The stated rationale is to undermine the Russian economy and create a "proper incentive structure" to push Moscow toward negotiations . President Trump reportedly approved the intelligence-sharing on energy targets because damaging Russia's oil revenue was seen as essential leverage to compel Putin to negotiate
. The intelligence has helped Ukraine's military determine flight routes, altitude, and timing for its drones to evade Russian air defenses
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CIA Director John Ratcliffe is widely credited as the key figure maintaining this intelligence pipeline . He protected and expanded the CIA's activities in Ukraine even as other U.S. support slowed, keeping CIA personnel in Ukraine at full capacity and increasing program funding
. He reportedly kept President Trump personally engaged on Ukraine by highlighting Russia's heavy battlefield losses — telling Trump that Moscow was losing more than 40,000 troops per month, sometimes while the two played golf together
. Under Ratcliffe, the CIA supercharged a covert campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil facilities and tankers, even as the Pentagon halted weapons deliveries and the State Department paused other aid
.
On March 5, 2025, the Trump administration temporarily suspended all intelligence-sharing with Ukraine, coinciding with a halt in military assistance . CIA Director Ratcliffe confirmed the pause publicly, saying it was intended to pressure Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to engage in peace talks with Russia
. The pause severely weakened Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian missile strikes and target Russian forces
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Just four days later — on March 9, 2025 — President Trump said the U.S. had "just about" ended the pause, expressing optimism ahead of U.S.-Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia . By August 2026, intelligence-sharing had been fully rebuilt to pre-freeze levels, with the flow of satellite data, targeting intelligence, and attack warnings restored
. U.S. senators and experts credited the restored intelligence cooperation with enabling more effective Ukrainian long-range strikes deep inside Russia
. As George Barros, director of innovation and open source tradecraft at the Institute for the Study of War, noted: "Those strikes were supercharged, and they became much more effective only starting in 2025 with the new Trump administration, when intelligence-sharing started to help provide the Ukrainians better information to make their strikes much more effective"
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Damaging Russia's energy infrastructure serves several U.S. strategic goals. Undermining Russia's oil refining capacity reduces its export revenue, which funds the war effort . Degrading Russia's energy sector is seen as a way to erode Putin's ability to sustain the war, creating leverage for peace negotiations
. Fuel production constraints limit Russia's ability to supply its military with fuel for vehicles, aircraft, and missiles. Reducing Russian refining capacity also cuts into Moscow's role as a major energy exporter, diminishing its geopolitical influence
.
The campaign has had measurable effects. Russian oil refining volumes fell to 21-year lows by mid-2026, with crude runs dropping to about 3.80 million barrels per day . Russia imposed a gasoline export ban from April to July 2026
. Between August and December 2025 alone, there were more than 50 successful strikes on Russian refineries, causing a minor fuel crisis during the summer driving season and agricultural harvest
. By mid-2026, 24 out of Russia's 34 refineries had been attacked, covering 81% of the country's total refining capacity
.
On August 10, 2026, Ukraine launched a major drone attack on the city of Nizhnekamsk in Russia's Tatarstan region — approximately 1,000–1,200 km (750 miles) from the Ukrainian border . The target was the Taneco oil refinery
. Reports vary slightly on casualties but indicate this was one of the deadliest attacks on Russian soil since the war began. The Guardian initially reported at least 13 killed, citing the local mayor
. Another account said 12 killed and 39 wounded
. A third source reported 13 killed and 75 injured
. The Nizhnekamsk facility had been hit previously in June 2026
S.
Russia is ramping up missile strikes. In July 2026 alone, Russia launched 153 cruise missiles and 198 ballistic and hypersonic missiles at Ukraine S. Russia has used more ballistic missiles in the first 19 days of July than its defense industry produces in an entire month S. Zelenskyy warned that allied air defense interceptor deliveries had fallen to a third of their 2025 level by the first half of 2026 SS.
Russia is producing missiles at 110–120% of planned monthly levels across several key systems SS. By August 3, 2026, Russia had already fulfilled its entire annual production targets for Zircon hypersonic and upgraded Oniks missiles, producing 33 Zircon missiles for the year S. Russia produces approximately 120 ballistic missiles per month — roughly twice the number of Patriot interceptors the U.S. produces SS. Production was on track to deliver up to 700 9M723 ballistic missiles for Iskander systems in 2026 SS. Russian forces are reprioritizing production toward missile types that can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses S.
In the broader campaign, Ukraine has been conducting large-scale drone attacks across Russian territory. On one major night in July 2026, Ukrainian drones struck three Russian oil refineries (TANECO, Saratov), tankers on the Sea of Azov, and pipeline pumping stations . Russia routinely claims to intercept large numbers of drones — on August 10, 2026, Russia said it shot down 456 Ukrainian drones, without specifying how many reached their targets
.
The intelligence-sharing relationship has been restored and expanded since the March 2025 pause, with Ratcliffe playing a central role. Ukraine's long-range drone campaign is progressively degrading Russia's refining capacity, while Russia simultaneously ramps up missile production and strikes on Ukraine at an accelerating pace.