Šefčovič wants to skip those translations during the most time-sensitive phases. Under the new approach, only an English-language version would be shared with EU governments and lawmakers for discussion and approval . The full multilingual versions would still be produced before final adoption, but the change would remove the translation bottleneck exactly when speed matters most
.
The goal is to shrink the timeline from signature to entry into force to roughly one year, compared with the current average of five years or more . Šefčovič has lamented that the EU simply cannot operate "in this environment with this timetable" when every year of delay means lost trade, lost jobs, and lost strategic opportunities
.
The Commission already has two agreements in mind to test the fast-track approach.
India concluded negotiations with the EU on a landmark free trade agreement on January 27, 2026 . Šefčovič has explicitly told EU trade ministers that this deal could serve as a pilot project for the English-only procedure during ratification
. The agreement is commercially significant, promising sharp tariff reductions on European exports like wines and automotive products
.
Indonesia is the second case. The EU is negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which reached a political breakthrough in July 2025 when Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced a deal . Šefčovič traveled personally to Indonesia in September 2025 to push negotiations toward conclusion, and accelerating the ratification of this agreement remains a stated priority
.
Both India and Indonesia are far advanced and represent exactly the kind of deals Šefčovič says the EU must lock in quickly amid global trade fragmentation .
The opposition from Paris and Rome is rooted in constitutional law and political principle.
Constitutional arguments: Both countries insist their national constitutions require international treaties to be published and ratified in their official languages . A French official stated bluntly: "This is a matter of the French Constitution. France cannot be bound by or commit to a text not drafted in French"
. Italian officials have cited similar constraints
. The French constitution stipulates French as the sole language of the Republic
.
Multilingualism principles: The EU's language regime is not merely administrative—it is enshrined in treaty law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights obliges the EU to respect linguistic diversity and prohibits language-based discrimination . Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes the principle of "equal authenticity of texts" across all official languages
. Article 342 TFEU requires any change to the language regime to be adopted unanimously by the Council—giving France and Italy an effective veto
.
Identity politics: For France especially, the fight goes beyond legal technicalities. Paris frames the proposal as "anglicisation" of EU institutions, an identity threat rather than a mere procedural change . This is not a new battle: France has previously sued the Commission over English-only hiring tests, arguing they discriminate in favor of anglophone candidates
. Italy likewise has a history of winning court rulings defending language rights in EU recruitment
.
The Trade Commissioner has advanced three main justifications.
Speed is existential: Šefčovič argues the EU has already lost an estimated €300 billion in trade opportunities due to slow ratification of past agreements . Between 2021 and 2025, the EU would reportedly have gained an extra €183 billion in exports and €291 billion in GDP had the Mercosur deal been in force
. With US tariffs escalating and global supply chains shifting, the Commissioner insists Europe cannot afford multi-year ratification timelines
.
Practical reality: English is already the de facto working language of trade negotiations and the language in which most legal drafting takes place within the Commission . The EU's own academic studies note that the recent EU-Japan trade deal broke precedent by giving priority to the English text, reflecting the language of the negotiations
. Šefčovič's proposal essentially aligns the formal process with existing practice
.
Trade defense in a tariff war: With the Trump administration imposing heavy tariffs and global trade fragmenting, Šefčovič has prioritized locking in deals with India, Indonesia, Mercosur, and Southeast Asian nations . He has told MEPs that "every year we lose is a year of lost trade, lost jobs and lost economic opportunities"
. Faster ratification is portrayed as a strategic necessity, not just an administrative convenience.
Šefčovič claims broad support from EU member states for faster ratification procedures . At an informal trade ministers' meeting in Cyprus on February 20, 2026, he said national governments backed the goal of shortening the timeline to one year
. Many countries—especially northern and central European states—favor efficiency gains
.
But France's opposition carries disproportionate weight for two reasons. First, French is one of the EU's original treaty languages, and Paris can rally other francophone and southern European states . Italy has already joined the resistance, and Hungary and Poland have shown solidarity with France on other trade issues, such as the Mercosur deal
.
Second, any formal change to the EU's language regime requires unanimous support in the Council under Article 342 TFEU . This gives France an effective veto. The Commission could attempt to implement the English-only approach informally—relying on the fact that English already dominates the working level—but a formal legal change would require French acquiescence that currently seems out of reach
.
The English-only push is part of a broader Commission strategy to streamline trade policy amid global tariff wars. The Mercosur agreement has faced similar resistance from France, yet the Commission pushed ahead with a qualified majority vote in January 2026 and is now exploring provisional application . That precedent—using legal workarounds to bypass French opposition—may offer a template for the language debate, though the constitutional stakes surrounding treaty language are arguably more fundamental.
What is clear is that the battle over English-only trade agreements is not just about translation logistics. It is a proxy fight over the soul of the EU: a technocratic union optimized for global competitiveness versus a political union built on the equal standing of its member states and their languages.