The closure blocked 20% of the world's oil and LNG (about 15 million barrels per day including refined products) . Gulf output fell 14.4 million barrels per day below pre-war levels according to the International Energy Agency .
Europe was the hardest hit for jet fuel — nearly half of its jet fuel imports transited the Strait. The Airports Council International warned that European airports faced a "systemic shortage" within three weeks if the Strait stayed closed .
Price trajectory:
United Airlines: CEO Scott Kirby announced a 5% reduction in planned capacity for 2026, warning oil could hit $175/barrel and estimating United's fuel costs could rise by $11 billion in a year .
Southwest Airlines: Southwest had ended fuel hedging in 2025, leaving it fully exposed to spot prices. Early in the crisis, more than 20,000 flights had been cancelled across the U.S. industry, and Southwest was among the hardest hit .
Ryanair: CEO Michael O'Leary warned of significant fare increases on later bookings . However, the airline expressed "near-zero concerns" about actual fuel shortages for summer 2026, citing its European operating base and diversified fuel sourcing — but warned holidaymakers booking later in the year could face much higher prices .
Broader industry impact:
This runs counter to a superficial expectation, but Gulf carriers have concrete reasons for maintaining their order books:
Long-term growth conviction: Emirates President Tim Clark stated the airline has no plans to defer orders, calling the conflict a temporary disruption against a decades-long growth trajectory . Boeing's VP for the Middle East confirmed Gulf carriers are not seeking to postpone deliveries because their long-term outlook remains solid .
Deferrals would be self-defeating: IATA's VP for the region warned that postponing aircraft orders now would create significant long-term costs — delivery slots are scarce, and carriers would lose their place in production queues, paying more later for less availability .
State-backed financial muscle: Emirates and other Gulf carriers are state-owned and can absorb near-term fuel cost volatility better than cash-strapped low-cost carriers. Tim Clark noted weaker airlines might collapse, but Emirates is maintaining capacity and even rolling out passenger incentives .
Strategic imperative: Middle East carriers are "doubling down on expansion even as the war hands them one of their toughest operating environments," viewing the crisis as a moment to gain market share from weakened competitors .
Note that while Emirates is not deferring orders due to the war, it is refusing delivery of the first 10–11 Boeing 777-9s — but this is due to Boeing's multi-year production delays, not the Iran conflict . That is a separate issue from the strategic decision to keep orders in place.