How Greek Shipping Companies Made $3.8 Billion Hauling Russian Oil Despite Sanctions

The G7 price cap on Russian oil was designed to cut Moscow's war revenue while keeping global markets supplied. But the policy has had an unintended effect: it has allowed Greek shipping companies to earn billions of dollars legally hauling Russian crude — and the sanctions regime itself may be the reason why.

Where the billions came from

According to a Financial Times analysis published July 7, 2026, Greek shipping companies earned at least $3.8 billion over the previous three years transporting Russian crude oil . The figure covers only major shipping routes with available pricing data, meaning actual revenue is likely higher . The analysis counted 389 million barrels shipped by Greek tankers; an additional 153 million barrels were excluded because no price data existed .

The mechanism was fully legal under G7 rules. Since December 2022, Western companies could provide shipping, insurance, and other maritime services for Russian oil only if it was sold at or below the G7 price cap — initially $60 per barrel. When Urals crude traded below that threshold, Greek firms re-entered the market in force, handling up to 40% of all Russian crude exports by mid-2025 .

The biggest single beneficiary was Dynacom Tankers, founded by Greek billionaire George Prokopiou, which earned at least $915 million from Russian crude shipments since July 2023 . Other top earners include Olympic Shipping & Management (part of the Onassis Group, $404 million+), Stealth Maritime ($200M+), and Polembros Shipping ($200M+) . Eight of the 20 companies earning the most from Russian oil shipments since June 2023 are Greek .

The flaws in the sanctions regime

The episode exposes several structural weaknesses in the G7 price cap approach:

The cap only binds when market prices are above it. When Urals crude naturally dipped below $60/barrel, Greek firms could legally provide full Western shipping and insurance without restriction. The cap became irrelevant . As one analysis put it, the price cap is self-defeating precisely when market conditions would already constrain Russia's revenue.

Massive sales of tankers to the shadow fleet. Separately, Greek shipowners sold an estimated 55% of the tankers now operating in Russia's "shadow fleet," earning roughly $3.7 billion from those vessel sales between 2022 and 2024 . These tankers now operate entirely outside G7 jurisdiction, transporting Russian oil to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa with no price cap compliance .

Enforcement is inconsistent and geopolitically divided. By mid-2026, only the United States was still actively enforcing the $60/barrel cap . Other G7 members had cut their thresholds below $50/barrel or effectively stopped enforcing altogether . The European Commission publicly urged the US to "strictly enforce" the cap in March 2026, after Washington suspended some oil-related sanctions .

Price cap adjustments lag the market. The EU's 18th sanctions package in July 2025 cut the cap from $60 to $47.60 per barrel and introduced a dynamic adjustment mechanism (15% below the six-month average Urals price) . Critics argue this still fails to prevent evasion via the shadow fleet or non-G7 service providers .

What may replace the price cap: a maritime services ban

In response to the Greek shipping windfall and broader enforcement failures, the G7 and EU are actively considering a fundamental shift: replacing the price cap with a comprehensive ban on all Western maritime services for Russian oil exports .

Key timeline developments include:

• December 2025 — Reuters exclusively reported that G7 and EU officials were discussing a full ban on Western maritime services — including insurance, financing, brokering, and flagging — for any vessel carrying Russian crude, regardless of price .
• February 6, 2026 — The European Commission formally proposed a new sanctions package replacing the price cap with a complete prohibition on maritime services related to Russian oil exports . The ban would effectively halt the legal trade that Greek firms have been exploiting, since most of those ships rely on EU-based insurance and services .
• February 26, 2026 — The EU acknowledged it must coordinate this ban with other G7 nations before proceeding .
• June 2026 — G7 leaders committed to tightening oil sanctions, but the group remained split on how aggressively to proceed, with the US pushing hardest for enforcement .

Key uncertainty: The maritime services ban requires unanimous approval from all 27 EU member states and parallel adoption by G7 partners. It has not yet been enacted as of early July 2026 . Industry observers question whether a ban can be effectively enforced given the scale of Russia's shadow fleet, estimated at several hundred tankers operating without Western insurance .

The bottom line

The G7 price cap was a carefully calibrated tool: it aimed to reduce Russian revenue without causing a global supply shock. But the Greek shipping revenues show that the cap's most fundamental design — allowing legal trade when market prices are low — creates a multibillion-dollar loophole for EU-based shippers. The proposed maritime services ban would close that loophole, but it also represents a major escalation that would force Russia to rely entirely on its shadow fleet, raising questions about enforceability, insurance, and the risk of oil spills from unregulated tankers.