Gulf Oil Exports in July 2026: A Market Under Siege

Second Half of July: The Siege Returns

The recovery was short-lived. Renewed US airstrikes on Iran triggered a cycle of retaliation that shut the Strait of Hormuz again by mid-July . On July 15–16, the US reimposed its naval blockade on Iranian ports, and Tehran responded by attacking supertankers . By July 17, just three commodity vessels crossed the strait — the fewest daily transits since May — as most ships halted or made U-turns . By July 21, only four vessels crossed . By late July, due to ongoing missile attacks, transit flows remained near zero .

Country-by-Country Breakdown

Iraq was the strongest performer and the main driver of July's modest monthly increase. Iraqi exports doubled from June, helping to offset declines elsewhere .

Saudi Arabia saw its Gulf loadings slump dramatically. Satellite images from July 15 showed only one tanker berthed at the kingdom's main Persian Gulf export terminal, after Iran attacked supertankers in the strait .

The UAE suffered the steepest percentage decline. Its exports through the Strait of Hormuz fell nearly 53% month-on-month to just 950,000 bpd, down from 2.01 million bpd in June . Total UAE exports averaged 3.46 million bpd, down about 20% from the prior month, as the country leaned on its 1.5 million bpd Fujairah bypass pipeline on the Gulf of Oman to circumvent the strait . Volumes loaded at Fujairah rose to 2.28 million bpd, up from 2.17 million in June .

Kuwait saw exports remain steady but constrained — the country has no major bypass route to avoid the Hormuz chokepoint.

Iran was effectively cut off by the US naval blockade reimposed on July 15–16. Tehran's retaliatory attacks on vessels only further reduced traffic .

Strait of Hormuz: A Timeline of the Siege

• July 7 — The US-led Joint Maritime Information Center raises the threat level to "severe," warning that "deliberate hostile action" by Iran is likely .
• July 9 — Oil tanker traffic through the strait is at a near standstill; just two tankers cross that day .
• July 13 — Transits fall to the lowest level since May 25 as renewed US-Iran strikes raise safety concerns . The US Energy Department claims more than 8 million barrels of oil transited the strait on July 13 with military assistance .
• July 15 — Satellite images show only one tanker at Saudi Arabia's main Gulf export terminal .
• July 16 — Only seven vessels cross after the US reimposes its naval blockade on Iranian ports .
• July 17 — Just three commodity vessels cross — the fewest since May — with most ships halting or making U-turns after Iranian attacks and the US blockade . At least nine ships have come under attack since July 6; one seafarer is killed .
• July 21 — Only four commodity vessels cross after a fresh exchange of attacks .

Saudi Aramco CEO Warnings: 2.6 Billion Barrels Lost

Amin Nasser, CEO of Saudi Aramco, delivered two major warnings during and after the July crisis.

In May 2026, Nasser stated that the oil market had already lost about 1 billion barrels of supply. He warned that if Hormuz disruptions persisted past mid-June, the market would not normalize until 2027. He estimated the world was losing 100 million barrels of supply every week the strait was effectively closed .

By August 4, 2026, the situation had worsened dramatically. Nasser said the Iran conflict had now wiped out more than 2.6 billion barrels from global oil supply — equivalent to nearly a month of normal global crude production. He warned that continued Hormuz disruption could delay inventory recovery by up to 18 months, adding that even if the strait opened immediately, it would take 18 months at an average rate of 2.1 million bpd to replenish lost stocks .

The Second Front: Houthi Attacks on Red Sea / Yanbu Loadings

The crisis expanded beyond Hormuz in late July when Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi militia opened a second front against Saudi Arabia's only remaining functioning crude-export corridor.

• July 20 — The Houthis declare a naval blockade on Saudi shipments through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, threatening to target Saudi, Israeli, and US-linked vessels .
• July 21 — Two oil tankers carrying Saudi crude for China and India make U-turns in the Red Sea after a Houthi warning, aborting their passages . A third tanker, Xin Long Yang (a VLCC carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude from Yanbu), also turns around .
• July 22–23 — The Houthis claim to have struck two Saudi oil tankers, Encelia and Layla, setting one ablaze . Brent crude briefly rises above $100 per barrel for the first time since the June 17 US-Iran MoU .
• July 25 — The Houthis strike Saudi Aramco's refinery complex in Jizan, setting it on fire, and launch a simultaneous attack on the Yanbu export terminal — the only remaining terminal feeding Saudi Arabia's last functioning crude-export corridor, the Petroline pipeline .
• July 27 — The Houthis say they targeted "sensitive crude oil supply and transport sites" linking eastern Saudi Arabia to Yanbu . Ship traffic through Bab el-Mandeb falls sharply . Red Sea tanker traffic and crude loadings at Yanbu drop by more than 70% .

The Houthi blockade compounded the Hormuz crisis by threatening Saudi Arabia's alternative export route. With more than half of Saudi oil now transported overland to Yanbu, the kingdom's Red Sea outlet became both its lifeline and its vulnerability .

Outlook: No Clear Path to De-escalation

The brief US-Iran memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 had partially restored freedom of movement through the Strait of Hormuz, allowing Gulf exports to spike briefly in late June and early July . That agreement collapsed in mid-July when the US reimposed its naval blockade on Iranian ports and both sides resumed strikes .

As of the end of July and early August 2026, there was no active diplomatic breakthrough reported. Hostilities continued, and the outlook for restoring freedom of navigation through the strait remained highly uncertain. The combination of the US blockade, Iranian retaliation, and the new Houthi Red Sea blockade meant that most shipping routes for Gulf oil were effectively blocked, with no clear path to de-escalation in the near term .