Trump’s Claimed IRGC Backchannel Meets Iranian Denials as U.S.-Iran Talks Stall

Reports about a secret U.S. channel to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have exposed the depth of the diplomatic impasse between Washington and Tehran. The Trump administration was reported to have used Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani to reach IRGC leaders after questioning whether Iran’s formal negotiators spoke for the military force.

Iranian officials rejected that account. IRGC spokesman Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi said no talks were taking place between IRGC officials and Americans, describing Trump’s claim as a “delusion.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei separately denied unofficial contacts through Iraq’s Kurdistan region and reports of a secret U.S.-Iran meeting in Erbil.

What Trump reportedly claimed

The reported backchannel was presented as an attempt to bypass Iran’s formal negotiating team and communicate directly with the IRGC. According to the Axios account cited by multiple outlets, U.S. officials approached Barzani because he was viewed as having relationships with both U.S. and IRGC figures. The alleged channel was intended to clarify whether Iranian negotiators Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Abbas Araghchi had the authority to speak for the IRGC.

The reporting is not fully consistent about what happened next. Axios reported that an IRGC official reached Barzani’s office in Erbil for a secure call and that U.S. officials considered secret talks there. Another report said the proposed meeting never occurred and that Pakistani and Omani mediators continued their efforts instead. Iran’s public denials mean the existence and scope of any direct contact remain contested rather than independently established.

How Mohebbi and Baghaei responded

Mohebbi’s response was categorical: he said there were no discussions between IRGC officials and U.S. representatives and that even Iran’s diplomatic apparatus was not negotiating with Washington. He attributed the claim to what he described as fantasies connected to U.S. defeat and desperation in the war, while pointing to Washington’s alleged breach of its promises.

Mohebbi also emphasized an institutional distinction. In his account, the IRGC is a military-security organization, not Iran’s diplomatic channel; formal diplomacy belongs to the state’s authorized institutions. That distinction undercut the idea that an unacknowledged IRGC channel could substitute for negotiations conducted through Iran’s official diplomatic machinery.

Baghaei rejected reports of unofficial contact through officials in Iraqi Kurdistan and denied that a secret U.S.-Iran meeting had taken place in Erbil. Iranian officials portrayed such reports as part of a broader psychological or hybrid-war effort designed to create political divisions and project weakness. Claims that the reports were specifically intended to manipulate oil or energy prices are allegations by Iranian officials, not independently verified findings.

Iran’s conditions and the stalled diplomatic track

Tehran’s denials came as Iran was also refusing to restart direct negotiations. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said messages were still being exchanged through intermediaries, but that Iran would not return to direct talks while Washington allegedly violated the June memorandum.

The June 17 memorandum signed by Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian established an interim framework covering a ceasefire, Iran’s nuclear program, economic relief and the Strait of Hormuz. It created a 60-day period for negotiating a final agreement, but the available reporting does not show that the framework produced a durable settlement or a completed follow-on deal.

Iran has tied any broader settlement to demands that include an end to attacks and alleged U.S. violations, compensation, the release of frozen Iranian assets, the withdrawal of U.S. forces and restrictions affecting U.S. and Israeli-linked vessels. Some sources present these as positions of the wider Iranian leadership rather than demands attributable specifically to Mohebbi, so they should not be treated as a single spokesman’s complete negotiating platform.

Why the Oman-Hormuz discussions were different

The separate Iran-Oman track did not amount to direct U.S.-Iran negotiations. Araghchi described it as a technical discussion over maritime routes and shipping management in the Strait of Hormuz. He said an arrangement with Oman could advance without automatically reopening the waterway, whose full reopening remained conditional on additional U.S. concessions.

That distinction mattered because the maritime issue remained connected to the wider conflict. Iran continued to insist that the strait would not fully reopen until Washington met its conditions, while reports also described another vessel being hit in the waterway.

The domestic message from Tehran

Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei called for national cohesion, rapid wartime decision-making and resistance to U.S. pressure. His remarks fit the Iranian authorities’ broader description of the conflict as involving military, economic, media and internal-security pressure.

The available source material does not support attributing to Ejei the specific formulation that he urged obedience to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Other provided reporting identifies Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s supreme leader in this scenario. That distinction is important when separating verified statements from claims added in secondary summaries.

What the dispute reveals

The backchannel controversy does not establish that a functioning U.S.-IRGC peace process existed. It shows instead that Washington reportedly explored an alternative route to Iran’s military leadership while Tehran publicly denied the channel and insisted that any renewed diplomacy required concrete concessions.

Three obstacles remain clear:

• Trust: Iran says Washington violated the June memorandum, while U.S. statements have continued to claim progress or control that Tehran disputes.
• Authority: Washington’s reported effort to contact the IRGC directly reflected uncertainty over whether Iran’s formal negotiators could deliver commitments accepted by the military establishment.
• Sequencing: Iran treats compensation, sanctions relief, troop withdrawal and the conditions for reopening Hormuz as prerequisites, while the United States has sought progress on ceasefire and navigation arrangements first.

Until those disagreements over authority, sequencing and enforcement are resolved, reports of secret channels are more a measure of reciprocal distrust than proof of diplomatic momentum.