Greenpeace Ukraine's satellite monitoring has been the primary source proving Russia's integration plan was underway as early as May 2025. Their high-resolution imagery showed Russia constructing a 201 km transmission line between Melitopol and Mariupol, with 90 km of pylon construction visible by June 2025 . Subsequent Greenpeace analysis in September 2025 confirmed construction continued, and Rosatom's chief that same month admitted active construction of a water pumping station — further evidence of preparation to restart the plant
. A February 2026 Greenpeace report also documented that the plant's cooling pond surface area shrank by over 100,000 m² in summer 2025, while fortified military positions and anti-drone structures appeared around the facility
.
On July 15, 2026, the chief engineer of ZNPP, Alexander Yakovlev, was killed when a drone struck his official vehicle at the boundary between the plant's industrial site and the city of Enerhodar . The driver was also killed. Rosatom head Alexei Likhachev reported the incident, and Russia's Investigative Committee opened a criminal case
. Ukraine's Foreign Ministry rejected responsibility, calling Yakovlev a collaborator
. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi condemned the killing as "an unacceptable attack on the plant and its management, seriously threatening nuclear safety"
. The incident underscores how the plant's management has become a target in the broader conflict.
ZNPP has suffered at least 20 complete external power outages since Russia seized the plant in March 2022 . The 17th blackout occurred on June 2-3, 2026 after the Ferosplavna-1 power line was severed
. The 15th blackout happened on April 26, 2026
. In September 2025, the plant experienced its longest-ever outage, lasting over three days — a "critical" moment according to the IAEA
. Each blackout forces the plant to rely on emergency diesel generators, which have finite fuel supplies and create risks of cooling system failure for the six reactor units, all of which are in cold shutdown but still require continuous cooling for spent fuel.
The IAEA has maintained a presence at ZNPP throughout the occupation but faces severe constraints. On June 5, 2026, the IAEA brokered a localized ceasefire to allow repairs to a critical power line — a rare example of frontline coordination — demonstrating how IAEA access depends on ad-hoc negotiations . The agency has been unable to fully verify the plant's operational status, staffing, or military equipment on site. The killing of the chief engineer further complicates the IAEA's ability to engage with plant management on safety issues.
Taken together, the evidence reveals a coherent Russian strategy:
The nuclear risks are severe: Europe's largest nuclear plant — with six reactors and massive spent fuel pools — operates under military occupation, endures routine shelling and drone strikes, suffers repeated cooling system stress from blackouts, has lost its chief engineer, and is being forcibly rewired to a foreign grid without international consensus. The IAEA has repeatedly warned that any reactor restart under these conditions, without proper regulatory oversight and while the site is actively a war zone, would pose a grave radiological threat to the region.