Iran and Oman Launch Joint Hormuz Committee: What the First Meeting Means for the Strait of Hormuz

On June 29, 2026, Iran and Oman held the inaugural meeting of the Joint Hormuz Committee in Muscat, marking the first formal bilateral session on future governance of the Strait of Hormuz since the Iran-US peace framework was signed . The meeting opens a critical new chapter in the struggle over who controls the world's most important oil chokepoint — and it carries implications for global energy markets, shipping costs, and regional security that extend far beyond the two Gulf states.

Key Developments of the Inaugural Committee Meeting

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi led Tehran's delegation in Muscat for what officials described as the first of a planned series of bilateral talks focused on "managing" and "governing" the strait . The committee moved discussions from broad diplomatic principles to specific, text-based arrangements on vessel transit procedures and cost-sharing for future management . Iran and Oman had agreed on the committee's formation on June 23, 2026, after a visit by Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Muscat .

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed that Iran is using the mechanism to try to exercise long-term authority over the strait, enabling it to regulate transit and restrict passage at its discretion — a prospect that alarms US officials and international shipping companies .

Legal Basis: The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding

The committee's talks derive their legal foundation from the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), a 14-point framework agreement signed electronically on June 17, 2026, and formally on June 19 in Switzerland between the US and Iran . The MoU explicitly provides for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and a mutual commitment to negotiate a final comprehensive deal within 60 days . It restored the prohibition on the use of force and sought a binding UN Security Council resolution to endorse a final settlement .

Crucially, the MoU did not specify how the strait would be governed long-term — that gap is precisely what Iran and Oman are now attempting to fill bilaterally, effectively pre-negotiating the strait's status before the 60-day window expires . Clause 5 of the Islamabad MoU, which both sides referenced during the Muscat meeting, provides the framework for these discussions .

Context: Four Months of Shipping Disruption and Military Clashes

The committee meeting did not take place in a vacuum. The strait had been effectively closed since February 28, 2026, when the US and Israel launched air strikes on Iran. The IRGC issued warnings forbidding passage, and major oil, gas, and tanker operators suspended shipments . The result was a severe global economic shock: thousands of maritime workers were stranded on some 2,000 vessels, insurers refused coverage, and ship-tracking data showed a near-total halt in traffic through the chokepoint that handles about 20% of global oil supply .

Military clashes continued even after the MoU was signed. On June 25, a UN agency paused the evacuation of ships after a vessel was hit by a projectile off Oman . On June 27, just two days before the committee met, Iran announced it had struck US military installations in the Middle East in retaliation for US strikes near the strait, threatening the fragile peace framework .

Competing Iranian and US Visions for Control of the Waterway

Iran's vision — joint Iran-Oman regulation. Tehran seeks to establish a permanent Iran-Oman mechanism that would give it co-equal authority to regulate and charge for transit. Iranian officials have explicitly warned that the strait "will not return to its pre-war status" and have indicated Tehran will levy fees on ships after the 60-day period . The joint statement from the June 23 talks specifically mentioned discussions on "shipping management, related services, and associated fees" .

The US vision — freedom of navigation under international law. The US position, reflected in the MoU, is for the strait to be reopened under the existing UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework, guaranteeing innocent passage and freedom of navigation without unilateral Iranian tolls or restrictions .

The strategic implication: By embedding Oman — a neutral state with its own territorial waters along the strait — into the governance structure, Iran is attempting to create a bilateral fait accompli that the US and international shipping community would find difficult to overturn, effectively squeezing the US out of the strait's future regulatory model .

Temporary Transit Arrangements During the 60-Day Window

Under the MoU, Iran agreed to a "gradual reopening" of the strait, and the US committed to lifting its naval blockade on Iranian oil exports . The UN-backed evacuation of stranded vessels, however, was paused on June 25 after the projectile attack off Oman, indicating that safe transit is not yet assured .

The clock is running: by mid-August 2026, the US and Iran must either finalize a comprehensive peace settlement or risk the collapse of the framework. If no deal is reached, Iran has signaled it will unilaterally impose its own transit fees and restrictions, while the US has warned of renewed military action . As of June 29, shipping traffic remains severely restricted — a "trickle" of vessels has moved, but normal commercial traffic has not resumed, and the security environment remains highly volatile .