During the war, China reduced crude purchases by more than a third, drawing down from its SPR and commercial reserves. Inventory draws averaged about 1 million barrels per day from commercial stocks alone, according to estimates from Vortexa, Kpler, and Energy Aspects . That move directly helped keep global oil prices from spiking even higher—CNBC reported that China's import decline was "a crucial role in preventing prices from escalating further"
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In the two months before the conflict, China significantly increased oil acquisitions, accelerating purchases as a deliberate hedge against the expected geopolitical disruption . The New York Times noted that Beijing had been "augmenting its strategic reserves, even as national oil consumption has been on a decline" in the lead-up to the war
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China's crude imports from the Gulf dropped by 25% in March 2026 compared to the prior year . Beijing rapidly pivoted to Russian oil via the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, which runs entirely overland from the Russian interior into northeastern China, bypassing the Hormuz chokepoint entirely
. Russian crude imports increased by 13% year-on-year in March
. China also acquired a record volume of Brazilian crude during the same period
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The crisis accelerated China's strategic shift from maritime chokepoint dependence toward continental energy corridors from Russia and Central Asia—a trend analysts described as a "catalyst" for long-term energy policy .
Beyond the formal SPR, China held an additional estimated 46 million barrels of Iranian crude stored in "dark fleet" tankers and bonded storage hubs at Dalian and Zhoushan, providing extra above-ground inventory .
On March 26, Iran announced that ships owned by China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan would be allowed to transit the Strait of Hormuz, even as Western vessels remained blocked . This gave China a unique logistical advantage that competitors like Japan and South Korea did not enjoy.
China also managed domestic demand by prioritizing lower refinery utilization and limiting fuel exports, conserving crude for internal use . The country's network of independent "teapot" refineries proved flexible in adjusting processing rates, helping cushion the domestic market
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Brent crude surged 10–13% to roughly $80–82/barrel by March 2, and prices climbed further as the blockade persisted . By June, oil prices had risen roughly 30% since February 28
. The disruption was described as "the biggest oil supply shock in history"
. China's SPR drawdown and reduced imports were a key factor keeping global oil prices below $100/barrel through mid-2026
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The IRGC used drones, ballistic missiles, and sea mines to threaten and attack vessels, making transit insurance unavailable or prohibitively expensive . The U.S. military launched operations in March to reopen the shipping lane, but traffic remained severely disrupted
. By June 11, Iran formally declared the Strait entirely closed to all oil tankers and commercial vessels
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Shortages emerged across Asia, from Thailand to Pakistan, as Gulf-dependent economies ran low on supply . Iran also struck Qatari LNG infrastructure in retaliation, disrupting natural gas markets globally
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China's advantage was relative. It insulated itself better than peers but was not immune. The Diplomat noted that China "remains exposed to external supply chains it does not control" and that its core vulnerability—reliance on maritime routes whose security is determined by U.S. naval power—was not eliminated . Specific data on fertilizer trade impacts and precise IMF growth forecast numbers were not available in the captured evidence.