Latvian intelligence agencies have independently warned that Russia is preparing possible provocations in the Baltic region, reinforcing the urgency of Szota's assessment . Reports from 2025 and 2026 detail a qualitative shift in Russia's hybrid campaign against Europe, moving from what analysts call "noise" to purposeful operational preparation
. The shift includes:
In March 2026, intelligence sources flagged the reactivation of separatist Telegram channels such as "Narva Republic" targeting Estonia — an effort to exploit ethnic Russian populations and create a pretext for intervention . A March 2026 report from the Soufan Center noted that Russia applied near-continuous pressure on Estonia since 2022 with tactics ranging from disinformation targeting Russian speakers to severing undersea cables, and that increasingly brazen incursions into land and air space denoted the importance of the Baltics as a "testing ground for NATO response thresholds"
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Szota is not alone in raising the alarm. In June 2025 — a full year before Szota's warning — Bruno Kahl, head of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND), told Table.Media that Berlin has concrete intelligence suggesting Ukraine is "only a step on the journey westward" for Moscow . "They don't need to send tanks for that," Kahl said. "They just have to send 'little green men' to Estonia to defend the allegedly oppressed Russian minority"
. Kahl's comments echoed the hybrid tactics Russia used during its 2014 annexation of Crimea
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Estonia's Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna has taken an even harder line. In November 2025, he told o2.pl: "Let me put it bluntly: if the little green men ever cross our border, we will shoot them" . Latvia's defense minister has similarly stated that any "little green man" on Latvian soil "will be eliminated immediately"
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Estonia has already observed suspicious activity. In October 2025, Estonian officials spotted Russian troops without insignia near the border village of Saatse. While officials described it as "not a direct provocation but rather an attempt to demonstrate presence," the sighting underscored the live nature of the threat .
The 36th NATO Summit convenes in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, at the Beştepe Presidential Compound . The summit's formal agenda — defense spending, Ukraine support, and defense industrial cooperation — already carries heavy geopolitical weight
. But the intelligence warnings from Warsaw and Riga, landing just days before leaders gather, inject a sense of immediate, near-term urgency into discussions about NATO's eastern flank
.
Key summit agenda items directly relate to the new threat assessments:
A Belfer Center report from February 2026 warned that within the next three years, Russia will likely escalate its gray-zone campaign against NATO member states, culminating in a limited military incursion into the alliance's northeastern flank . The report specifically noted that the Trump administration's reliability as a NATO member will likely continue to diminish over the same period
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NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has already sent a warning to the Kremlin that an attack on an alliance member will lead to a "devastating reaction" . In a video message ahead of the summit, Rutte said: "In Ankara, we're going to show the world that we are delivering on the commitments we made in The Hague last year"
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The "little green men" scenario is not merely a hypothetical war-game. It is a direct test of NATO's most fundamental commitment — Article 5 collective defense — executed through ambiguity and deniability. As a 2016 Brookings Institution analysis put it, NATO should think through the implications of the little green men phenomenon "in particular for the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia" .
Szota's warning, corroborated by Latvian and German intelligence, leaves no room for complacency. With the Ankara summit just days away, allies face a stark choice: treat the hybrid threat as a first-order priority and harden the eastern flank's defenses, or risk a slow-motion crisis that could escalate faster than the alliance's political machinery can react.
The Kremlin, meanwhile, is already changing laws for the use of the army abroad and activating separatist channels in Estonia . The question is not whether Russia is preparing the ground — it is whether NATO is prepared to meet the test.