Gradual return of tanker traffic. Although throughput remains well below normal, tankers began transiting the Strait again. Even when only about 2 million barrels moved through on June 23 — a fraction of normal daily flow — futures prices dropped sharply as traders priced in the expectation of normalization .
Demand destruction. High prices in April and May crushed demand in importing nations, accelerating the correction . For the first time since the war began, analysts cut their 2026 oil price forecasts in a Reuters poll of 31 economists, lowering the Brent average forecast from $90.44 to $84.50 per barrel
.
Multiple analysts and Reuters commentary have warned that the apparent calm is fragile. A May 14 Reuters analysis was bluntly titled "Oil market's deceptive calm will not last," noting that the temporary stability was propped up by reduced Chinese purchases and a surge in U.S. exports — neither of which is sustainable .
Key concerns include:
The MOU is an interim 60-day deal, not a permanent peace. Iran's nuclear stockpile remains intact, its government is unchanged, and the fate of Lebanon is unresolved . If negotiations collapse after August 21, the Strait could close again instantly.
Physical flows are still impaired. The IEA estimates the UAE is exporting oil at only about 85% of pre-war capacity . Gulf infrastructure suffered damage during the conflict, and Hormuz traffic remains below normal levels
.
Commercial inventories are dangerously thin. JPMorgan Chase, in a report titled "The Illusion of Plenty," projected that stockpiles in wealthy nations could reach "operational stress levels" as early as early August and "operational floor levels" by September .
Volatility remains extreme. SEB Commodities Analyst Ole R. Hvalbye warned that while the price "looks orderly on paper," daily swings of 5–10% in both directions continue .
The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell to 325.7 million barrels in the week ending June 26, 2026 — the lowest level since May 1983 . This is part of a 172-million-barrel release authorized to offset the Iran war supply gap
. By July 6, Reuters reported the SPR was still declining
.
The global picture is similarly concerning. While the exact global figure is difficult to pin down from a single source, the U.S. drawdown alone accounts for 172 million barrels, and other major importers — China, Japan, India, and IEA members — also released heavily from their strategic reserves during the crisis. No clear public plan exists to refill these caverns .
Why this is dangerous:
The 42% crash in Brent crude is real and provides welcome relief for oil-importing nations. But it rests on a temporary political agreement, impaired infrastructure, and strategically depleted reserves. Without a plan to replenish the global strategic reserve buffer, the next supply shock — whether from a Hormuz closure, OPEC+ supply cut, or a major producer outage — would hit a market with almost no emergency buffer . The global energy safety net is thinner than it has been in decades, and no mechanism is in place to rebuild it.