The August 2025 EU-US Framework Agreement set a 15% US tariff ceiling on most EU goods in exchange for EU tariff reductions on US industrial and agricultural products, with a sunset clause expiring 31 December 2029 . The deal was supposed to resolve the long-running metals dispute — and it hasn't.
After the agreement, the US in August 2025 added 407 product categories to its Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum derivatives . In April 2026, Washington further tightened duties on aluminum and copper via a new Presidential Proclamation, applying tariffs to the full customs value of imported products regardless of metal content
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In April 2026, Germany and France led EU member states in rejecting a US proposal to settle the metals dispute, casting fresh uncertainty over the entire framework's implementation . The EU's own trade chief, Maroš Šefčovič, traveled to Washington in April 2026 seeking to break the deadlock but failed
. By August 2026, both sides extended the suspension of retaliatory tariffs as a temporary truce, but the underlying negotiations remain stuck
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In a significant escalation, the Trump administration published a White House report in August 2026 accusing the EU — along with over 40 other economies including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Mexico, and Canada — of being part of a $75 billion transshipment network that China uses to evade US tariffs . The report is titled "The Great Transshipment Scam"
. The core allegation is that Chinese steel, aluminum, and other goods are routed through these jurisdictions and re-exported to the US with mislabeled origin, circumventing the 30–50% tariffs Washington has imposed.
This accusation directly undermines the EU's negotiating position. The US argues that the EU cannot simultaneously demand the removal of Section 232 tariffs while serving as a conduit for the very Chinese overcapacity those tariffs were designed to block. The EU has rejected the allegation, but the timing — alongside the CBAM dispute — deepens Washington's view that Brussels is not a reliable trade partner.
The tariff escalations are producing measurable and severe damage:
On the Brazil dimension, the available evidence does not confirm a specific US-EU dispute over declining trade flows with Brazil in August 2026. The Brazil angle appears to be part of the broader global steel trade disruption: as US and EU markets become more restricted, steel shipments are being redirected to third markets including South America. Brazilian steel exports to the EU actually rose 47.4% in May 2026 compared to a year earlier, though they dipped for the January-to-May period overall . No direct US-EU confrontation over Brazilian trade specifically was surfaced in the search results.
The CBAM naming dispute, the framework agreement's near-breakdown over metals, the new Chinese transshipment accusation, and the real-world collapse of steel trade flows all reinforce each other — creating a climate where Washington sees Brussels as using climate policy as a trade weapon, and Brussels sees Washington as reneging on a deal it signed just a year ago.