The primary driver was not voluntary compliance but war. Ukrainian forces struck Russia's oil production, storage, and pipeline assets persistently throughout July, directly forcing lower crude extraction . This marked a dramatic reversal: prior to the intensified campaign, Russia had often exceeded its quota; the deep undershoot represented a war-related disruption rather than a policy choice .

How Ukrainian strikes on refineries triggered a domestic fuel crisis

The campaign against Russia's refining capacity has been even more damaging than the production hit. Ukraine has struck at least 24 of Russia's 34 largest refineries in roughly 50 attacks . The Moscow refinery — the largest fuel supplier to the capital — suffered two drone strikes in June 2026 and was knocked offline for at least six months .

By early July 2026, the Ukrainian General Staff estimated that 43% of Russia's refining capacity was offline, with later monitoring data showing it slumped to its lowest level in 21 years, at 3.91 million barrels per day . The results for Russia's domestic fuel market were swift and severe:

• Widespread shortages and rationing: Fuel shortages spread across more than 40 Russian regions. President Putin publicly admitted the shortages were driven by Ukrainian strikes, telling state television: "Of course, they create problems, that's obvious. Right now we're observing a certain shortage, but it's not critical" .
• Reversal from exporter to importer: Russia, historically one of the world's largest fuel exporters, received its first-ever shipment of gasoline from India in August 2026, produced by Nayara Energy, an Indian refiner partially owned by Russian state oil giant Rosneft . Moscow also imports from Belarus and as far away as Morocco .
• Logistical scrambling: Authorities have been rerouting fuel from Siberia to shield Moscow from shortages, while Crimea — a regular target of Ukrainian attacks — remains the worst-hit area . Russia banned exports of gasoline in April, jet fuel on June 1, and diesel on July 8 .

How Gulf producers widened the OPEC+ production imbalance

While Russia's output cratered, the picture among its OPEC+ allies looked very different. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait sharply increased their own production in July 2026:

• OPEC's total crude output rose by 1.16–1.7 million bpd in July, reaching roughly 19.44 million bpd (or 23.6 million bpd in the broader OPEC-12 figure) .
• Iraq posted the largest monthly increase, ramping up by 665,000 bpd to around 2.62 million bpd. Saudi Arabia's production climbed by 590,000 bpd to 7.35 million bpd, and Kuwait increased output by 393,000 bpd to 1.85 million bpd .
• The seven OPEC+ nations implementing voluntary cuts jointly boosted output by 1.424 million bpd in July compared to June, far exceeding the 188,000 bpd increase agreed at their June meeting .

The result: Gulf states largely compensated for war-related disruptions elsewhere, while Russia — constrained by Ukrainian strikes — could not raise its own output to fill the gap. This widened the production disparity within OPEC+, with Russia falling far short of its quota even as Gulf allies ramped up toward or above theirs .

The primary driver was not voluntary compliance but war. Ukrainian forces struck Russia's oil production, storage, and pipeline assets persistently throughout July, directly forcing lower crude extraction . This marked a dramatic reversal: prior to the intensified campaign, Russia had often exceeded its quota; the deep undershoot represented a war-related disruption rather than a policy choice .

How Ukrainian strikes on refineries triggered a domestic fuel crisis

The campaign against Russia's refining capacity has been even more damaging than the production hit. Ukraine has struck at least 24 of Russia's 34 largest refineries in roughly 50 attacks . The Moscow refinery — the largest fuel supplier to the capital — suffered two drone strikes in June 2026 and was knocked offline for at least six months .

By early July 2026, the Ukrainian General Staff estimated that 43% of Russia's refining capacity was offline, with later monitoring data showing it slumped to its lowest level in 21 years, at 3.91 million barrels per day . The results for Russia's domestic fuel market were swift and severe:

• Widespread shortages and rationing: Fuel shortages spread across more than 40 Russian regions. President Putin publicly admitted the shortages were driven by Ukrainian strikes, telling state television: "Of course, they create problems, that's obvious. Right now we're observing a certain shortage, but it's not critical" .
• Reversal from exporter to importer: Russia, historically one of the world's largest fuel exporters, received its first-ever shipment of gasoline from India in August 2026, produced by Nayara Energy, an Indian refiner partially owned by Russian state oil giant Rosneft . Moscow also imports from Belarus and as far away as Morocco .
• Logistical scrambling: Authorities have been rerouting fuel from Siberia to shield Moscow from shortages, while Crimea — a regular target of Ukrainian attacks — remains the worst-hit area . Russia banned exports of gasoline in April, jet fuel on June 1, and diesel on July 8 .

How Gulf producers widened the OPEC+ production imbalance

While Russia's output cratered, the picture among its OPEC+ allies looked very different. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait sharply increased their own production in July 2026:

• OPEC's total crude output rose by 1.16–1.7 million bpd in July, reaching roughly 19.44 million bpd (or 23.6 million bpd in the broader OPEC-12 figure) .
• Iraq posted the largest monthly increase, ramping up by 665,000 bpd to around 2.62 million bpd. Saudi Arabia's production climbed by 590,000 bpd to 7.35 million bpd, and Kuwait increased output by 393,000 bpd to 1.85 million bpd .
• The seven OPEC+ nations implementing voluntary cuts jointly boosted output by 1.424 million bpd in July compared to June, far exceeding the 188,000 bpd increase agreed at their June meeting .

The result: Gulf states largely compensated for war-related disruptions elsewhere, while Russia — constrained by Ukrainian strikes — could not raise its own output to fill the gap. This widened the production disparity within OPEC+, with Russia falling far short of its quota even as Gulf allies ramped up toward or above theirs .