'The morning after they use a bomb, all of America's military bases around the world will be occupied. Today, things are different than World War II,' Naqdi told PBS, according to a transcript of the interview .

The warning echoes a long-standing IRGC doctrine: that the United States has global vulnerabilities that Iran can exploit through asymmetric means, even without matching US nuclear capabilities.

Justification for not pursuing nuclear weapons

Naqdi argued that Iran does not need to pursue a nuclear bomb because it relies on popular support and public mobilization as its primary source of deterrence . In the PBS interview, he stated: 'We have to attain deterrence so that the enemy never dares to attack us, so we can live with security'—but he framed that deterrence as coming from Iran's capacity for prolonged asymmetric warfare and its ability to impose costs, not from a nuclear arsenal .

This position aligns with Iran's longstanding official policy of not seeking nuclear weapons, though international concerns about Iran's nuclear program have persisted for decades.

The strategy to outlast Trump

Naqdi explicitly outlined a strategy of deliberately drawing out the war with the United States until President Donald Trump leaves office in January 2029 . Key elements of this plan include:

• Outlast the US administration: He said Iran could prolong the conflict into the next US presidential term to show any future administration that 'there is a cost' to hostile actions against Iran .
• Exhaust the US: Naqdi claimed Iran has 'learned how to fight America' over five months of war and that 'victory is on our side' .
• Build deterrence through attrition: Prolonged fighting is framed as a way to build lasting deterrence so the enemy 'never dares to attack us' .
• Expand operations beyond borders: He stated the IRGC has been ordered to develop offensive capabilities for operations outside Iran's borders .

'One way is to prolong this war until we get to the next term of the presidency and cause attrition, so that if anyone else wants to attack Iran, they will know there is a cost,' Naqdi said .

How these threats fit Iran's broader strategy

Naqdi's statements are not isolated rhetoric. They align with a series of coordinated Iranian moves across three fronts: the Strait of Hormuz, oil spill compensation claims, and stalled diplomacy.

Strait of Hormuz control: Iran's parliament is reviewing legislation to ban US and Israeli ships from the Strait of Hormuz and charge other nations a toll until Tehran is compensated for war damage . Iran says it has finalized an agreement with Oman defining new shipping lanes that would prohibit American and Israeli vessels, with fines of up to 20% of cargo value for violators . Iran has tied any reopening of the waterway to US concessions including compensation, lifting sanctions, and ending the naval blockade .

Oil spill compensation: On August 13, 2026, Iran demanded compensation from shipping nations after an oil slick reached its southern Qeshm Island, citing environmental degradation in the Strait of Hormuz . The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated the spill has 'degraded the waters of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman' . TankerTrackers, a US-hosted monitoring service, reported that the spill appeared to derive from an Iranian attack on the bulk carrier Minoan Pioneer in Omani waters on August 3 .

Stalled diplomacy: The US-Iran interim agreement—a 14-point 'Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding' signed in June 2026 that declared an end to war and established a 60-day ceasefire—has effectively collapsed . A senior Iranian source reports there has been 'absolutely no progress' in talks to revive it, and Tehran is not discussing any extension of the ceasefire . Iran says Washington must first return to the June interim pact and set a timetable for commitments before any further talks can happen . Both sides are trading demands for compensation from each other, further dimming prospects for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the conflict .

What this means

Naqdi's PBS interview represents one of the most direct articulations of Iran's current military and diplomatic strategy. The combination of a nuclear warning, a public mobilization-based deterrence doctrine, and a war-of-attrition timeline aimed at outlasting the Trump administration suggests that Tehran is preparing for a prolonged confrontation rather than seeking a quick diplomatic exit. The collapse of the June interim deal, the ongoing blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, and the mutual compensation demands between Washington and Tehran all reinforce this trajectory.

'The morning after they use a bomb, all of America's military bases around the world will be occupied. Today, things are different than World War II,' Naqdi told PBS, according to a transcript of the interview .

The warning echoes a long-standing IRGC doctrine: that the United States has global vulnerabilities that Iran can exploit through asymmetric means, even without matching US nuclear capabilities.

Justification for not pursuing nuclear weapons

Naqdi argued that Iran does not need to pursue a nuclear bomb because it relies on popular support and public mobilization as its primary source of deterrence . In the PBS interview, he stated: 'We have to attain deterrence so that the enemy never dares to attack us, so we can live with security'—but he framed that deterrence as coming from Iran's capacity for prolonged asymmetric warfare and its ability to impose costs, not from a nuclear arsenal .

This position aligns with Iran's longstanding official policy of not seeking nuclear weapons, though international concerns about Iran's nuclear program have persisted for decades.

The strategy to outlast Trump

Naqdi explicitly outlined a strategy of deliberately drawing out the war with the United States until President Donald Trump leaves office in January 2029 . Key elements of this plan include:

• Outlast the US administration: He said Iran could prolong the conflict into the next US presidential term to show any future administration that 'there is a cost' to hostile actions against Iran .
• Exhaust the US: Naqdi claimed Iran has 'learned how to fight America' over five months of war and that 'victory is on our side' .
• Build deterrence through attrition: Prolonged fighting is framed as a way to build lasting deterrence so the enemy 'never dares to attack us' .
• Expand operations beyond borders: He stated the IRGC has been ordered to develop offensive capabilities for operations outside Iran's borders .

'One way is to prolong this war until we get to the next term of the presidency and cause attrition, so that if anyone else wants to attack Iran, they will know there is a cost,' Naqdi said .

How these threats fit Iran's broader strategy

Naqdi's statements are not isolated rhetoric. They align with a series of coordinated Iranian moves across three fronts: the Strait of Hormuz, oil spill compensation claims, and stalled diplomacy.

Strait of Hormuz control: Iran's parliament is reviewing legislation to ban US and Israeli ships from the Strait of Hormuz and charge other nations a toll until Tehran is compensated for war damage . Iran says it has finalized an agreement with Oman defining new shipping lanes that would prohibit American and Israeli vessels, with fines of up to 20% of cargo value for violators . Iran has tied any reopening of the waterway to US concessions including compensation, lifting sanctions, and ending the naval blockade .

Oil spill compensation: On August 13, 2026, Iran demanded compensation from shipping nations after an oil slick reached its southern Qeshm Island, citing environmental degradation in the Strait of Hormuz . The Iranian Foreign Ministry stated the spill has 'degraded the waters of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman' . TankerTrackers, a US-hosted monitoring service, reported that the spill appeared to derive from an Iranian attack on the bulk carrier Minoan Pioneer in Omani waters on August 3 .

Stalled diplomacy: The US-Iran interim agreement—a 14-point 'Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding' signed in June 2026 that declared an end to war and established a 60-day ceasefire—has effectively collapsed . A senior Iranian source reports there has been 'absolutely no progress' in talks to revive it, and Tehran is not discussing any extension of the ceasefire . Iran says Washington must first return to the June interim pact and set a timetable for commitments before any further talks can happen . Both sides are trading demands for compensation from each other, further dimming prospects for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the conflict .

What this means

Naqdi's PBS interview represents one of the most direct articulations of Iran's current military and diplomatic strategy. The combination of a nuclear warning, a public mobilization-based deterrence doctrine, and a war-of-attrition timeline aimed at outlasting the Trump administration suggests that Tehran is preparing for a prolonged confrontation rather than seeking a quick diplomatic exit. The collapse of the June interim deal, the ongoing blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, and the mutual compensation demands between Washington and Tehran all reinforce this trajectory.