Moonshot's Kimi K3, released on July 16, 2026, is a 2.8-trillion-parameter mixture-of-experts (MoE) model — the largest open-weight AI model ever released . K3 activates only 16 of its 896 experts per token (roughly 104 billion active parameters), but its total compute demands are immense. According to reports, K3's training required stitching together computing capacity from at least two Chinese cloud providers because no single supplier could provide enough Blackwell chips
. The model's popularity at launch further overwhelmed inference capacity within 48 hours, underscoring the infrastructure strain that makes Moonshot's pursuit of additional GPUs urgent
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Kimi K4 is still in early discussion stages, but the company's trajectory is clear: bigger models require more advanced hardware. The Information reports that Moonshot is actively seeking greater access to Nvidia's Blackwell GPUs, including the top-end GB300 chips, to develop K4 . These chips are subject to U.S. export controls that ban their sale to Chinese entities, meaning Moonshot must rely on offshore infrastructure or back-channel procurement strategies.
On July 22, 2026 — less than a week after K3's release — White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director Michael Kratsios publicly accused Moonshot of multiple violations. In a social media post, Kratsios stated that the company "acquired GB300-equipped servers and has accessed GB300s in Thailand, likely to train its AI models," directly violating U.S. export regulations . The accusation described a procurement method where Moonshot did not physically import banned chips into China but rather accessed them through offshore servers, reportedly located in data centers in Thailand
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Kratsios also alleged that Moonshot stole intellectual property from Anthropic's frontier Fable model through a process called "distillation" — using the U.S. model's outputs to train Kimi K3 . He called it "large-scale, covert industrial distillation aimed at stealing proprietary U.S. technology"
. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent subsequently announced that the administration would investigate whether Chinese AI models used distillation to steal capabilities from U.S. systems, warning that sanctions would follow if theft is confirmed
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The accusations against Moonshot have broader implications. Analysts warn that threatened sanctions against Chinese AI developers risk unraveling U.S.-China efforts to establish a bilateral dialogue on AI safety — at a time when increasingly powerful models raise concerns over serious security breaches .
Moonshot's scramble for Blackwell GPUs is not happening in isolation. Chinese AI labs of all sizes face an acute shortage of advanced Nvidia hardware. While the U.S. permits the sale of some less-capable Nvidia chips to China, the Blackwell line — including the GB300 — remains firmly off-limits . Domestic alternatives from companies like Huawei still lag significantly behind Nvidia's Blackwell architecture in performance, making access to U.S. chips a critical competitive differentiator for Chinese labs pursuing frontier-scale models
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Moonshot recently raised $3.5 billion at a $35 billion valuation, far exceeding the $1 billion to $2 billion it initially targeted . The round was fueled by the momentum from Kimi K3's breakout success and gives Moonshot the financial resources to pursue back-channel procurement strategies. Reports indicate the company is even considering raising additional funds at a potential $50 billion valuation ahead of a public listing
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The pattern mirrors moves by other Chinese AI labs. DeepSeek, Baidu, and other players have also been accused of circumventing export controls to obtain restricted Nvidia hardware for training large models. The emerging playbook involves using intermediaries, offshore data centers in third countries like Thailand, and stitching together compute from multiple less-reliable cloud providers to assemble enough GPU capacity for frontier training runs .
Moonshot is attempting to repeat its K3 playbook — procure banned Blackwell GPUs through offshore intermediaries — at a time when U.S. scrutiny has never been higher. Whether it can secure enough additional compute before new sanctions or enforcement actions cut off its supply routes remains the central open question.