Kazakhstan’s Oil Output Surges 40% as Tengiz Field Rebounds from Drone Attacks

What caused the 40% surge

The surge was a recovery bounce after a brutal July. Ukrainian drone attacks on tankers and infrastructure at the CPC's Novorossiysk terminal forced three separate suspensions of loadings in July 2026 . The CPC stopped accepting Kazakh oil, terminal storage tanks filled, and Kazakhstan was forced to slash output — by some accounts halving daily production to around 1 million bpd .

Tengiz was the biggest swing factor. A source told Reuters that Kazakhstan's largest field cut output by more than half during the CPC outage . When loadings resumed in late July, Tengiz rapidly restored production, and by August 9 the national rebound was complete .

The numbers confirm it was a snap-back. The August 9 figure of ~2.08 million bpd is consistent with Kazakhstan's record-high output levels before the disruption. July CPC loadings had fallen more than 20% below plan due to the attacks .

Tengiz field's role in the rebound

Tengiz, operated by Chevron (via its Tengizchevroil joint venture), is the engine of Kazakhstan's oil sector. It drove a record-high crude output of 1.88 million bpd in June 2025 and has been the primary source of Kazakhstan's persistent overproduction relative to OPEC+ quotas .

Tengiz is in the middle of a multi-year expansion project (Tengizchevroil) that has steadily raised the field's capacity. This structural growth means that every time the CPC route reopens, Tengiz can ramp back up quickly — as it did on August 9 .

The CPC route handles approximately 80% of Kazakhstan's total crude exports . There is no pipeline alternative with comparable capacity, so the entire production system is hostage to the security of the Black Sea terminal at Novorossiysk.

Global supply context and OPEC+ compliance

Kazakhstan is a chronic OPEC+ overproducer. In June 2025, its crude output hit 1.88 million bpd — far above its official OPEC+ quota of ~1.5 million bpd at the time . The country has consistently exceeded its targets, driven by Tengiz expansion .

New quotas are rising, but overproduction continues. Seven OPEC+ members agreed to raise combined output targets by 188,000 bpd in August 2026, and Kazakhstan's crude quota rose to 1.628 million bpd for September 2026 . Even at this higher quota, Kazakhstan's August 9 production (~2.08 million bpd including condensate) is far above its crude-only limit.

Compensation plans exist but are not being followed. Six OPEC+ overproducers, including Kazakhstan, submitted schedules to compensate for approximately 434,000 bpd of cumulative excess output, targeting full adjustment by mid-2026 . However, Kazakhstan's Deputy Energy Minister Alibek Zhamauov told OPEC in May 2025 that the country would not cut output . No formal sanctions have been imposed by OPEC+ .

The drone attacks temporarily helped compliance. The CPC disruptions in July forced Kazakhstan's output down involuntarily, briefly bringing it closer to its quota. But the August 9 surge shows that the moment the export route reopens, Kazakhstan reverts to overproduction .

Planned pipeline diversions

Kazakhstan is actively working to reduce dependence on the CPC route. After the July 2026 drone strikes, the energy ministry confirmed it is evaluating alternative export routes through Azerbaijan, including:

• Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline — avoids Russian territory entirely, ending at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea .
• Baku-Supsa pipeline — a smaller route to Georgia's Black Sea coast .
• Trans-Caspian route — oil shipped across the Caspian Sea to Baku, then onward via pipeline .

Volumes are still small but growing. KazMunayGas (KMG), Kazakhstan's national oil company, transported 1.3 million tons via BTC in 2025 and plans to increase that by 31% to 1.7 million tons in 2026 . A separate target of 2.2 million tons via the Trans-Caspian/BTC corridor was also reported . However, these volumes remain a fraction of the approximately 80 million tons per year that typically flow through the CPC .

No quick fix is in sight. Analysts note that even after expansion, the alternative routes can only absorb a small share of Kazakhstan's export volume. The country's structural dependence on the CPC is likely to persist for years .