When Chinese officials cite national AI metrics—the world's largest AI patent portfolio, over 6,200 AI companies, and a core industry worth 1.2 trillion yuan—they present these figures not as markers of victory but as evidence of capacity to meaningfully contribute to global AI development .

The Rice Doctrine: 'We Have to Win This Race'

Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has become the most prominent American voice articulating the opposing view. Her arguments, repeated across major addresses and podcasts throughout 2025–2026, establish a clear framework that echoes through official US policy channels.

In a February 2025 address to tech diplomats at the US State Department, Rice was blunt: "We have to win this race" because emerging technologies will define the future of US statecraft . She has consistently developed three core arguments:

• It is a "two-horse race" that a democracy must win: Rice argues that an authoritarian state like China will inevitably suppress information about AI failures, much as it did during the COVID-19 pandemic, creating hidden systemic risks that a democratic system would expose and correct .
• Innovation requires minimal regulation: She has warned that US university budget cuts and state-level regulatory overreach risk ceding the lead to China. Her prescription is for the US to "run hard and fast" rather than rely primarily on export controls .
• The stakes are civilizational: Rice has characterized this as the most important technological arms race in human history, arguing that whoever pioneers AI will define the global order .

The Rice doctrine aligns closely with official US government positions. A December 2025 US Senate hearing on AI concluded bluntly that "America has to beat China in the AI race" as a matter of both economic and national security . That same month, the White House issued an executive order aimed at eliminating state-level AI regulations to maintain US innovation speed .

The Structural Contrasts: Where Policy Diverges Completely

The table below captures the core differences between the two approaches, each supported by primary sources.

The Fog of Competition: Export Controls and the Missing Dialogue

Beneath these grand strategic framings, the operational reality is shaped by Washington's sustained campaign of technology denial. The US has maintained and tightened export controls on advanced AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China throughout 2025–2026 . China has consistently condemned these controls as "attempts to politicize and weaponize trade and tech issues" and argues they destabilize global supply chains .

Chinese foreign ministry spokespeople have repeatedly stated that China remains open to AI cooperation with the US and have noted that AI was discussed at recent US-China leaders' summits . However, despite these statements of openness, no bilateral AI governance framework has been publicly formalized, and a specific, ongoing bilateral AI governance talk track remains unconfirmed in this reporting period .

The question of whether US and Chinese entities are collaboratively advancing large language models or robotics projects remains an area where the available search evidence is insufficient. This represents a significant knowledge gap: if such collaboration exists quietly, it would complicate the dominant 'arms race' narrative.

Two Conferences, Two Visions for the World

As WAIC 2026 opens its doors in Shanghai this July, it will function as much as a diplomatic signal as a technology exhibition. While the US approach treats AI primacy as a national security imperative best secured through denial and speed, China's conference circuit—from WAIC to the Global Developer Pioneers Summit—actively recruits global participation and positions China as the architect of a cooperative AI order . The tension between these two models will define not only market outcomes but the rules, values, and institutions that govern humanity's most powerful technology.

When Chinese officials cite national AI metrics—the world's largest AI patent portfolio, over 6,200 AI companies, and a core industry worth 1.2 trillion yuan—they present these figures not as markers of victory but as evidence of capacity to meaningfully contribute to global AI development .

The Rice Doctrine: 'We Have to Win This Race'

Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has become the most prominent American voice articulating the opposing view. Her arguments, repeated across major addresses and podcasts throughout 2025–2026, establish a clear framework that echoes through official US policy channels.

In a February 2025 address to tech diplomats at the US State Department, Rice was blunt: "We have to win this race" because emerging technologies will define the future of US statecraft . She has consistently developed three core arguments:

• It is a "two-horse race" that a democracy must win: Rice argues that an authoritarian state like China will inevitably suppress information about AI failures, much as it did during the COVID-19 pandemic, creating hidden systemic risks that a democratic system would expose and correct .
• Innovation requires minimal regulation: She has warned that US university budget cuts and state-level regulatory overreach risk ceding the lead to China. Her prescription is for the US to "run hard and fast" rather than rely primarily on export controls .
• The stakes are civilizational: Rice has characterized this as the most important technological arms race in human history, arguing that whoever pioneers AI will define the global order .

The Rice doctrine aligns closely with official US government positions. A December 2025 US Senate hearing on AI concluded bluntly that "America has to beat China in the AI race" as a matter of both economic and national security . That same month, the White House issued an executive order aimed at eliminating state-level AI regulations to maintain US innovation speed .

The Structural Contrasts: Where Policy Diverges Completely

The table below captures the core differences between the two approaches, each supported by primary sources.

The Fog of Competition: Export Controls and the Missing Dialogue

Beneath these grand strategic framings, the operational reality is shaped by Washington's sustained campaign of technology denial. The US has maintained and tightened export controls on advanced AI chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China throughout 2025–2026 . China has consistently condemned these controls as "attempts to politicize and weaponize trade and tech issues" and argues they destabilize global supply chains .

Chinese foreign ministry spokespeople have repeatedly stated that China remains open to AI cooperation with the US and have noted that AI was discussed at recent US-China leaders' summits . However, despite these statements of openness, no bilateral AI governance framework has been publicly formalized, and a specific, ongoing bilateral AI governance talk track remains unconfirmed in this reporting period .

The question of whether US and Chinese entities are collaboratively advancing large language models or robotics projects remains an area where the available search evidence is insufficient. This represents a significant knowledge gap: if such collaboration exists quietly, it would complicate the dominant 'arms race' narrative.

Two Conferences, Two Visions for the World

As WAIC 2026 opens its doors in Shanghai this July, it will function as much as a diplomatic signal as a technology exhibition. While the US approach treats AI primacy as a national security imperative best secured through denial and speed, China's conference circuit—from WAIC to the Global Developer Pioneers Summit—actively recruits global participation and positions China as the architect of a cooperative AI order . The tension between these two models will define not only market outcomes but the rules, values, and institutions that govern humanity's most powerful technology.