Speaking at the FII PRIORITY Europe summit in Rome (June 17–19, 2026), Aramco Chairman Yasir Al-Rumayyan stated: “Aramco has storage facilities around the world, especially in Asia—in Korea and Japan—and we are thinking seriously of having larger storage facilities all over the world” . The move was explicitly framed as a lesson from the Iran war, which “highlighted the critical role of strategic reserves in maintaining the supply of crude oil to clients” . Al-Rumayyan confirmed Aramco is “considering owning global storage facilities larger than its current facilities” .
Aramco’s current international storage is heavily concentrated in Asia, built over more than a decade of bilateral agreements:
The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply, and its effective closure from late February 2026 created an immediate supply chain crisis . Saudi storage sites filled rapidly: Kayrros reported that the Ju’aymah terminal on Saudi Arabia’s east coast “was quickly running out of spare capacity” as of March 1 . Four of six tanks at the Ras Tanura refinery—halted after Iranian attacks—were full . Shipping costs at Yanbu, the Red Sea port, surged to $28 million per tanker as Aramco scrambled to divert oil away from Hormuz .
Aramco’s immediate operational response was to sharply ramp up its East-West Pipeline—a 750-mile system connecting the eastern oil fields to the Red Sea—to its maximum capacity of 7.0 million barrels per day in Q1 2026 . This was a dramatic increase from the pre-crisis flow of about 2.8 million barrels per day . The pipeline allowed Saudi Arabia to divert roughly 70% of its normal crude production through the Red Sea, according to Aramco’s March 2026 assessment .
However, the bypass had limits. The Oxford Analysis of the crisis noted that “available bypass capacity currently covers less than a third of normal Hormuz throughput” . The lesson was clear: a single pipeline is a valuable but incomplete solution.
On May 11, 2026, during Aramco’s Q1 earnings call, CEO Amin Nasser delivered one of the starkest warnings in the company’s history. He stated that even if the Strait of Hormuz reopened immediately, “it will take a few months for the oil market to rebalance”—and if the disruption continued beyond mid-June, “normalization will last into 2027” . Nasser described the crisis as “the largest energy supply shock the world has ever witnessed” . The global market had already lost about 1 billion barrels of supply during the first months of the crisis .
Despite the disruption—or in part because of soaring oil prices—Aramco reported strong Q1 2026 results. Adjusted net income rose 26% year-over-year to $33.6 billion, beating analyst consensus by $2.4 billion . The company’s Q1 report emphasized that the East-West Pipeline ramp-up, combined with domestic and international storage, provided “additional optionality” during the period, and flagged “strategic investment in critical infrastructure and robust contingency planning” as a priority going forward .
The core lesson Aramco appears to have drawn from the crisis is that domestic storage plus one pipeline bypass is not sufficient for a world where key chokepoints can be closed for months. The company’s emerging strategy is to add larger international storage capacity and reinforce critical infrastructure so it can keep crude moving to customers even when a major chokepoint is disrupted . By positioning storage closer to major demand centers in Asia and beyond, Aramco reduces its exposure to strait-based disruptions and gains the flexibility to pre-position crude far from conflict zones.
The strategic pivot also aligns with broader industry thinking. The Oxford analysis argued that expanding Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and the UAE’s Fujairah corridor “is, at this point, as much a security investment as an infrastructure one” . Aramco’s storage expansion plan reflects the same calculus: in a world of heightened geopolitical risk, resilient infrastructure is the only durable hedge.
| Element | Detail |
|---|---|
| Trigger | Strait of Hormuz disruption exposed vulnerability of a single export chokepoint |
| Immediate response | East-West Pipeline ramped to 7.0 mb/d maximum capacity, diverting to Red Sea |
| Storage gap exposed | Ju’aymah terminal quickly ran out of spare capacity; shipping costs at Yanbu surged to $28M per tanker |
| New strategy | Aramco considering global storage facilities larger than its current base |
| Existing Asian footprint | Japan (Okinawa, Kiire), South Korea (Ulsan), China (Zhoushan); total outside-Kingdom capacity estimated at 30-35 million barrels |
| CEO market warning | Normalization may not occur until 2027 if Hormuz stays closed past mid-June |
| Financial position | Q1 2026 net income $33.6B (+26% YoY), supporting major infrastructure investment |
| Broader lesson | Bypass capacity covers less than 1/3 of normal Hormuz throughput; infrastructure hardening is now a security priority |
Speaking at the FII PRIORITY Europe summit in Rome (June 17–19, 2026), Aramco Chairman Yasir Al-Rumayyan stated: “Aramco has storage facilities around the world, especially in Asia—in Korea and Japan—and we are thinking seriously of having larger storage facilities all over the world” . The move was explicitly framed as a lesson from the Iran war, which “highlighted the critical role of strategic reserves in maintaining the supply of crude oil to clients” . Al-Rumayyan confirmed Aramco is “considering owning global storage facilities larger than its current facilities” .
Aramco’s current international storage is heavily concentrated in Asia, built over more than a decade of bilateral agreements:
The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply, and its effective closure from late February 2026 created an immediate supply chain crisis . Saudi storage sites filled rapidly: Kayrros reported that the Ju’aymah terminal on Saudi Arabia’s east coast “was quickly running out of spare capacity” as of March 1 . Four of six tanks at the Ras Tanura refinery—halted after Iranian attacks—were full . Shipping costs at Yanbu, the Red Sea port, surged to $28 million per tanker as Aramco scrambled to divert oil away from Hormuz .
Aramco’s immediate operational response was to sharply ramp up its East-West Pipeline—a 750-mile system connecting the eastern oil fields to the Red Sea—to its maximum capacity of 7.0 million barrels per day in Q1 2026 . This was a dramatic increase from the pre-crisis flow of about 2.8 million barrels per day . The pipeline allowed Saudi Arabia to divert roughly 70% of its normal crude production through the Red Sea, according to Aramco’s March 2026 assessment .
However, the bypass had limits. The Oxford Analysis of the crisis noted that “available bypass capacity currently covers less than a third of normal Hormuz throughput” . The lesson was clear: a single pipeline is a valuable but incomplete solution.
On May 11, 2026, during Aramco’s Q1 earnings call, CEO Amin Nasser delivered one of the starkest warnings in the company’s history. He stated that even if the Strait of Hormuz reopened immediately, “it will take a few months for the oil market to rebalance”—and if the disruption continued beyond mid-June, “normalization will last into 2027” . Nasser described the crisis as “the largest energy supply shock the world has ever witnessed” . The global market had already lost about 1 billion barrels of supply during the first months of the crisis .
Despite the disruption—or in part because of soaring oil prices—Aramco reported strong Q1 2026 results. Adjusted net income rose 26% year-over-year to $33.6 billion, beating analyst consensus by $2.4 billion . The company’s Q1 report emphasized that the East-West Pipeline ramp-up, combined with domestic and international storage, provided “additional optionality” during the period, and flagged “strategic investment in critical infrastructure and robust contingency planning” as a priority going forward .
The core lesson Aramco appears to have drawn from the crisis is that domestic storage plus one pipeline bypass is not sufficient for a world where key chokepoints can be closed for months. The company’s emerging strategy is to add larger international storage capacity and reinforce critical infrastructure so it can keep crude moving to customers even when a major chokepoint is disrupted . By positioning storage closer to major demand centers in Asia and beyond, Aramco reduces its exposure to strait-based disruptions and gains the flexibility to pre-position crude far from conflict zones.
The strategic pivot also aligns with broader industry thinking. The Oxford analysis argued that expanding Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and the UAE’s Fujairah corridor “is, at this point, as much a security investment as an infrastructure one” . Aramco’s storage expansion plan reflects the same calculus: in a world of heightened geopolitical risk, resilient infrastructure is the only durable hedge.
| Element | Detail |
|---|---|
| Trigger | Strait of Hormuz disruption exposed vulnerability of a single export chokepoint |
| Immediate response | East-West Pipeline ramped to 7.0 mb/d maximum capacity, diverting to Red Sea |
| Storage gap exposed | Ju’aymah terminal quickly ran out of spare capacity; shipping costs at Yanbu surged to $28M per tanker |
| New strategy | Aramco considering global storage facilities larger than its current base |
| Existing Asian footprint | Japan (Okinawa, Kiire), South Korea (Ulsan), China (Zhoushan); total outside-Kingdom capacity estimated at 30-35 million barrels |
| CEO market warning | Normalization may not occur until 2027 if Hormuz stays closed past mid-June |
| Financial position | Q1 2026 net income $33.6B (+26% YoY), supporting major infrastructure investment |
| Broader lesson | Bypass capacity covers less than 1/3 of normal Hormuz throughput; infrastructure hardening is now a security priority |