Persistently sluggish consumer spending, a still-depressed property sector, and subdued business confidence meant domestic orders could not offset the export slowdown . NBS statistician Huo Lihui attributed the decline directly to 'weak demand,' and Capital Economics pointed to weakness in domestic goods demand including building activity
. The new orders subindex contracted after expanding in June (49.9 vs 51.2), while output shrank for the first time in five months (49.9 vs 51.4)
. The weakness was broad-based: the non-manufacturing PMI (covering services and construction) also declined to 49.0, confirming the loss of momentum was not confined to factories
.
Cost pressures from the ongoing Middle East war added to factory input expenses, squeezing manufacturers already facing shrinking new orders . The Trading Economics report cited persistently elevated production as a factor alongside weak demand
.
On July 30 — the day before the PMI data was released — China's Politburo met and acknowledged the slowdown but stopped well short of launching a major stimulus package .
The PMI contraction crystallizes a structural dilemma: exports — the main growth engine in Q2 — are decelerating just as domestic consumption remains too weak to take over . The Politburo's cautious incrementalism signals that Beijing is unwilling to deploy the kind of stimulus that might meaningfully revive domestic demand, preferring slower growth rather than accumulating more debt
. With the World Bank projecting GDP growth to moderate to 4.4% in 2026 amid continued weakness in domestic demand, the July PMI marks a tangible shift from stabilization back toward deterioration
.