How Houthi Attacks on Saudi Oil Tankers, Refineries, and Airports Created a Two-Chokepoint Energy Crisis

On July 28, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at another Saudi oil tanker—the NCC Ghazal—in the Red Sea, saying the vessel had breached the blockade and ignored warnings . The group threatened to expand attacks to any tanker using Saudi Arabian ports, a warning taken seriously by the shipping industry: two oil tankers that had already loaded Saudi crude for China and India immediately made U-turns on July 22, heading back toward the Suez Canal rather than risk transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait . Five tankers in total changed course in the Red Sea that week .

Strikes on Saudi Onshore Oil Infrastructure

On July 25, the Houthis struck Saudi Aramco's refinery complex in Jizan, setting it on fire, and simultaneously attacked the Yanbu export terminal—the only functioning crude-export corridor for Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline . Saudi authorities confirmed they intercepted some of the missiles and drones, but video verified by AFP showed thick black smoke rising over the Jizan facility .

On July 26–27, the Houthis fired missiles and drones at what they described as "sensitive crude oil supply and transport sites" linking eastern Saudi fields to Yanbu, further targeting Aramco's Red Sea infrastructure . By July 28, Aramco was forced to halt operations at the Jazan refinery—which has a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day—after damage to its integrated gasification combined-cycle complex and an oil storage area . Aramco planned to complete repairs and begin restarting operations by August 15 .

Attack on Najran Airport

On August 4, the Houthis claimed a drone strike on a "sensitive target" at Najran Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, near the Yemeni border, saying it was retaliation for Saudi drone incursions over northern Yemen . A regional source with knowledge of the situation told AFP that the airport's main radar was damaged and operations were suspended indefinitely . Reuters and other outlets reported that there was no immediate confirmation from Saudi authorities .

The Two-Chokepoint Energy Crisis

Iran's Strait of Hormuz Blockade: The Dominant Disruption

Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz "closed" on March 4, 2026, and has since attacked ships attempting to transit . Roughly 27% of global crude oil and petroleum product trade and 20% of global LNG pass through the strait . As of June 2026, the strait is effectively closed: insurance is unavailable or prohibitively expensive, and seafarers are unwilling to make the journey . The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projected oil supply reductions from the Middle East would peak at 10.8 million barrels per day (bpd) in May 2026, with global inventories declining sharply . Bloomberg estimated the closure was reducing global oil flows by some 11 million barrels a day, leaving a roughly 9 million-barrel shortfall—more than the oil consumption of the UK, France, and Germany combined .

Houthi Red Sea Attacks Compound the Crisis

The Houthi strikes extended the war to a second major shipping chokepoint—the Bab al-Mandab Strait—creating a simultaneous dual-chokepoint crisis . By late July, shipping routes were "increasingly constrained," energy infrastructure under direct attack, and importers were beginning to avoid supplies from a region that had accounted for one-fifth of global oil and LNG exports before the war . By mid-April 2026, Reuters calculated that over $50 billion worth of crude oil had already been lost since the onset of the Iran war . Combined exports from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia's west coast slipped by late July to around 6.2 million barrels per day, less than half the wartime peak of 13.4 million bpd hit in late June and far below the more than 20 million bpd that typically left the region before the war .

Disruption to Saudi Shipping Routes Through the Bab al-Mandab Strait

The Houthi naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, enforced through missile and drone attacks on tankers, effectively made the Bab al-Mandab Strait a high-risk transit zone for Saudi-flagged vessels. The simultaneous attacks on the Yanbu export terminal—the Red Sea outlet for Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline—severely constrained Saudi Arabia's ability to bypass the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint by exporting westward . The trap was described by analysts as "complete": Saudi Arabia could not easily export eastward through the Strait of Hormuz (blocked by Iran) or westward through the Bab al-Mandab (blocked by the Houthis), and its remaining export corridor at Yanbu was under direct attack .

Impact on Commercial Aviation

The August 4 drone strike on Najran Airport forced an indefinite suspension of operations . A regional source cited by AFP and other outlets confirmed the airport's main radar was damaged, knocking the facility out of service . The attack effectively closed a civilian airport serving a major city in southern Saudi Arabia, adding an aviation dimension to the broader disruption. No independent Saudi confirmation of the radar damage or the duration of the closure was available as of August 5 .

Key caveats: Saudi Arabia did not immediately confirm several of these attacks, including the July 22 tanker strikes and the August 4 Najran strike . Some damage and impact reports come from regional sources or Houthi claims rather than official Saudi statements.