| Stake | FTX Cost Basis | Sale Price (Actual) | Current Value (If Held) | Missed Upside |
|---|
| Cursor / Anysphere (~5% stake) | $200,000 | $200,000 | ~$3 billion (at SpaceX's $60B acquisition valuation) | ~$2.9998 billion |
| Anthropic (~8% stake) | ~$500 million | ~$1.3 billion | ~$30+ billion (at $380B valuation) | ~$28.7 billion |
| Total | ~$31.7 billion |
In April 2022, Alameda Research — FTX's trading arm — invested $200,000 in Anysphere, the company behind the AI code editor Cursor, securing roughly a 5% stake at a $4 million valuation . One year later, with FTX in bankruptcy, the court-appointed estate sold that stake for exactly the same $200,000 .
In April 2026, Elon Musk's SpaceX announced an agreement to acquire Cursor at a $60 billion valuation . That 5% stake would now be worth approximately $3 billion — a 15,000x return that went to the buyer, not to FTX creditors .
FTX invested approximately $500 million in Anthropic in 2021, acquiring close to an 8% stake in the AI company behind the Claude chatbot . During 2024, the estate sold that holding in two tranches for a combined ~$1.3 billion: about $884 million in March to a consortium including Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth funds, and another $452 million in June .
Anthropic's valuation has since soared to $380 billion after a Series G funding round . At that valuation, the same 8% stake would be worth over $30 billion . The gap between the sale price and the current value is roughly $28.7 billion .
It's easy to call these sales a blunder, but the FTX bankruptcy estate was not free to hold venture positions for higher returns. Several structural constraints pushed toward liquidation.
1. Chapter 11's immediate cash needs. FTX filed for Chapter 11 on November 11, 2022, after a severe liquidity crisis . The estate needed cash immediately to fund bankruptcy operations, professional fees, and eventual creditor distributions — illiquid venture stakes couldn't pay those bills .
2. Fiduciary duty to maximize recoverable value. In a court-supervised Chapter 11 process, the estate's job was to resolve creditor claims, not speculate on early-stage private companies . Holding concentrated, risky positions for uncertain future upside would have been hard to defend to the court and creditors .
3. Concentration and volatility risk. The estate held illiquid, difficult-to-value assets. Bankruptcy courts heard expert testimony about the illiquidity and inherent risk of such holdings in related FTX asset disputes, making rapid monetization more defensible than retaining large undiversified bets .
4. Court and creditor oversight. The Delaware bankruptcy court supervised every major decision, and a creditors' committee participated actively in the proceedings . This structure didn't allow open-ended venture bets — the estate needed court approval to hold rather than sell .
5. No viable holding vehicle. Chapter 11 wind-down is designed to administer claims and distribute value, not operate as a long-term venture capital fund . Distributing private company shares to millions of creditors or maintaining a portfolio for years wasn't practical .
One analysis placed total missed gains from FTX's forced fire sales — including Anthropic, Cursor, and other positions — at over $35 billion . The Cursor and Anthropic stakes alone account for the vast majority of that figure .
While the estate recovered about $1.5 billion from selling these two stakes — more than their original cost — the forgone upside is staggering. For FTX creditors, it's a painful reminder that in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the legal obligation to maximize current recoverable value can come at the expense of future fortune.
| Stake | FTX Cost Basis | Sale Price (Actual) | Current Value (If Held) | Missed Upside |
|---|
| Cursor / Anysphere (~5% stake) | $200,000 | $200,000 | ~$3 billion (at SpaceX's $60B acquisition valuation) | ~$2.9998 billion |
| Anthropic (~8% stake) | ~$500 million | ~$1.3 billion | ~$30+ billion (at $380B valuation) | ~$28.7 billion |
| Total | ~$31.7 billion |
In April 2022, Alameda Research — FTX's trading arm — invested $200,000 in Anysphere, the company behind the AI code editor Cursor, securing roughly a 5% stake at a $4 million valuation . One year later, with FTX in bankruptcy, the court-appointed estate sold that stake for exactly the same $200,000 .
In April 2026, Elon Musk's SpaceX announced an agreement to acquire Cursor at a $60 billion valuation . That 5% stake would now be worth approximately $3 billion — a 15,000x return that went to the buyer, not to FTX creditors .
FTX invested approximately $500 million in Anthropic in 2021, acquiring close to an 8% stake in the AI company behind the Claude chatbot . During 2024, the estate sold that holding in two tranches for a combined ~$1.3 billion: about $884 million in March to a consortium including Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth funds, and another $452 million in June .
Anthropic's valuation has since soared to $380 billion after a Series G funding round . At that valuation, the same 8% stake would be worth over $30 billion . The gap between the sale price and the current value is roughly $28.7 billion .
It's easy to call these sales a blunder, but the FTX bankruptcy estate was not free to hold venture positions for higher returns. Several structural constraints pushed toward liquidation.
1. Chapter 11's immediate cash needs. FTX filed for Chapter 11 on November 11, 2022, after a severe liquidity crisis . The estate needed cash immediately to fund bankruptcy operations, professional fees, and eventual creditor distributions — illiquid venture stakes couldn't pay those bills .
2. Fiduciary duty to maximize recoverable value. In a court-supervised Chapter 11 process, the estate's job was to resolve creditor claims, not speculate on early-stage private companies . Holding concentrated, risky positions for uncertain future upside would have been hard to defend to the court and creditors .
3. Concentration and volatility risk. The estate held illiquid, difficult-to-value assets. Bankruptcy courts heard expert testimony about the illiquidity and inherent risk of such holdings in related FTX asset disputes, making rapid monetization more defensible than retaining large undiversified bets .
4. Court and creditor oversight. The Delaware bankruptcy court supervised every major decision, and a creditors' committee participated actively in the proceedings . This structure didn't allow open-ended venture bets — the estate needed court approval to hold rather than sell .
5. No viable holding vehicle. Chapter 11 wind-down is designed to administer claims and distribute value, not operate as a long-term venture capital fund . Distributing private company shares to millions of creditors or maintaining a portfolio for years wasn't practical .
One analysis placed total missed gains from FTX's forced fire sales — including Anthropic, Cursor, and other positions — at over $35 billion . The Cursor and Anthropic stakes alone account for the vast majority of that figure .
While the estate recovered about $1.5 billion from selling these two stakes — more than their original cost — the forgone upside is staggering. For FTX creditors, it's a painful reminder that in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the legal obligation to maximize current recoverable value can come at the expense of future fortune.