This is not a one-quarter blip. The memory crunch has multiple fronts, each reinforcing the others, and the evidence suggests price increases will persist at least through 2027 .
Three companies — Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron — control approximately 96% of the global DRAM market and effectively 100% of High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) . That concentration alone would give them significant pricing power, but the AI boom has turned it into an unbreakable lock.
HBM — the ultra-fast memory stacked directly alongside AI accelerators like Nvidia's Blackwell GPUs — now accounts for 52–62% of the bill-of-materials on leading GPUs . Every unit of DRAM and HBM that Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron plan to produce in 2027 is already fully contracted by AI customers, leaving zero spare capacity for smartphone makers or any other new buyer
.
The result is a cascade: with HBM swallowing fab capacity and commanding far higher margins, commodity DRAM production gets squeezed, and prices for even standard LPDDR5X mobile memory climb relentlessly. DRAM contract prices surged 40–50% in Q4 2025, another 40–50% in Q1 2026, and the upward trend continued through Q2 .
Apple, facing the same cost pressure as every other phone maker, attempted an end run around the triopoly. Beginning in mid-2026, it approached Chinese memory manufacturer CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) to negotiate lower prices for LPDDR5X mobile DRAM, hoping to secure cheaper chips for the next iPhone generation .
CXMT's response was a shock to Apple's usual bargaining power: it rejected Apple's demand for price cuts outright and instead insisted on prices equal to or higher than what Samsung and SK Hynix already charge . The reason was straightforward: strong domestic demand from Huawei and Xiaomi had already locked up CXMT's capacity through long-term, high-price contracts
. CXMT didn't need Apple's business, and it wasn't going to discount for it.
Apple's bid to use CXMT as leverage against the Korean suppliers backfired spectacularly. Rather than gaining a cheaper alternative, Apple's failed negotiation signaled to Samsung and SK Hynix that the iPhone maker had no other credible option — handing the Korean chipmakers even more pricing power . There is no fourth DRAM supplier at competitive terms available in the 2026–2027 window.
Just as Apple's CXMT option collapsed, the US political system slammed the door shut. On July 29–30, 2026, a bipartisan group of US senators led by Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Jim Banks (R-IN) sent a letter to Apple CEO Tim Cook demanding that Apple publicly commit by August 21 to not use any memory chips from CXMT or YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies Co.) — both of which the Pentagon has designated as Chinese military-linked entities .
The House Select Committee on China separately urged Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to block US purchases of Chinese memory chips entirely . The political calculus is clear: legally, Apple can buy Chinese memory, but doing so without administration support would expose the company to severe national-security backlash
.
This political pressure closes Apple's last escape route. It cannot turn to CXMT for cheaper DRAM without provoking a major US political crisis, locking Apple into the tight Samsung/SK Hynix/Micron supply chain with zero pricing leverage .
While smartphone makers absorb rising costs, Samsung and SK Hynix are enjoying historic profit booms. SK Hynix — Nvidia's main HBM supplier — achieved a staggering 76.3% operating margin in Q2 2026 and plans to accelerate HBM4 volume production . HBM now accounts for over 40% of SK Hynix's revenue
.
With all 2027 HBM and DRAM capacity pre-sold, the Korean suppliers face zero pricing pressure and every incentive to keep commodity DRAM prices high . They are not expanding DRAM capacity rapidly; they are prioritizing HBM, where margins are far fatter
. SK Hynix chairman has warned that the HBM shortage could persist until 2030
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The structure of the market leaves Apple, Huawei, Xiaomi, and every other device maker with no meaningful alternative source of memory at competitive prices. The triopoly has the volume, they have the HBM demand as a pricing umbrella, and CXMT — the only potential disruptive supplier — now charges parity or premium to the Korean giants .
The memory crunch is a multi-front crisis with no easy resolution through at least 2027:
Yu's warning on August 5 that widespread smartphone price increases are inevitable appears well-founded. The forces behind the memory price surge — structural oligopoly, AI-driven capacity absorption, and geopolitically constrained supply options — are not short-term disruptions. They are the new normal for the smartphone industry.