The story of Google's response is one of whiplash-inducing contradictions.
Phase 1 — "Nice Catch!" O'Leary reported the bug to Google on March 8, 2026 . On March 27, a Google security engineer accepted the report and told him "Nice Catch!"
. The engineer said they filed a bug with the relevant product team and assured O'Leary they would work with Google Cloud to fix the flaw, writing: "We'll work with the product team to ensure this issue is addressed. We'll let you know when the issue was fixed"
. Google assigned the bug P1 priority (highest) and S1 severity (critical — affects a large percentage of users and can disrupt core organizational functions)
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Phase 2 — "Working as intended." On April 7 — 11 days later — O'Leary received a message from a Google Security Bot reversing the decision . The Cloud Vulnerability Reward Program panel concluded the "security impact of this issue does not meet the criteria to qualify for a reward" and that the software "is working as intended"
. Google denied any bounty payout.
The contradiction: As of The Register's June 18 report, Google's internal bug tracker still listed ConfigConfusion as P1/S1 with status "in progress (accepted)" — conflicting with the public position that no vulnerability exists .
As of mid-June 2026 — over three months after the initial report — the vulnerability remains unpatched and unresolved . O'Leary has since published a research blog post with full technical details at olearysec.com
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In early May 2026, Google overhauled its Vulnerability Reward Programs for Chrome and Android, explicitly citing the rise of AI tools in vulnerability discovery .
Key changes:
Critics argue this creates an awkward contrast: Google cuts Chrome payouts due to "AI noise" while simultaneously denying a human researcher's carefully reported, CVSS 10.0 cloud infrastructure bug on the grounds that it's "working as intended" — a decision many in the security community have called short-sighted and damaging to researcher trust .
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