Why Russia, a Historic Oil Giant, Is Now Importing Gasoline by Sea

Ukraine's strategy was deliberate. As Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated, the most effective sanctions are those targeting Russia's oil refineries, terminals, and depots . The tactic was designed to disrupt fuel supplies to the Russian military, diminish revenue from energy exports, and create domestic unrest .

Fuel Crisis at the Pump: Record Prices, Shortages, and Rationing

The refinery damage triggered a deepening fuel crisis inside Russia that quickly spread nationwide.

• Wholesale prices hit records. In August 2025, the benchmark price of AI-92 gasoline on the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange soared to historic highs after major refineries were forced offline . AI-92 reached 71,500 rubles ($890) per ton on August 18, while AI-95 hit 80,430 rubles ($1,000) per ton — a 38% jump since January .
• Retail shortages spread to 20 regions. Fuel stations across more than 20 regions, from annexed Crimea to Russia's Far East, experienced shortages . Some gas stations ran dry entirely . In September 2025, stations began rationing fuel sales, as reported by the pro-Kremlin daily Izvestia .
• Small independent stations hit hardest. Surging wholesale costs combined with high borrowing rates made it impossible for many private filling stations to maintain adequate fuel inventories .
• The Kremlin banned fuel exports. In late September 2025, Russia prohibited fuel exports for the rest of the year to try to preserve supply for the domestic market . The ban was later extended into 2026 .
• By June 2026, the shortages had become severe enough that Russia resorted to importing gasoline by sea from Asian suppliers — a deeply unusual step for an energy superpower . Moscow also eliminated tariffs on fuel imports through the Eurasian Economic Commission and ramped up imports from Belarus by 36% since July .

The Paradox: Crude Exports Surge While Refined Exports Collapse

The drone campaign created a striking market anomaly that reveals the depth of Russia's processing capacity constraints.

• Crude oil exports surged to wartime highs. Because refineries could not process as much crude, the surplus barrels were diverted to export terminals. Russia's seaborne crude shipments hit a 16-month high in early October 2025, averaging 3.57 million barrels per day . Western port oil exports rose 25% in September 2025 alone compared to August, directly attributed to refinery shutdowns . By June 2026, year-to-date crude exports were running at 3.46 million barrels per day — about 120,000 bpd higher than 2025 and the highest since Russia's 2022 invasion .
• Refined product exports collapsed. Russian seaborne shipments of refined fuels averaged just 1.88 million barrels per day in the first 10 days of October 2025 — the lowest since at least the start of the war .
• The net effect is deeply inefficient and financially damaging: Russia is selling more raw crude abroad while simultaneously having to buy back gasoline from Asia . Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak acknowledged in June 2026 that oil production had fallen since the beginning of the year due to refineries under unscheduled repairs .

What This Means for Global Energy Markets

The paradox carries significant implications. Russia's crude export surge has helped keep global oil markets supplied even as OPEC+ quotas ease , but the country's ability to divert crude to export terminals is running up against physical limits. Ports like Novorossiisk on the Black Sea have reached peak export capacity, leaving traders struggling to redirect unprocessed crude .

Meanwhile, the sustained loss of Russian refined product exports — particularly diesel, naphtha, and gasoline — tightens global markets for those fuels. The IEA projects that suppressed refinery runs will persist through at least mid-2026 , meaning Russia's transformation from refined fuel exporter to gasoline importer may not be a temporary blip.

For a country that has long defined itself as an energy superpower, the image of gasoline tankers arriving from Asia at Russian ports represents a stark reversal — one driven not by market forces, but by the strategic use of drones targeting the heart of Russia's wartime economy.