Market share achieved

• H1 2026: 69,513 China-made EVs registered — a 178.7% year-on-year increase, lifting share of new EV registrations to 35% (up from 26.8% in H1 2025) .
• One report using a slightly different methodology (including some non-passenger vehicles) pegs the share at over 40% .
• Full-year 2025: 74,728 China-made EVs sold, a 33.9% market share .
• Imported-car crown: China-made vehicles (ICE + EV) captured 41.2% of South Korea's total imported-car market in H1 2026, overtaking Germany for the first time .
• This marks a rapid rise from just 4.7% in 2022 .

Structural risks from Chinese import dependence

• Subsidy cliff: In July 2026, South Korea tightened EV subsidy rules, temporarily disqualifying new BYD and Zeekr models from purchase incentives — a direct policy response to the surge .
• Auto parts dependency: Imports of Chinese auto parts hit a record $1.439 billion in H1 2026, increasing reliance that hurts domestic suppliers .
• Strategic influence expansion: Chinese carmakers are moving beyond vehicle sales into strategic investments and critical supply-chain positions, deepening what analysts call "Korea's China dilemma" .
• Domestic industry pressure: KAMA's chairman warned that without production incentives matching those of China, India, and the US, South Korea could cede EV leadership entirely . Domestic EV share has already fallen from 75% to 57.2% .
• Geopolitical risk: The Bank of Korea flagged that China-made vehicles now represent the largest share of imported cars, surpassing Germany, and the concentration poses risks amid trade tensions .

Argentina

Chinese EVs have reshaped Argentina's market from near-zero to a dominant force in under two years, enabled by President Milei's tariff-free import policy, but this has triggered a collapse in local manufacturing and created acute structural dependency risks.

Retail expansion and fleet deals

• Tariff-free entry: Milei's government lifted import tariffs on EVs and hybrids, allowing up to 50,000 units to enter duty-free in 2026 — a policy aimed at crushing inflation and opening the protected market .
• BYD's rapid ascent: BYD launched sales in Argentina in late 2025 and vaulted into the top 10 car sellers overall in South America's second-largest economy within its first year .
• Mass shipments: In January 2026, the first dedicated Chinese EV cargo vessel unloaded over 5,800 EVs and hybrids at Zárate port, a scale unprecedented for Argentina .
• Chinese EV imports hit a five-year high in 2026, lowering car prices significantly .

Market share achieved

• Collapse of local production: The share of locally manufactured new cars sold in Argentina fell from 65% in the first five months of 2023 to just 34% in the same period of 2026 .
• Import surge: The share of cars imported from outside South America climbed to 25%, with China the fastest-growing source .
• China has become Argentina's third-largest source of imported cars, with the trend accelerating sharply in 2026 .
• Exact EV-only market share figures are not yet published, but the broader displacement of local production is dramatic.

Structural risks from Chinese import dependence

• De-industrialization risk: The local auto manufacturing base is shrinking rapidly — 65% domestic share in 2023 vs. 34% in 2026 — threatening jobs, supply chains, and industrial capacity .
• Policy reversibility: The tariff-free quota is a government decree, not a treaty commitment, making the entire market structure vulnerable to a single policy reversal by a future administration.
• Geopolitical friction: Milei's pro-US, anti-China rhetoric during his campaign has given way to a pragmatic embrace of Chinese EVs, creating tension with Washington. US officials have pushed Buenos Aires to reduce economic ties with Beijing .
• Asymmetric dependency: An academic analysis found that Argentina's model reproduces "asymmetric dependencies and extractivist logics" in its economic relationship with China, even as it pursues energy transition goals .
• Cyber and data security concerns: Connected Chinese EVs raise potential cybersecurity and data-sovereignty risks that importing democracies are only beginning to address .

Market share achieved

• H1 2026: 69,513 China-made EVs registered — a 178.7% year-on-year increase, lifting share of new EV registrations to 35% (up from 26.8% in H1 2025) .
• One report using a slightly different methodology (including some non-passenger vehicles) pegs the share at over 40% .
• Full-year 2025: 74,728 China-made EVs sold, a 33.9% market share .
• Imported-car crown: China-made vehicles (ICE + EV) captured 41.2% of South Korea's total imported-car market in H1 2026, overtaking Germany for the first time .
• This marks a rapid rise from just 4.7% in 2022 .

Structural risks from Chinese import dependence

• Subsidy cliff: In July 2026, South Korea tightened EV subsidy rules, temporarily disqualifying new BYD and Zeekr models from purchase incentives — a direct policy response to the surge .
• Auto parts dependency: Imports of Chinese auto parts hit a record $1.439 billion in H1 2026, increasing reliance that hurts domestic suppliers .
• Strategic influence expansion: Chinese carmakers are moving beyond vehicle sales into strategic investments and critical supply-chain positions, deepening what analysts call "Korea's China dilemma" .
• Domestic industry pressure: KAMA's chairman warned that without production incentives matching those of China, India, and the US, South Korea could cede EV leadership entirely . Domestic EV share has already fallen from 75% to 57.2% .
• Geopolitical risk: The Bank of Korea flagged that China-made vehicles now represent the largest share of imported cars, surpassing Germany, and the concentration poses risks amid trade tensions .

Argentina

Chinese EVs have reshaped Argentina's market from near-zero to a dominant force in under two years, enabled by President Milei's tariff-free import policy, but this has triggered a collapse in local manufacturing and created acute structural dependency risks.

Retail expansion and fleet deals

• Tariff-free entry: Milei's government lifted import tariffs on EVs and hybrids, allowing up to 50,000 units to enter duty-free in 2026 — a policy aimed at crushing inflation and opening the protected market .
• BYD's rapid ascent: BYD launched sales in Argentina in late 2025 and vaulted into the top 10 car sellers overall in South America's second-largest economy within its first year .
• Mass shipments: In January 2026, the first dedicated Chinese EV cargo vessel unloaded over 5,800 EVs and hybrids at Zárate port, a scale unprecedented for Argentina .
• Chinese EV imports hit a five-year high in 2026, lowering car prices significantly .

Market share achieved

• Collapse of local production: The share of locally manufactured new cars sold in Argentina fell from 65% in the first five months of 2023 to just 34% in the same period of 2026 .
• Import surge: The share of cars imported from outside South America climbed to 25%, with China the fastest-growing source .
• China has become Argentina's third-largest source of imported cars, with the trend accelerating sharply in 2026 .
• Exact EV-only market share figures are not yet published, but the broader displacement of local production is dramatic.

Structural risks from Chinese import dependence

• De-industrialization risk: The local auto manufacturing base is shrinking rapidly — 65% domestic share in 2023 vs. 34% in 2026 — threatening jobs, supply chains, and industrial capacity .
• Policy reversibility: The tariff-free quota is a government decree, not a treaty commitment, making the entire market structure vulnerable to a single policy reversal by a future administration.
• Geopolitical friction: Milei's pro-US, anti-China rhetoric during his campaign has given way to a pragmatic embrace of Chinese EVs, creating tension with Washington. US officials have pushed Buenos Aires to reduce economic ties with Beijing .
• Asymmetric dependency: An academic analysis found that Argentina's model reproduces "asymmetric dependencies and extractivist logics" in its economic relationship with China, even as it pursues energy transition goals .
• Cyber and data security concerns: Connected Chinese EVs raise potential cybersecurity and data-sovereignty risks that importing democracies are only beginning to address .