Zelenskyy’s argument was that every unblocked supply route can help preserve Russia’s ability to sustain attacks. He therefore asked partners to target not only Russian defense companies, but also individuals and legal entities that assist with missile production, provide launchers, or supply the necessary components.
Closing loopholes would mean making existing sanctions harder to evade. The practical focus is on tracing procurement networks, restricting re-exports, and identifying companies or intermediaries that continue to connect Russian manufacturers with foreign technology. Available reporting supports the existence of these enforcement concerns, but does not establish that every component found in a Russian weapon was knowingly sold for military use by its original manufacturer.
Zelenskyy said Ukraine had coordinated with its intelligence agencies, Foreign Ministry, and special services. The goal was to determine two things: when Kyiv expected new sanctions decisions from particular partners, and which pressure points could most effectively reduce Russia’s active military capabilities.
That description suggests a targeted approach rather than a request for indiscriminate additions to sanctions lists. Kyiv was assembling intelligence on procurement routes and priority companies, then sharing proposals with partners whose decisions could disrupt those networks. Ukraine had also ordered preparations for a sanctions operation focused on specific sectors and companies within Russia’s military-industrial complex.
No public, partner-by-partner timetable for future sanctions decisions was provided in the available reporting. The coordination described by Zelenskyy was therefore an effort to align intelligence, diplomacy, and enforcement priorities—not an announcement that all expected measures had already been approved.
Zelenskyy’s appeal coincided with news that EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas planned to propose what she described as the bloc’s most far-reaching sanctions listings since the start of the full-scale invasion. If adopted, the measures would increase the total number of sanctioned Russian individuals, companies, and organizations by about one-third.
EU diplomatic sources cited by Reuters said the proposal could include roughly 1,600 individuals and entities, primarily connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. The figure describes a proposed package, not a final list; Kallas had not publicly detailed all of the designations or their exact timing.
The proposed expansion would build on the EU’s July measures. The bloc’s 21st sanctions package added 218 listings—48 individuals and 170 entities—and subjected those listed to measures including asset freezes and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available. Listed individuals also face travel bans.
The July package also targeted parts of Russia’s financial system, including banks and cryptocurrency networks.
The sequence of announcements shows the difference between announcing sanctions and making them effective. New designations can increase legal and financial pressure, but Russia’s continued access to foreign-made components shows why enforcement across borders and through intermediaries remains central.
Zelenskyy was asking G7 and EU partners to connect sanctions policy with the physical supply chains that support missile and weapons production. The proposed EU autumn package could widen the number of targeted entities, while Kyiv’s intelligence-led coordination is intended to help identify the routes and actors that broader restrictions must reach. The package remained prospective at the time of the August 17 reporting, so its eventual scope and impact could not yet be confirmed.