Moody's does not present the opportunity as easy or automatic. The report highlights several structural barriers that limit how quickly and easily emerging markets can capture midstream and downstream value:
Indonesia is the clearest example of an emerging market moving up the critical minerals value chain — and the one Moody's and related sources point to most prominently as both a model and a warning.
The export ban policy. In January 2020, President Joko Widodo banned raw nickel ore exports, mandating that all nickel be processed domestically before export . This "downstreaming" (hilirisasi) strategy has since been extended to bauxite, with the government identifying 15 priority downstream commodities for development
.
The scale of transformation. The results have been dramatic. Nickel pig iron (NPI) smelters grew from just 2 to over 44, with cumulative downstream investment of roughly US$40 billion . Indonesia now accounts for 54% of global NPI production and hosts 74% of the world's NPI smelters
. Mined nickel output roughly tripled to approximately 2 million tonnes per year
. The export value of nickel rose from US$1.4 billion in 2020 to US$6.8 billion in 2023
. By 2024, processed nickel exports had reached US$34 billion, a tenfold increase
.
Continuing momentum. In Q1 2026, mineral downstream investment hit IDR 98 trillion, led by nickel at IDR 41.5 trillion, copper, and bauxite . Indonesia now commands roughly two-thirds of global refined nickel supply
.
The key caveat — Chinese control. Independent assessments consistently point to a major problem: the new capacity is overwhelmingly Chinese-owned and controlled. Chinese firms built over 90% of Indonesia's nickel smelters, control approximately 75% of the roughly 8 million tonnes of refining capacity, and 94% of ferronickel export value goes to China . The SOAS case study on Indonesia's nickel boom puts it bluntly: "Downstreaming was designed to build Indonesian industrial capacity. In practice, it built Chinese-controlled capacity in Indonesia"
. The Energy Shift Institute's report on Indonesia's nickel value chain concludes the country has achieved "dominance without depth" — it is the world's largest nickel smelter (Tier 3) but has not advanced into Tier 2 fabrication or Tier 1 OEM production
.
The demand-side context for the rush to build processing capacity is provided by UNCTAD's June 2026 Global Trade Update on critical minerals. The headline numbers are stark:
The United Nations itself has called for "fair play" in the global race for critical minerals, noting that resourcerich developing countries are at the centre of emerging value chains but risk being left with the environmental costs and limited benefits .
In October 2025, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, and Appian Capital Advisory launched a US$1 billion partnership to accelerate responsible development of critical minerals, metals, and mining-related projects in emerging markets . The IFC anchors the fund with an initial contribution of US$100 million
. This is IFC's first dedicated mining vehicle for emerging markets and its first partnership with a private mining equity specialist
. The fund is explicitly a response to the global critical minerals shortage and the concentration of supply chains
. It exists precisely because private capital alone has been insufficient to bridge the gap in emerging markets.
The evidence underscores that infrastructure and financing gaps remain binding constraints on the ability of emerging markets to move up the value chain:
Multiple sources warn that without deliberate industrial policy and sustained investment, resource-rich countries risk remaining stuck at the bottom of the value chain:
Moody's July 17 "Macro Views" page notes that the push to secure critical minerals supply chains is accelerating, driven by defense, AI, and renewable energy demand, with countries taking steps to strengthen supply chains . The broader context is that the U.S. and its allies are racing to reduce dependence on Chinese refining via the Minerals Security Partnership and related initiatives, though the specific timing of executive orders or IRA implementation details was not independently sourced in the search results captured.
The IEA's warnings are stark. Data from the IEA, cited in a June 7, 2026 investor report, indicate that China controls between 47% and 87% of global refining capacity across many critical mineral supply chains and is estimated to control approximately 94% of global rare earth magnet manufacturing capacity . JP Morgan's Global Research reinforces this picture, noting that China supplies 91% of refined rare earths and 92% of magnets
. The IEA has repeatedly warned that investment in new refining capacity outside China is far below what is needed to meet 2030 and 2050 demand scenarios, creating a structural supply chain concentration risk
.
Moody's July 2026 report presents a window of opportunity for resource-rich emerging markets to move up the critical minerals value chain. But it is a narrow window hedged by China's overwhelming control of midstream refining, massive capital requirements, multi-year lead times, and the risk that foreign investment builds capacity without building domestic industrial capability — as Indonesia's nickel story illustrates in real time. The opportunity is real, but it will require deliberate industrial policy, international financing at scale, and a willingness to confront the structural barriers that have kept mineral-rich countries at the bottom of global supply chains for generations.