The mechanism was fully legal under G7 rules. Since December 2022, Western companies could provide shipping, insurance, and other maritime services for Russian oil only if it was sold at or below the G7 price cap — initially $60 per barrel. When Urals crude traded below that threshold, Greek firms re-entered the market in force, handling up to 40% of all Russian crude exports by mid-2025 .
The biggest single beneficiary was Dynacom Tankers, founded by Greek billionaire George Prokopiou, which earned at least $915 million from Russian crude shipments since July 2023 . Other top earners include Olympic Shipping & Management (part of the Onassis Group, $404 million+), Stealth Maritime ($200M+), and Polembros Shipping ($200M+) . Eight of the 20 companies earning the most from Russian oil shipments since June 2023 are Greek .
The episode exposes several structural weaknesses in the G7 price cap approach:
The cap only binds when market prices are above it. When Urals crude naturally dipped below $60/barrel, Greek firms could legally provide full Western shipping and insurance without restriction. The cap became irrelevant . As one analysis put it, the price cap is self-defeating precisely when market conditions would already constrain Russia's revenue.
Massive sales of tankers to the shadow fleet. Separately, Greek shipowners sold an estimated 55% of the tankers now operating in Russia's "shadow fleet," earning roughly $3.7 billion from those vessel sales between 2022 and 2024 . These tankers now operate entirely outside G7 jurisdiction, transporting Russian oil to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa with no price cap compliance .
Enforcement is inconsistent and geopolitically divided. By mid-2026, only the United States was still actively enforcing the $60/barrel cap . Other G7 members had cut their thresholds below $50/barrel or effectively stopped enforcing altogether . The European Commission publicly urged the US to "strictly enforce" the cap in March 2026, after Washington suspended some oil-related sanctions .
Price cap adjustments lag the market. The EU's 18th sanctions package in July 2025 cut the cap from $60 to $47.60 per barrel and introduced a dynamic adjustment mechanism (15% below the six-month average Urals price) . Critics argue this still fails to prevent evasion via the shadow fleet or non-G7 service providers .
In response to the Greek shipping windfall and broader enforcement failures, the G7 and EU are actively considering a fundamental shift: replacing the price cap with a comprehensive ban on all Western maritime services for Russian oil exports .
Key timeline developments include:
Key uncertainty: The maritime services ban requires unanimous approval from all 27 EU member states and parallel adoption by G7 partners. It has not yet been enacted as of early July 2026 . Industry observers question whether a ban can be effectively enforced given the scale of Russia's shadow fleet, estimated at several hundred tankers operating without Western insurance .
The G7 price cap was a carefully calibrated tool: it aimed to reduce Russian revenue without causing a global supply shock. But the Greek shipping revenues show that the cap's most fundamental design — allowing legal trade when market prices are low — creates a multibillion-dollar loophole for EU-based shippers. The proposed maritime services ban would close that loophole, but it also represents a major escalation that would force Russia to rely entirely on its shadow fleet, raising questions about enforceability, insurance, and the risk of oil spills from unregulated tankers.