Key strikes include the Moscow oil refinery (Gazpromneft) in mid-June and the Novo-Ufimsk refinery in Bashkortostan, where a drone strike shut down a main crude distillation unit . Ukrainian attacks have focused on hydrocrackers and other high-value refining units, which are slow and expensive to repair, creating a persistent bottleneck even when crude oil remains abundant
. According to an analyst cited by Al Jazeera, "indirect evidence indicates that Ukrainian drone attacks have disabled about a quarter of Russia's oil refining capacity"
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As shortages spread, fuel rationing became widespread. In Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Tatarstan, major chains capped sales at 20 liters of AI-92/AI-95 gasoline and 40 liters of diesel per customer . In some regions, limits were as low as 10–20 liters per visit
. The crisis even reached Russia's key oil-producing regions: in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, which yields roughly 40% of Russia's crude, Gazprom Neft and Lukoil stations imposed caps of 40 liters of gasoline and up to 80 liters of diesel per transaction
. In 18 regions, local authorities made rationing legally binding on all stations, typically capping fuel at about 30 liters per car
. The harshest restrictions were in annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, where fuel sales to the public were effectively halted
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Russia banned exports of gasoline and jet fuel, drew down strategic gasoline reserves, and considered a ban on diesel exports as well . On June 29, 2026, President Vladimir Putin publicly conceded for the first time that fuel shortages and queues persist at filling stations across the country, calling the situation a "temporary deficit"
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In an unprecedented reversal for a major oil exporter, Russia began importing gasoline from India by sea. Reuters reported on July 1, 2026, citing two industry sources, that Russia had started seaborne gasoline imports from India to mitigate the shortages . Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed the imports, marking Russia's first major fuel imports since the post-Soviet period
. At least 60,000 metric tons of gasoline were dispatched from India to Russia on two tankers
. Russia also petitioned Kazakhstan for 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline
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Indian refiners such as Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy buy discounted Russian crude, refine it domestically, and sell finished gasoline back to Russia at international prices—creating an arbitrage where Russia effectively buys back its own oil as processed fuel . This marks a dramatic reversal in global energy flows, driven by wartime disruption and refinery vulnerability.
Ukraine's campaign has two interconnected axes. Inside Russia proper, the focus is on attacking refineries, fuel depots, and storage to cut Russia's refining capacity, reduce domestic fuel supply, and strain the Russian economy and war logistics. Oil infrastructure accounted for 75% of all successful Ukrainian long-range strikes in 2025 . In occupied Crimea, Ukraine is conducting a systematic campaign to "choke off" the peninsula by striking fuel tankers, the railway hub at Dzhankoi, the Kerch Strait logistics corridor, and electrical infrastructure
. In late June 2026, Ukrainian strikes triggered power cuts in Sevastopol, Crimea's largest city
. The New York Times described this as an effort to turn Crimea from a Russian stronghold into a "significant challenge for the Kremlin"
. The Institute for the Study of War confirmed Ukrainian operations aiming to "deny Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel across the Kerch Strait"
.