According to the FT, many transactions were below $100 million, allowing them to fly under the radar . A LinkedIn analysis of the FT report noted that collectively, these small acquisitions create something much larger: European manufacturing capacity, European engineering capability, existing OEM relationships, local supply-chain integration, and increasingly, "Made in EU" product labels
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The FT investigation identified a deliberate shift in Chinese strategy. Rather than merely exporting finished vehicles or components from China, Chinese parts makers began acquiring European suppliers directly, embedding themselves inside the EU's trade barriers .
This approach was partly a response to the EU's escalating tariffs. In 2024, the EU imposed anti-subsidy duties of up to 45% on Chinese-made EVs, making it far more economical for Chinese companies to own factories inside the bloc than to export from China . By keeping individual acquisitions small, Chinese firms accumulated significant supply-chain control without triggering the political backlash that large, headline-grabbing deals would invite
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A deeper structural shift is also underway: Chinese OEMs are increasingly practicing "de-Tier 1" vertical integration—developing their own domain controllers and bypassing traditional European Tier 1 suppliers like Continental, ZF, Faurecia, and Valeo entirely .
The EU's own policies inadvertently accelerated the trend. The bloc's anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese finished vehicles made localized parts production more economically attractive for Chinese firms . In a paradox that European policymakers now acknowledge, the protectionist measures designed to shield European industry instead incentivized deeper Chinese penetration of the supply chain.
The EU's response is now shifting. In May 2026, the FT reported that the EU was formulating rules to force companies to source essential components from at least three different suppliers and cap dependency on any single country at roughly 30–40% —a measure explicitly aimed at reducing reliance on China . These forthcoming regulations would impact several critical industries, including chemicals and industrial machinery
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The pressure on European parts makers is severe and structural. According to an in-depth analysis from 36Kr, three forces are strangling European Tier 1 suppliers simultaneously: Chinese OEMs bypassing them through vertical integration, Chinese rivals undercutting them on price, and the rapid EV transition eroding traditional combustion-engine component revenue streams .
The numbers are stark: a survey found that 7 in 10 European parts makers now face direct competition from Chinese imports in markets like Germany . Chinese suppliers are inundating Germany with low-cost electrical systems and forged metal parts, hitting companies including Robert Bosch, Mahle, and PWO
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Perhaps the most striking finding of the FT investigation is the paradox at the heart of Europe's response. Even as European parts makers struggle, European carmakers themselves are turning to Chinese partners to fill factory floors .
Stellantis has made deals with Leapmotor and Dongfeng for its plants in Spain and France. Fiat workers expect a "China solution" for the Cassino plant. Nissan is working with Chery in the UK, Volkswagen is in talks with Xpeng, and Ford clinched a deal with Geely in Spain . The FT report noted that European automakers are increasingly reliant on Chinese technology and partners to keep factories running
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Chinese FDI in Europe reached a seven-year high of €16.8 billion in 2025, up 67% year-on-year, with the automotive sector attracting more investment than any other industry—€7.6 billion, of which 93% focused on the EV supply chain . China has become the second-largest investor in Europe's EV supply chain, behind only intra-EU flows .
The EU is now racing to catch up. The proposed mandatory supplier diversification rules represent an acknowledgment that the bloc's previous approach—relying on tariff barriers alone—was insufficient. But the deeper question remains: having embedded themselves inside Europe's industrial system, Chinese parts suppliers cannot be easily removed without disrupting the very cars Europe builds.
As the FT series concluded, the rise of Chinese EV makers was only half the story. The quiet acquisition of the supply chain that makes European cars possible may prove the more consequential development for the industry's long-term future.