal. On July 19, two tankers—the ASIA and NISSOS IOS—were attacked during loading, prompting CPC to suspend loadings. The ASIA caught fire, although CPC said there were no injuries among its staff or contractors and no oil spill.

Further attacks followed. On July 30, another vessel was attacked while loading at SPM-3, and CPC halted loading again. The interruptions reduced CPC’s July loadings by more than 20% from schedule, to roughly 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day, according to sources cited by Reuters.

The disruption also reached Kazakhstan’s oil fields. When CPC stopped accepting crude, reports said storage tanks at the terminal were full, leaving producers with less room to move oil into the export system. Kazakhstan’s daily oil production consequently fell by more than half during the closure, before exports resumed.

The security risk remains after the restart signal

The central challenge is no longer only whether CPC can repair or replace its moorings. It is whether tankers can safely approach, load and leave the terminal.

A Greek-run Suezmax tanker named Skiros was reportedly attacked near Novorossiysk on August 16 after loading at the CPC terminal. The incident indicates that the threat may extend beyond the loading buoy itself and can continue after a vessel has departed.

That distinction matters. Restoring SPM-2 would increase physical loading capacity, but it would not by itself remove the operational risk created by drone attacks on the terminal area or vessels serving it. CPC has already resumed operations under security conditions and confirmed tanker nominations, rather than demonstrating that the route is permanently secure.

Why a sustained CPC restart matters

CPC is the main export route for Kazakhstan’s crude, carrying oil from major producing projects including Tengizchevroil and other fields to the Black Sea. When the route operates normally, producers can continue feeding crude into the pipeline and loading tankers for international markets.

When it does not, the consequences appear quickly: terminal storage fills, producers face output restrictions and international shipments fall. July’s more-than-20% loading shortfall illustrates the scale of the disruption, while the reported halving of Kazakhstan’s daily production shows why a prolonged outage would be more than a shipping problem.

For the oil market, a durable restart would restore a major flow of CPC Blend and reduce one source of Black Sea supply uncertainty. For Kazakhstan, it would provide the infrastructure needed to unwind production curbs and restore export activity. But the latest evidence supports a cautious conclusion: CPC may be bringing SPM-2 back into service, while the security environment still makes reliable, full-capacity operations uncertain.