The firm’s forecast calls for approximately 14 million iPhone Ultra units in fiscal 2027. Of those, it assumes only about 4 million would replace sales of conventional iPhones, leaving most of the volume as incremental demand.
That assumption is the key distinction between a growth thesis and a simple product-switching thesis. If buyers mostly trade from an existing iPhone into the foldable, Apple would gain mix but not necessarily many additional users. Redburn instead believes Apple’s entry could attract customers who are not currently buying iPhones or encourage existing users to purchase a higher-priced device without sharply reducing the rest of the lineup.
The analysts point to AirPods and Apple Watch as precedents for Apple expanding categories it enters. Their analysis attributes roughly 65% to 75% of incremental unit growth in those categories to Apple after launch. That comparison supports Redburn’s view that Apple can sometimes create demand around a new product rather than merely redistribute existing demand.
Redburn projects iPhone revenue running 3% to 14% above consensus across fiscal 2026 through fiscal 2030, while its overall earnings estimates are reportedly 8% to 18% above consensus by fiscal 2030.
The model combines several effects:
One summary of the call puts the firm’s expected iPhone sales growth at 12% annually through fiscal 2030, with sales reaching as much as 14% above consensus expectations. These are analyst forecasts, not Apple guidance.
Redburn reportedly described Apple Intelligence and Apple’s foundation-model efforts as subpar and behind frontier competitors. It also highlighted Apple’s dependence on Google’s Gemini for some generative-AI capabilities and the broader strategic importance of Google’s search-placement payments to Apple.
That weakness is not simply a risk in Redburn’s framework; it is also an opportunity. The firm believes Apple could improve its position by focusing on the parts of AI where it has structural advantages: hardware integration, proprietary silicon, distribution, privacy controls, and services.
Redburn’s suggested approach, described as “Fast Follower 2.0,” would involve adopting capable open-source models rather than attempting to lead foundation-model development from scratch. Nvidia’s Nemotron family was cited as one possible option, potentially alongside a deeper relationship with Nvidia.
The idea is strategic rather than established. The available reporting describes a possible Nvidia partnership, not a confirmed deal, and notes that Apple and Nvidia have had strained relations historically. The bullish case therefore assumes Apple can secure or deploy competitive models while using its ecosystem to make them useful at scale.
The foldable thesis has several obvious execution risks. A production delay would push back the catalyst, while problems with display creases, hinge durability, or overall hardware quality could damage demand for a device positioned at the top of the market.
There is also a pricing risk: consumers may not be willing to pay $2,199, especially if the device offers an evolutionary rather than transformational experience. And if most foldable buyers simply switch from other iPhones, the volume contribution would be less incremental than Redburn assumes.
The AI case is similarly conditional. Apple could remain dependent on third-party providers, an Nvidia arrangement may never materialize, and adopting open-source models would not by itself guarantee a better consumer product. Redburn’s upgrade is therefore a bet on execution and strategic flexibility—not a claim that Apple has already solved AI.
Rothschild Redburn upgraded Apple because it sees an underappreciated combination of premium hardware growth and AI optionality. Its model assumes a roughly $2,199 foldable iPhone could sell 14 million units in fiscal 2027, cannibalize only a minority of traditional iPhone sales, raise iPhone ASPs, and push revenue and earnings above consensus.
The second leg is a potential shift from trying to develop frontier models internally toward integrating strong open-source models into Apple’s hardware-and-services ecosystem. If both assumptions prove correct, Redburn’s $400 target has a clear logic. If the foldable is delayed, demand is weak, or Apple’s AI reset fails, much of the upside thesis disappears.