The plan is straightforward but politically explosive. Currently, once a trade deal is concluded with a partner country, it must be translated into all 24 official EU languages before EU governments and the European Parliament can begin their ratification work. This process alone can take several years, delaying market access for European businesses .
Šefčovič wants to skip those translations during the most time-sensitive phases. Under the new approach, only an English-language version would be shared with EU governments and lawmakers for discussion and approval . The full multilingual versions would still be produced before final adoption, but the change would remove the translation bottleneck exactly when speed matters most .
The goal is to shrink the timeline from signature to entry into force to roughly one year, compared with the current average of five years or more . Šefčovič has lamented that the EU simply cannot operate "in this environment with this timetable" when every year of delay means lost trade, lost jobs, and lost strategic opportunities .
The Commission already has two agreements in mind to test the fast-track approach.
India concluded negotiations with the EU on a landmark free trade agreement on January 27, 2026 . Šefčovič has explicitly told EU trade ministers that this deal could serve as a pilot project for the English-only procedure during ratification . The agreement is commercially significant, promising sharp tariff reductions on European exports like wines and automotive products .
Indonesia is the second case. The EU is negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which reached a political breakthrough in July 2025 when Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced a deal . Šefčovič traveled personally to Indonesia in September 2025 to push negotiations toward conclusion, and accelerating the ratification of this agreement remains a stated priority .
Both India and Indonesia are far advanced and represent exactly the kind of deals Šefčovič says the EU must lock in quickly amid global trade fragmentation .
The opposition from Paris and Rome is rooted in constitutional law and political principle.
Constitutional arguments: Both countries insist their national constitutions require international treaties to be published and ratified in their official languages . A French official stated bluntly: "This is a matter of the French Constitution. France cannot be bound by or commit to a text not drafted in French" . Italian officials have cited similar constraints . The French constitution stipulates French as the sole language of the Republic .
Multilingualism principles: The EU's language regime is not merely administrative—it is enshrined in treaty law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights obliges the EU to respect linguistic diversity and prohibits language-based discrimination . Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes the principle of "equal authenticity of texts" across all official languages . Article 342 TFEU requires any change to the language regime to be adopted unanimously by the Council—giving France and Italy an effective veto .
Identity politics: For France especially, the fight goes beyond legal technicalities. Paris frames the proposal as "anglicisation" of EU institutions, an identity threat rather than a mere procedural change . This is not a new battle: France has previously sued the Commission over English-only hiring tests, arguing they discriminate in favor of anglophone candidates . Italy likewise has a history of winning court rulings defending language rights in EU recruitment .
The Trade Commissioner has advanced three main justifications.
Speed is existential: Šefčovič argues the EU has already lost an estimated €300 billion in trade opportunities due to slow ratification of past agreements . Between 2021 and 2025, the EU would reportedly have gained an extra €183 billion in exports and €291 billion in GDP had the Mercosur deal been in force . With US tariffs escalating and global supply chains shifting, the Commissioner insists Europe cannot afford multi-year ratification timelines .
Practical reality: English is already the de facto working language of trade negotiations and the language in which most legal drafting takes place within the Commission . The EU's own academic studies note that the recent EU-Japan trade deal broke precedent by giving priority to the English text, reflecting the language of the negotiations . Šefčovič's proposal essentially aligns the formal process with existing practice .
Trade defense in a tariff war: With the Trump administration imposing heavy tariffs and global trade fragmenting, Šefčovič has prioritized locking in deals with India, Indonesia, Mercosur, and Southeast Asian nations . He has told MEPs that "every year we lose is a year of lost trade, lost jobs and lost economic opportunities" . Faster ratification is portrayed as a strategic necessity, not just an administrative convenience.
Šefčovič claims broad support from EU member states for faster ratification procedures . At an informal trade ministers' meeting in Cyprus on February 20, 2026, he said national governments backed the goal of shortening the timeline to one year . Many countries—especially northern and central European states—favor efficiency gains .
But France's opposition carries disproportionate weight for two reasons. First, French is one of the EU's original treaty languages, and Paris can rally other francophone and southern European states . Italy has already joined the resistance, and Hungary and Poland have shown solidarity with France on other trade issues, such as the Mercosur deal .
Second, any formal change to the EU's language regime requires unanimous support in the Council under Article 342 TFEU . This gives France an effective veto. The Commission could attempt to implement the English-only approach informally—relying on the fact that English already dominates the working level—but a formal legal change would require French acquiescence that currently seems out of reach .
The English-only push is part of a broader Commission strategy to streamline trade policy amid global tariff wars. The Mercosur agreement has faced similar resistance from France, yet the Commission pushed ahead with a qualified majority vote in January 2026 and is now exploring provisional application . That precedent—using legal workarounds to bypass French opposition—may offer a template for the language debate, though the constitutional stakes surrounding treaty language are arguably more fundamental.
What is clear is that the battle over English-only trade agreements is not just about translation logistics. It is a proxy fight over the soul of the EU: a technocratic union optimized for global competitiveness versus a political union built on the equal standing of its member states and their languages.