Why Russia, a Top Oil Producer, Is Importing Gasoline from Morocco and Kazakhstan

In a stark reversal of its usual role as a major fuel exporter, Russia has been forced to import gasoline from Morocco, negotiate with Kazakhstan to refine its crude, and extend export bans through January 2027. Here is exactly how the crisis unfolded and why it represents a structural vulnerability, not a temporary glitch.

Ukrainian Drone Strikes Destroyed a Critical Share of Russia's Refining Capacity

The core of the crisis is a sustained and intensifying Ukrainian drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. The damage is staggering:

• From January to May 2026 alone, Ukrainian drone strikes incapacitated approximately 700,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across 16 refineries, with some facilities hit multiple times .
• By late July 2026, Ukrainian deep strikes had disabled more than 30% of Russia's operating refining capacity and roughly 45% of its nominal capacity, according to Financial Times analysis .
• In central Russia, nearly all principal refineries were forced to either cease operations or sharply reduce production . Russian refinery crude runs fell to 21-year lows of about 3.80 million barrels per day .
• The International Energy Agency (IEA) had already warned in October 2025 that drone damage would suppress Russia's refinery processing rates at least through mid-2026 .

The Result: Shortages Across Virtually All of Russia

As production collapsed, the shortages spread nationwide:

• By June 2026, President Vladimir Putin publicly acknowledged fuel supply problems across Russian regions and set up a task force to manage distribution .
• Shortages and sales restrictions — including fuel coupons and per-customer limits as low as 20 liters — spread across nearly all 83 Russian regions .
• In occupied Sevastopol, a limit of 20 liters per customer was instituted in May 2026, followed by a switch to fuel coupons for AI-95 gasoline with priority given to public transportation .
• Industry analysts described the situation as the most severe fuel crisis Russia has faced since the Soviet collapse .

Russia's Emergency Response: Three Unprecedented Measures

1. Importing Gasoline from Abroad for the First Time in Decades

Russia normally exports refined products, not imports them. The crisis changed that:

• In June 2026, Russia began negotiating to buy approximately 50,000 tons of AI-92 gasoline from Kazakhstan .
• In July 2026, it received its first-ever seaborne cargo of 30,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline from Morocco, supplied by Lukoil and unloaded at the Arctic port of Murmansk . A Panama-flagged tanker loaded the cargo at Morocco's port of Tangier in mid-July .
• Morocco became the third country, after India and Kazakhstan, to supply Russia with gasoline during the crisis .

2. Negotiating Crude Refining in Kazakhstan

In an even more telling measure, Russia is now looking to have its own crude processed abroad:

• Kazakhstan's Energy Ministry confirmed it is in talks with Russia to process Russian crude oil at Kazakh refineries, with a portion of the finished products shipped back to Russia .
• Kazakhstan's Kondensat refinery is already processing some Russian crude under an existing arrangement, and in early July it exported motor gasoline to Russia for the first time .
• Kazakhstan has set conditions, however, and some industry sources described the chances of a full agreement as limited .

3. Extending Fuel Export Bans Through Early 2027

To keep whatever supply exists inside the country, Russia has locked its borders to fuel exports:

• Russia initially banned diesel exports from July 8–31 and had restricted gasoline exports since March 1, 2026 .
• On July 30, 2026, the government extended bans on both diesel and gasoline exports through January 31, 2027 .
• The new order covers gasoline, diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils, and took effect August 1 .

The Paradox: Plenty of Crude, Not Enough Working Refineries

The crisis exposes a structural vulnerability in Russia's oil industry. The country's infrastructure is configured to export large volumes of crude while processing a smaller share domestically. Ukrainian strikes have disproportionately hit the refining end of the chain, so Russia is left in the absurd position of being a major crude producer that cannot reliably turn its own oil into gasoline and diesel for its own citizens .

The export bans, imports from Morocco and Kazakhstan, and crude-processing negotiations with Kazakhstan are all stopgap measures. They underscore the severity of a crisis with no quick structural fix — rebuilding or repairing the destroyed refining capacity will take months or years, and in the meantime, Russia must rely on the goodwill of its neighbors and the global spot market to keep its gas stations supplied.