Gulf producers were forced to shut in an estimated 7.5 million barrels per day (b/d) of production in March, rising to 9.1 million b/d in April . Global oil supply crashed by 10.1 million b/d that month
. Brent crude, the international benchmark, rocketed to a peak of $138 per barrel on April 7
.
Sawan's point is that this crisis is a brutal preview, not an anomaly. "Prices are going to move up," he said, describing it as "the story of five to ten years" . The Strait of Hormuz closure simply accelerated a trajectory that supply-and-demand fundamentals had already set in motion
.
While the conflict grabbed headlines, Sawan pointed specifically to sustained global demand as the real long-term driver . The world's appetite for oil isn't fading—it's structurally robust. Even as the EIA's June 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook noted that high prices and government initiatives are expected to curb global oil demand by about 1 million b/d this year, this is a demand destruction response to extreme prices, not a permanent shift
. Sawan's logic is that once prices stabilize—even at elevated levels—underlying demand growth from developing economies and industrial activity will resume.
Perhaps the most striking sentence Sawan uttered was this: "All the easy oil and gas has been found" . It's a blunt acknowledgment of a structural supply problem. The era of giant, low-cost conventional oil fields that gushed with minimal effort is over. New production increasingly comes from complex deepwater projects, unconventionals like shale, or politically unstable regions—all of which carry higher costs and longer lead times. This makes the supply side less elastic and more prone to sustained price pressure.
The depletion cycle is visible in the data. The EIA confirmed that global oil inventories are plummeting—by an average of 8.5 million b/d in some forecast periods . JPMorgan warned in May that stockpiles could hit alarmingly low levels by September if the strait remains closed
. These inventory drains leave the market with razor-thin buffers, meaning any future supply shock—geopolitical or otherwise—will translate into price spikes far more quickly than in the past.
Despite a ceasefire negotiation process that has cooled the most acute panic, Brent crude remains elevated well above Sawan's stated "ideal" stable range of $60–$70/barrel. By early June 2026, Brent was trading around $94–$97/barrel and WTI near $91/barrel . On June 9, Brent briefly dipped to $92.37
. These levels, more than $30 above the top of the "ideal" band, signal that markets are pricing in persistent tightness, not just a transient conflict premium.
The contango and volatility in the futures curve reinforce this. The EIA forecasts Brent to average $89/bbl in Q4 2026 and $79/bbl in 2027—still above Sawan's $70 upper bound . This means even the official U.S. government forecast expects prices to remain structurally higher than what the CEO of one of the world's largest oil companies calls a stable equilibrium.
Shell's first-quarter 2026 earnings underscore the financial reality of this price regime. The company reported adjusted earnings of $6.92 billion—up 24% year-on-year, double the previous quarter, and the highest in two years . The firm explicitly cited gains linked to the Middle East war
. Its chemicals and products division, which includes refining and oil trading, booked $1.93 billion in profit, smashing analyst expectations of $1.24 billion
.
These numbers matter for Sawan's thesis. When a major integrated oil company can generate nearly $7 billion in quarterly profit during a supply crisis, it has less immediate incentive to flood the market with cheap new supply. High prices sustain high cash flows, which in turn support shareholder distributions—Shell raised its dividend by 5% and returned $5.3 billion to shareholders in Q1 . This financial logic reinforces the structural stickiness of elevated prices: the industry's economic signals don't point toward a rapid supply response.
An important counterweight has emerged. The IEA warned in May that global oil demand is now expected to contract by 420,000 b/d year-over-year in 2026—a sharp reversal from pre-war expectations . The EIA's June STEO echoed this, cutting its demand forecast by 1.1 million b/d
. High fuel prices, reduced availability, and government conservation measures, particularly in Asia, are destroying demand at the margin
.
This creates the central tension in Sawan's long-term forecast. If prices stay high enough for long enough, they will eventually cure the demand growth that Sawan cites as his core driver. The EIA itself projects that reduced demand could limit price increases from the Hormuz disruption . Sawan's view appears to be that this demand destruction is temporary and price-induced, while the structural forces of industrialization and population growth in developing nations will reassert themselves once crude stabilizes—even at a higher baseline.
Sawan's forecast frames a world where cheap oil is historical memory, not a baseline to which markets will revert. The Strait of Hormuz may eventually reopen, but the deeper architecture of the oil market—declining conventional reserves, long investment cycles, and resilient demand growth—suggests prices will remain under structural upward pressure. Shell's own strategy reflects this: the company plans to hold oil production flat while investing in liquefied natural gas and renewables, betting that hydrocarbons will remain the backbone of energy for decades .
For consumers, businesses, and policymakers, the implication is clear. The days of $60 oil as a natural equilibrium may be over. The question isn't whether the current crisis will end, but what price level becomes the new normal once it does.
Comments
0 comments