On that same day, July 13, the Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones at Abha International Airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia, describing it as direct retaliation for the Sanaa airport strike. The Saudi-led coalition said its air defenses intercepted the incoming threats .
A common claim circulating online is that this attack injured 26 people and disrupted flights. That claim is not supported by available July 2026 sources. Both the Associated Press and BBC reporting from July 13–14, 2026, covering the Abha attack reported "no casualties" . The figure of 26 injured appears to be a conflation of a separate Houthi missile attack on the same airport from June 2019, which did leave at least 26 civilians injured (including women and children)
. No source confirms a casualty count of 26 for the July 2026 strike.
The Saudi-led coalition has pledged a response with "unprecedented determination and force" against any targeting of the kingdom . Specific Saudi military options being considered or signaled include:
The United States has signaled strong backing for Riyadh. On July 15, 2026, the State Department approved a potential $1.96 billion Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia for up to 20,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS-II) guidance sections — divided equally between air-to-air and air-to-ground variants . Analysts described this as Washington's largest-ever counter-drone Foreign Military Sale, specifically designed to help Saudi Arabia counter the Houthi drone and missile threat
. The sale came just days after the Sanaa airport strike and the collapse of the truce
.
The search results do not contain a direct, attributable quote from Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi from July 2026 threatening all Saudi oil facilities and vital installations. However, the Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Sarea, issued statements on July 13 warning airlines to avoid Saudi airspace and framing the Abha attack as the start of a new phase of operations . The Houthi leadership has made similar threats against Saudi oil infrastructure (recalling the 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attacks) in previous escalation cycles. Given the current trajectory, a threat against Saudi energy infrastructure is consistent with the group's doctrine, but specific sourcing for that exact warning in July 2026 could not be located within the available search budget.
The July 2026 escalation marks a significant turning point in the Yemen conflict. The informal truce that had held since 2022 is effectively broken, Saudi Arabia is weighing military responses with explicit US backing through a record arms sale, and the Houthis have signaled readiness to retaliate. The immediate risk is a return to the kind of cross-border strikes that characterized the earlier years of the war, with potentially serious implications for regional energy infrastructure and Red Sea security.